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Abstract
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are multi-hop networks that have secured
a significant position in the technological world due to their unique charac-
teristics. These networks are dynamically self-healing, self-organizing, and
self-configurable. They help to realize the future of network connectivity
anywhere and anytime. Moreover, WMNs substantially minimize the com-
plexity in network deployment and maintenance hence reduce the deployment
costs of the networks. A WMN consisting of mesh routers with multiple
network interfaces can significantly improve the performance and aggregate
capacity of the network. While these mesh routers usually have minimal
mobility, mesh clients can be either stationary or mobile. These networks can
provide facilities to enhance the performance of wireless local area networks
(WLANs), metropolitan area networks (WMANs), and ad hoc networks.
Moreover, they can be utilized for a variety of applications such as broad-
band home networking, community networking, transportation systems, and
building automations.
In order to provide multi-hop authentication in WMNs, different schemes
have been proposed over the years. Many of these schemes have certain
limitations. Either the schemes use cryptographic mechanisms which are
computationally complex or assume to have centralized key distribution
and authentication strategies. However, a WMN does not usually have a
centralized trust and being a multi-hop network, does have relay nodes.
Therefore, security solutions in these networks must be computationally
efficient, lightweight, and must handle the additional threats possible from
relay nodes. For instance, WMNs are highly prone to severe security attacks
such as denial of service attacks. This sense of being insecure demotiv-
ates the companies to deploy and provide state-of-the-art wireless services
through WMNs. However, if these security issues are efficiently handled,
these networks have the ability to provide multiple services to their users
concurrently such as online banking, community based file sharing, and live
video streaming etc. Moreover, the nodes in WMNs might have distinct
resources available (e.g. hardware) and undergo distinguishable security
requirements. The ability of WMNs to provide multiple types of network
viii
services and the presence of distinct resources in these networks raise the
importance of having different levels of security services. The customers
using the network services should be able to chose the required security level
based on the their needs (e.g. based on the type of service/application) and
availability of resources.
In this thesis, we try to present the security issues of WMNs in three
dimensions. Firstly, we present a protection mechanism based on neigh-
borhood trust to gain efficient authentication of nodes and identification
privacy in a clustered WMN. Our approach renders a lightweight protection
using hash chains and does not require any trusted authority rather develops
mutual trust among nodes in the network based on communication history.
We then introduce a secure connection establishment scheme based on neigh-
borhood trust. It preserves anonymity of any two communication parties
using a lightweight authentication scheme. In addition, it also offers seamless
and secure connectivity to mobile nodes. Our proposed solution applies
to both mesh and ad hoc networks. Secondly, we propose a requirement-
and resource-friendly security framework established on Merkle trees and
adaptive security service-level association mechanism to provide fast authen-
tication and tunable security association among nodes in WMNs based on the
availability of network resources and application requirements. Finally, we
propose two schemes to mitigate two rather vicious denial of service attacks
known as channel assignment attacks and jellyfish attacks in both wireless
mesh and ad hoc networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“The ignorance of one voter in
a democracy impairs the security
of all.”
- John F. Kennedy (1917-1963)
In this opening chapter, we provide a helicopter view of the thesis as
a whole. We discourse the motivation for our research and delineate the
contributions of this thesis to the area of security in wireless mesh networks.
1.1 Motivation
Communication networks have been playing a vital role in helping people
exchange valuable information with each other wherever and whenever re-
quired. A wide variety of different electronic gadgets and machines such as
laptops, mobile phones, digital cameras, and even automobiles are now able
to converse by utilizing these inspiring networking technologies. Among these
next generation service technologies, one of the key wireless technologies
called wireless mesh networks (WMNs) has emerged recently. A WMN
consists of mesh routers and mesh clients forming a dynamic, self-organized,
and self-healing network. The mesh routers usually have low mobility while
the mesh clients can be highly mobile in these networks. These nodes provide
mesh connectivity and forward packets on behalf of each other, hence behav-
ing as relay nodes. Having these characteristics, WMNs enjoy great benefits
such as low-upfront costs, reliability, and prompt troubleshooting.
Despite all these fringe benefits, one of the greatest challenges in wireless
mesh networks is that they are exposed to a number of hazardous security
vulnerabilities. Although security issues do exist in every type of wireless
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networks, these issues become really critical and vital in WMNs because of
some very strong reasons described in the following points:
 The nature of a WMN is that every (intermediate) node relays or
forwards information on behalf of the other to finally deliver it to
the destination. Due to this very nature, nodes in WMNs require
that the protocols running within these nodes are energy efficient.
This is specially true for those mesh clients which have high mobility.
Therefore, efficient and robust security algorithms running on these
nodes are indispensable.
 Many of the proposed security schemes focus on one-hop communication
and hence do not suffice for a multi-hop network such as WMN.
 WMNs require security at different levels. At wireless access level,
security is required from mesh clients to mesh routers. On the other
hand, security among mesh routers is also needed. While mesh routers
usually belong to a company proving mesh services and mesh clients
can be common end-users, the security mechanism needed within mesh
routers is different from the one required for the access level. These
nodes have different capabilities and resources at their disposal. For
example, a mesh router which is considered to have sufficient power
and usually has a powerful hardware should be able to perform com-
plex computations. These computations, although resource-intensive,
usually produce strong security solutions. In contrast, a mesh client
in a WMN usually possesses limited power and computing resources.
Moreover, end-users enjoying distinct services or applications in WMNs
might also have discrete security requirements. Therefore, an adaptive
security mechanism is needed.
 Additionally, various flavors of recently evolving information and net-
work security attacks harm the networks, leaving them in possibly
catastrophic states. Various types of denial of service (DoS) attacks
can not only partition the network but can also make the network
services unavailable to its users. Few examples of these attacks are
jellyfish attacks, wormhole attacks, and channel assignment attacks. To
cater for these and other attacks in WMNs, efficient security protocols
are required to be implemented in such a way that these protocols not
only provide adequate security but also consume least possible energy.
Computationally complex security solutions might lead to network
congestion and overload the network as well as the nodes themselves.
On the other hand, trying to implement extremely lightweight solutions
for the sake of robustness might result in a vulnerable and insecure
network. In multi-hop networks such as WMNs, it is easier to launch
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attacks such as DoS attacks because of the nature of these networks.
Hence, mitigation of these DoS attacks is indispensable.
1.2 Organization of thesis and summary of
contributions
The next chapter of this thesis introduces the reader to the key technical
details of WMNs. In the beginning of chapter 2, we provide the reader
an acquaintance to the WMN technology itself. Later, the same chapter
focuses on some vital information about the network security issues currently
existing in WMNs. Our main contributions are explained from chapter 3
onwards. They are summarized as follows:
 In chapter 3, we discuss a protection mechanism called NETCLAW
(Neighborhood Trust Based Protection in Clustered Wireless Mesh
Networks) to gain efficient authentication and identification privacy in a
clustered WMN. Our approach provides a computationally lightweight
authentication scheme using hash chains and does not require any
trusted authority. The trust among nodes in the network is rather
developed based on their communication history.
 In chapter 4, we present a secure and anonymity-friendly scheme called
MALMA (Mobility, Anonymity and Lightweight Security in Mesh and
Ad hoc Networks) for wireless ad hoc and mesh networks. MALMA
provides a secure connection establishment mechanism between nodes
of WMNs based on neighborhood trust. In addition, this scheme also
offers seamless secure connectivity to mobile nodes and is applicable
to both mesh and ad hoc networks.
 We then put forward a requirement and resource friendly security
framework for mobile wireless networks established on Merkle trees.
This introduces an adaptive security service-level association mechanism
acronymically known as ASSA to provide fast authentication and
tunable security association based on the availability of resources and
application requirements in WMN. This is explained in chapter 5.
 In order to mitigate the security vulnerabilities, we suggest a secure
channel assignment scheme called PiCAT (Palliating channel assign-
ment assaults using adjustable trust in wireless mesh networks) for
Multi-channel and Multi-radio WMNs (MC-MR-WMNs) in chapter 6.
This scheme mitigates the channel assignment vulnerabilities that exist
in WMNs to achieve the benefits of MC-MR-WMNs.
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 In chapter 7, we introduce a node-monitoring scheme to mitigate
jellyfish attacks in wireless mesh and ad hoc networks called JAM
(Jellyfish Attack Mitigator). These attacks target closed-loop flows
such as TCP that are responsive to network conditions like delay and
packet losses and can easily partition the network. Our proposed
scheme can be used to detect, penalize, and hence mitigate jellyfish
attacks in wireless networks.
 Finally, we present the performance analysis of our proposed approaches
in chapter 8 and then conclude with future directions in chapter 9.
1.3 Publications
Various protection schemes and security mechanisms presented in this thesis
have already been presented and published in the form of research publications
at reputable conferences organized by Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE) and Association of Computing Machinery (ACM). These
research papers consist of the work I have jointly done with my colleague
Dr. Sadeq Ali Makram and students Mr. Qassem Abu Ahmad and Mr.
Shankar Karuppayah at the Department of Computer Science 4, RWTH
Aachen University, Germany. The ideas presented in these publications are
discussed in chapter 3 to chapter 8. The scheme NETCLAW has been
presented in the IEEE sponsored conference known as NGMAST’09 held in
Cardiff, U.K. [120]. MALMA has been introduced in an ACM conference
called Q2SWinet’09 held in Spain [90]. ASSA scheme has been presented in
IEEE LCN 2010 [121] held in Denver, Colorado, USA. The mechanism to
mitigate channel assignment attacks has been introduced in IEEE ICCCN
2010 [88] held in Zurich, Switzerland.
Chapter 2
An Overview of Security in
Wireless Mesh Networks
“Distrust and caution are the
parents of security.”
- Benjamin Franklin (1706- 1790)
In this chapter we first introduce wireless mesh network, its architecture,
and the concept of security in wireless mesh networks briefly. We then
identify the security challenges that currently exist in this area. We begin
our discussion by precisely unveiling the subject of wireless mesh networks
itself.
2.1 Wireless Mesh Networks
The Internet and specially wireless networks are heading towards finding out
faster, simpler, and more efficient ways to get the users connected. WMNs
are one of the key technologies to provide a solution in this perspective.
These networks are dynamic, self-healing, and self-organizing in which the
nodes reflexively set-up and maintain mesh connectivity with each other.
These networks consist of two basic types of mesh networking nodes called
mesh routers and mesh clients. These mesh clients not only function as
hosts but also route information packets. Client nodes such as laptops,
PDAs, and desktop PCs possessing wireless network interface card (NICs)
can communicate directly with mesh routers to keep the users connected
anywhere and anytime. In a WMN, mesh routers are usually static (or have
minimum mobility) while mesh clients are either static or highly mobile.
Mesh routers can be categorized into access, backbone, and gateway mesh
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Figure 2.1: An example of a wireless mesh network
routers. Mesh clients approach a mesh network through access mesh routers
while the mesh backbone is connected to the Internet through gateway
routers. These functionalities can coexist in a single router. Communication
in a wireless mesh network is of multi-hop nature in which nodes behaving
as routers forward packets on behalf of other nodes that are not in the direct
transmission range of their destinations. For detailed technical information,
readers can refer to the IEEE standards. The IEEE 802.11s 1 is a draft
amendment of the IEEE 802.11 which discusses mesh networking. A simple
WMN is shown in Figure 2.1.
2.1.1 Classification of WMNs
In terms of architecture and design, wireless mesh networks can generally
be classified into three groups: infrastructure-less, infrastructure, and hybrid
networks. These are briefly discussed in the following discussion.
 Infrastructure-less mesh networks are one-tier networks in which client
nodes participate in routing architecture and construct the real network.
In addition to routing, network configuration functionality is also
performed by these client nodes which eliminates the need of any
special router. A wireless ad hoc network can be an example of
infrastructure-less mesh networks.
 In contrast to the infrastructure-less mesh, infrastructure mesh net-
works consist of a backbone of mesh routers and are two-tier networks.
This backbone or infrastructure can be built using any of the various
1http://www.ieee802.org/11/
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wireless radio technologies such as the IEEE 802.11. In these networks,
mesh routers perform the routing functionalities and provide access
to the users and clients. They behave as access points for the con-
ventional clients. Usually, mesh routers in these networks use two
levels of communication: backbone communication and users’ (access)
communication.
 Hybrid mesh networks provide combined functionalities of infrastruc-
ture and infrastructure-less networks. In addition to mesh routers,
mesh clients also participate in routing by either connecting to a mesh
router or by meshing with other mesh clients. This property of mesh
clients enhances the coverage of the mesh backbone.
2.1.2 Features of WMNs
The key features of WMNs include robustness, reliability, low-cost, easy
deployment, and maintenance. These reasons make WMNs worthy to in-
tegrate with wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi), cellular networks, sensor networks,
and worldwide inter-operatablity for microwave access (WiMAX) [9]. In the
forthcoming discussion, we highlight some of the notable features of WMNs.
 WMNs provide redundant paths between the source and the destination
of a wireless connection. In this way, these networks are capable to
re-route messages through various available paths, ruling out or at
least reducing to a great extent the possibility of bottlenecks and
single points of failure [54]. This boosts reliability and make networks
robust against node and path failures. Moreover, it also extends the
network operating time in the presence of element failure and network
congestion.
 Until recently, wireless connections to end-users are offered by using
wireless access points (APs). Providing complete coverage spread
throughout a metro-scale area requires excessive number of APs as
the transmission range of these APs is usually very limited. This
increases the infrastructure costs to a great extent since an expensive
cabled connection to the wired Internet backbone is necessary for each
AP. WMNs reduce these costs as mesh nodes require fewer points of
connection to the wired networks using mesh gateways.
 Wireless mesh networks are dynamically self-organized and self-configured.
The nodes (mesh routers and mesh clients) in WMNs maintain network
connections automatically. This makes connectivity among multi-hop
nodes seamless and reliable. When new nodes join a WMN, they auto-
matically discover their neighbor nodes, accessible routers, and possible
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routes to the Internet. The existing routers reorganize themselves
accompanying the newly joined nodes and their routes so that the
networks can be easily expanded.
 WMNs can be used to extend the coverage of wireless networks without
sacrificing the channel capacity. To accomplish this task, WMNs make
use of multi-hop meshing technique which provides higher throughput,
better frequency reuse, and lesser interference among mesh nodes [34].
 Mobility among nodes in WMNs varies from node to node. A mesh
router usually has minimal mobility while mesh clients might have
high mobility. This feature of WMNs distinguishes them from ad hoc
networks.
 Like mobility, requirements of power consumption also vary in WMNs.
Mesh routers do not have strict constraints on power consumption.
However, mesh clients, because of being possibly mobile, may have
high power constraints. This is one of the reasons that the MAC or
routing protocols optimized for mesh routers might not be suitable for
mesh clients.
 Mesh routers can have multiple radios to perform routing and access
functionalities. A mesh router usually handles two types of traffic in
the network. On one hand, it regulates the routing and configuration
traffic with other mesh routers for which it uses separate radio(s). On
the other hand, it also provides dedicated radio(s) access for end users
to access the network.
There are many other features of WMNs. For further details, readers can
refer to the material provided in the references [9, 54].
2.2 Comparison of Wireless Mesh and Ad hoc
Networks
A WMN is usually considered as a special type of wireless ad hoc network.
WMNs can be distinguished from conventional ad hoc networks as follows:
 Mesh routers usually have lesser energy constraints and higher capabil-
ity than the nodes in ad hoc networks and are capable of forwarding
broadband traffic.
 While ad hoc networks are mostly dynamic in nature having frequent
topology changes, WMNs usually have static mesh nodes (routers) with
low or no mobility.
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 Clients in mesh networks use a kind of infrastructure (i.e. mesh
backbone) for routing, while ad hoc clients are generally user-to-user
and are not associated with any kind of infrastructure.
2.3 Applications of WMNs in the Real World
Network engineers and companies may argue whether we really need to have
wireless mesh networks even though similar networks providing wire range
facility such as cellular networks do exist. In order to prove the need and
importance of WMNs, we now discuss some of the applications of these
networks. A WMN can be deployed to render a wide variety of applications.
 Transportation systems: WMNs can be used to provide useful in-
formation services in public transport to develop intelligent transport
systems. These services include passenger information, inter-driver
and driver-station communication, and remote monitoring of vehicle
security videos. High-speed mobile back-haul from a vehicle to the
Internet and mobile mesh networks with the vehicle are needed for this
purpose [9] .
 Metropolitan area networks (MANs): These networks might also be
useful in MANs. WMNs observe relatively higher transmission rate
at the physical-layer than that in any cellular systems, for example, a
rate of 54 Mbps in the IEEE 802.11g standard. Wireless mesh MAN
provides an economical solution to broadband networking, particularly
in underdeveloped regions.
 Enterprise networking: This type of networking can be of any scale. It
can be a small office, a medium-sized company within a building, or
a large-scale network with multiple buildings. Although the standard
IEEE 802.11 wireless networks are still in use at various enterprise
locations, these networks are still isolated and need wired Ethernets for
interconnection. This incurs high costs for these networks. Replacing
access points with mesh routers can eliminate the necessity of Ether-
net wires. Moreover, WMNs can easily expand with the size of the
enterprise.
 Broadband home networking: Similar to enterprise locations, broad-
band home networking is accomplished by using WLANs and the
standard IEEE 802.11 protocol. Home networks using access points
usually have zones with no coverage. Performing site surveys and
installing multiple access points are expensive and impractical. This is
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because the Ethernet wiring from access points to back-haul network
access modem or hub costs too much. Additionally, two end-nodes
located within two different end-points have to pass through the access
hub which is not a feasible and efficient solution.
 Community and neighborhood networking: In most cases, the archi-
tecture used in communities for network access uses cable or DSL
connected to the Internet and at the end-user’s side a wireless router
is connected to any of these two options. Accessing the network in this
way raises many issues.
– All traffic must flow through the Internet which reduces network
resource utilization significantly.
– Some areas in the neighborhood are not covered by wireless ser-
vices.
– Only one single route is usually available between the end user’s
home and the Internet or with neighbors.
WMNs overcome all these limitations by providing flexible mesh con-
nections between homes and communities.
 Building automation: Different electrical devices such as fans, lights,
and air conditioners etc. should be monitored in a building. Usually
wired networks are used for this purpose which are of course expensive.
The replacement of access points for building automation and control
networks with mesh routers will reduce the cost and simplify the
deployment.
 Security surveillance systems: To deploy surveillance systems at public
and private premises such as company buildings, shopping malls, and
grocery stores etc., WMN is a more feasible solution than wired network.
Due to the frequent transfer of images and videos, these systems demand
high network capacity which can be efficiently managed by WMNs.
 Spontaneous and P2P networking: WMNs can also be used for spontan-
eous networking and P2P communications. For example, in emergency
situations like fire burns in buildings and flood relief in rural areas, one
cannot anticipate where the network should be deployed. A WMN can
solve this issue easily and a network can quickly be established.
All these applications demonstrate the importance of WMNs in the real
world. While these networks provide great benefits to the society but because
of their diverse application and properties, they also bring forth security
vulnerabilities which lead to several kinds of severe attacks on these networks.
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2.4 Open Research Challenges in WMNs
The fascinating characteristics of WMNs also put forward many open research
issues and challenges for researchers and companies (deployers or service
providers). These issues can either be design issues in the architecture of
WMNs or in the communication protocols, ranging from the application to
the physical layer [54]. While many research advancements and developments
have been done in this area, many issues still need to be dealt with. This in-
cludes the performance improvement of protocols at different communication
layers, provision of efficient network security, and enhancement of algorithms
for network configuration. The shortcomings or critical issues in WMNs
which still need to be explored are briefly described in the following points
[9, 54]:
 Various technologies and schemes such as reconfigurable radios, fre-
quency agile/cognitive radios, directional and smart antennas, multiple
input multiple output (MIMO) systems, and multi-radio and multichan-
nel systems have been recently presented to improve the capacity of
WMNs. However, efficient protocol designs are still needed to imple-
ment these technologies successfully.
 Network security is another domain in WMN which has to be explored
further. Most of the existing schemes to provide security in WMNs
which are proposed for other wireless networks either show poor per-
formance or are not practical for WMNs. Therefore, it is required
to develop new security algorithms for efficient authentication, strong
encryption, and secure key distribution in WMNs. Moreover, these
schemes should also handle and act against devastating security attacks
such as DoS attacks and other intrusions in these networks.
 WMNs render varying network services to the users– from a simple
file transfer to live multimedia streaming. In order to provide these
services, various performance metrics are necessary to be handled such
as aggregate and per-node fairness, packet loss, delay, and jitter.
 In order to deploy WMNs on a large scale with multiple mesh back-
bones from different service providers, an inter-system authentication
mechanism is needed. This issue should be dealt together with mobility
management schemes. Low latency handover and location management
algorithms are also needed for seamless mobility and quality of service.
 WMNs having very large topologies should not increase the number of
network operations exponentially. Moreover, an increase in the number
of hops between sender and receiver should have the least possible affect
on systems’ performance in order to maintain an adequate fairness
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among the nodes in terms of resources. New protocols at different com-
munication layers (MAC, network, and transport) with least possible
overhead must be designed for improved scalability in WMNs.
In addition to the above-mentioned challenges, there are several other
demands associated with WMNs. For further details, readers are advised to
read reference material [9, 54]. As discussed in chapter 1, this thesis from
here onwards highlights some very important aspects of security in WMNs.
2.5 Security in WMNs
Despite the benefits that can be achieved through wireless mesh networks,
security is always a big concern to their users and administrators. Without
a satisfactory level of security, users are reluctant and lack motivation to use
services provided by WMNs. These networks cannot achieve distinguishable
popularity and success in the technological world unless providing overwhelm-
ing security and reliable services to their users. Security schemes that have
been developed for WLANs1 are not suitable enough to be incorporated in
WMNs as there is no centralized trusted authority in WMNs to distribute
the public key. There are many reasons supporting the fact that new security
protocols and schemes should be developed for WMNs. Some of the very
important reasons are highlighted here.
 WMNs offer multi-hop architecture which raises many more complex
security issues than those existing in other wireless networks that
focus on one-hop communications. This makes the current strategies
inefficient for multi-hop architectures.
 WMNs usually require two levels of security. One level is for wireless
access from mesh clients to mesh routers and the other level is among
mesh routers. As mesh clients are usually users having distinct security
requirements and mesh routers belong to a service provider, the security
mechanisms required at these two levels are also divergent. This
makes handling security in WMNs different from that of other wireless
networks.
 In WMNs, usually there is no centralized trusted authority, so security
is mostly established based on distributed or mutual trust among the
nodes. This makes the security requirements for WMNs dynamic in
nature.
1http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/
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Security in wireless networks can be of two types: information security and
network security. Due to the presence of over-the-air transmission and the
above described security challenges, WMNs like other wireless networks are
vulnerable to various kinds of severe security attacks. Among the various
types of attacks which exist in WMNs, some attacks target only information
security, while the others aim at network security. Nevertheless, attacks
compromising both types of security are also possible. Security attacks in
WMNs can generally be categorized into two classes: passive and active
attacks. Here we briefly explain the most common types of security attacks
that can jeopardize any WMN [30, 9].
2.6.1 Passive Attacks
Attackers in passive attacks are usually hidden and try to tap in the com-
munication channels to get unauthorized data access. In these attacks, the
adversaries, rather than actively injecting or manipulating information, just
listen to the communication of benign nodes for their own benefits. These
types of attacks are usually against data confidentiality. Examples of passive
attacks are passive eavesdropping and traffic analysis.
2.6.1.1 Passive Eavesdropping
This attack is successful when communication between benign nodes is in
plain text (not encrypted). The attackers can simply read all the information
without actively manipulating it. To handle this attack, a strong crypto-
graphic scheme should be used. Unencrypted data can be easily eavesdropped
by tapping the wireless communication. For example, an adversary can tap
information about credit cards, passwords, and other confidential data while
this information is being transmitted over a wireless link.
2.6.1.2 Traffic Analysis
In addition to the contents of data packets, the traffic flowing pattern can
also be beneficial for the adversary. While this is an attack on information
security, it usually does not harm the network security. The traffic analysis
can be done using the following techniques:
 The carrier is sensed at the physical layer and a particular node is
observed for its incoming and outgoing traffic.
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 The headers of frames can be analyzed for routing details and topology
of the network.
 Transmission of packets by a node can be correlated to find the routing
path in addition to the source and destination nodes.
 In a clustered environment, analyzing the traffic of a cluster coordinator
(cluster head) might be useful for the adversary.
2.6.2 Active Attacks
In addition to passive attacks , adversaries can execute even worse type of
attacks categorized as active attacks. In these attacks, the adversary manip-
ulates the communication or operation in the network by forging, altering,
blocking, or re-routing messages. Active attacks not only compromise data
confidentiality, but also affect data integrity. In the latter case, the attacker
by manipulating the communication between the benign nodes, can try for an
unauthorized access to network resources. In this way, it performs malicious
activities that are detectable. Additionally, gratuitousness is also threatening
for wireless networks. This happens when a client or a router node is open
to tampering, alteration, and unauthorized access. These threats should also
be handled by prescribed security schemes. Active attacks can be broadly
categorized into four types:
2.6.2.1 Physical Attacks
This includes damage to hardware, electromagnetic pulse attacks, and micro-
probing etc. Physical attacks against hardware can be a serious issue.
When nodes are unattended and can be physically reached by the adversary,
tampering techniques such as micro-probing, laser cutting, focused ion-beam
manipulation, glitch attacks, and power analysis can be used to attack the
hardware [71]. This tampering can also help in masquerading and attacks.
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack is also a kind of physical attack. It
contains a short-burst of extremely intense electromagnetic energy producing
voltage surges and hence damages electronic devices.
2.6.2.2 Misbehaviors
Nodes may show selfishness to gain unfair shares of resources or deny to pay
for charged services. They may also be selfish by refusing to relay messages
for other nodes. Several selfish nodes showing this behavior may lead to a
DoS attack. Salem et al. [119] discuss various attacks against the charging
schemes in multi-hop networks providing these services:
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 Dishonesty: In multi-hop networks, intermediate nodes are required to
relay the packets to others. Rewarding mechanisms such as ‘paying’
can be designed in this regard. A dishonest node may try to prove that
it was involved in the forwarding but actually it is not.
 Denial of usage: A node may refuse that it has carried out any com-
munication mentioned on the payment bill.
 Piggybacking: Intermediate nodes on the route between a source and
a destination may piggyback their own packets on to the ongoing
communication to avert bill payment.
2.6.2.3 Unauthorized Access
When a node starts communicating in a WMN, it first needs to be au-
thenticated and authorized to join and use services of the network. If
the authorization and authentication mechanisms fail in the process, any
unauthorized node can get access to the network.
2.6.2.4 Message Forgery and Replay Attacks
Attackers can modify the actual message contents maliciously or resend
the acknowledged message. These attacks manipulate the message integrity.
Adversaries can inject forged messages into the network, resulting the network
protocols to malfunction. Even when the message integrity is enforced, the
attacker can replay some authorized messages causing the network protocols
to malfunction.
2.6.2.5 Man-in-the-middle Attack
An adversary can try to reside between mesh clients and mesh routers or
two mesh routers to intercept and manipulate their communication. For
example, an adversary can set up a rogue mesh router to induce other routers
or clients to communicate with it. This vital attack can compromise both
information and network security and can affect any type of nodes (routers
or clients).
2.6.2.6 Denial of Service Attacks
A denial of service (DoS) or distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack
affects the availability of the network services or simply partitions the net-
work. It decreases a network’s ability to perform accurately according to
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its anticipated capacity in a timely manner. DoS attacks can be further
explained based on the following properties [138]:
 Disruptive: It degrades the quality of services provided by the network.
 Malicious: It hinders the network from executing its functionalities.
 Asymmetric: The adversary can disrupt the network on a large scale
by putting just a little effort.
DoS attacks could happen at all the layers in the protocol stack from the
physical to the application layer [56]. Various approaches are used to defend
against DoS attacks at different layers of the protocol. For example, spread
spectrum can be used against jamming (type of DoS attack) and special
measures such as rate limitation can be utilized at the MAC layer. Special
consideration is needed at the network layer for the defense mechanism against
this attack due to the multi-hop routing mechanism in WMN. If a multi-hop
routing scheme is not properly designed, it may introduce unfairness or
starvation in network traffic. This often leads to DoS at some nodes of
the network. Concisely, there is no comprehensive solution to handle DoS
attacks. Therefore, a cross-layer security solution might be required for the
future networks. Launching these attacks involves active participation of the
adversary which affects the communication and therefore can be noticed.
DoS attacks in the network layer are divided into two categories: routing
disruption attacks and resource consumption attacks [59]. In routing disrup-
tion attack, the adversary aims to dysfunction the routing scheme which leads
to the unavailability of its network services. However, the aim of resource
consumption attacks is to unlawfully utilize the network resources such as
bandwidth, computational power, and memory. Some well-known examples
of DoS attacks at different protocol layers are channel jamming, wormhole
attack, hello flooding, Sybil attack, black hole, and gray hole attacks. Here
we briefly define some of these attacks [9, 70].
 Jamming: It attacks the physical layer and targets the network
security. A WMN can easily be brought down by channel jamming. A
malicious device can jam a wireless carrier by transmitting a signal at
that frequency. The strength of this signal is good enough to deteriorate
the signal-to-noise ratio, making the nodes unable to receive data on
that channel.
 Wormhole attack: In this attack, a malicious node receives data
packets at one point and transfers them to the other point of the
2.7 Characteristics and Demands of a Secure WMN 17
network using an out-of-band channel. The second adversary (node)
then replays the received packets. This makes the one-hop neighbors
of the second malicious node falsely believe that the first malicious
node is their one-hop neighbor. In this way, it affects the performance
of various network services such as time synchronization, localization,
and data fusion.
 Hello flooding: A malicious node may broadcast routing or other
information with high transmission power to other nodes in the network
to make them believe that it is their neighbor. When the other nodes
reply to this malicious node, no node exists to receive this packet.
 Sybil attack: An adversary may produce multiple identities of nodes in
the network. This affects the geographic routing protocols. Moreover,
it may also affect the performance of schemes such as misbehavior
detection, data aggregation and fusion, and distributed storage.
 Black hole attack: An adversarial node may drop all packets it is
supposed to forward to other nodes. A successful attack may block all
the communication around the victimized node.
 Gray hole attack: A malicious node may drop selected packets from
the received packets and forward all the others. This makes it difficult
to be detected. This attack is also called selective forwarding attack.
DoS attacks can be brutal for any wireless network and may destroy
them completely. Hence, serious care has to be taken for the defense when
dealing with these attacks. In addition to the above mentioned attacks, there
are many other types of DoS attacks. For further details, please consult the
provided reference [30].
2.7 Characteristics and Demands of a Secure
WMN
Although security schemes that have been proposed for other wireless net-
works are a building block to construct a security framework for WMN, the
special characteristics of WMNs invoke the developers and researchers to
upgrade these schemes or propose new ones for these networks [9]. This
is mainly because of the multi-hop nature of WMNs which makes these
schemes insufficient for WMN security. WMNs differ in architecture from
the IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs and the IEEE 802.16 wireless MANs as
WMNs have added the mesh architecture into the network replacing the
traditional Ethernet connection between APs or base stations. For this
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reason, WMNs have to special security requirements: multi-hop network
security and multi-tier security. Hence, new security schemes must be intro-
duced for mesh networking among mesh routers and clients. In addition, the
security protocols for network access from mesh clients to mesh routers need
improvement. WMNs face both challenges and opportunities when compared
with wireless ad hoc networks. WMNs have their own security needs which
are distinct from other wireless networks. On one hand, mesh routers in
WMNs have minimal mobility, and on the other hand mesh clients can be
highly mobile. Hence, the security schemes formulated for other wireless
networks can be too cumbersome for WMNs. Applying those schemes can
cause unnecessary overhead and too much complexity. Additionally, mesh
routers in the mesh backbone have two types of traffic. First, these routers
serve other routers in the backbone for forwarding and relaying of inform-
ation. Second, these routers also provide wireless services to mesh clients.
Moreover, each mesh node might be connected to a service provider or server
which has its own specific security requirements. For example, a node or an
autonomous network providing live streaming service or traffic might not
require heavy and complex security schemes to be implemented because that
would put an extra overhead on a traffic which is delay intolerant. This
service, on the contrary, would probably require lightweight security scheme
for authenticating paid users of the service specially when the clients are
mobile. On the contrary, a set of nodes connected to an online banking
system would definitely require very strong security schemes and can tolerate
an extra overhead for stiffer security.
After discussing the above arguments, it is obvious that the current
WMNs have twofold requirements. Firstly, these networks desperately require
to implement robust and efficient security mechanisms which can provide
strong but fast authentication of nodes in the network without the need of a
centralized trusted authority. Secondly, these new security protocols should
also be adaptive according to the resources available at the network nodes
and the services they provide. In our work, we present some security schemes
covering these aspects.
In multi-hop wireless networks such as mesh networks, the nodes are
still vulnerable to security threats even after a successful authentication
mechanism is executed. Various kinds of adversaries may launch different
types of attacks on the existing nodes to jeopardize the network. DoS attacks
are among these attacks which target the availability of network services.
The methods of execution, the benefits of launching, and the possible targets
of these attacks may vary greatly. This is one of the many reasons why these
attacks are considered as lethal for computer networks and specially wireless
networks. Although there are many examples of DoS attacks, two of the
very important are channel assignment attacks and jellyfish attacks. These
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attacks are explained in upcoming chapters in this thesis. This work presents
mitigation schemes which successfully handle these two types of DoS attacks.

Chapter 3
Trust Based Protection in
Clustered Mesh Networks
“If you think technology can solve
your security problems, then you
don’t understand the problems
and you don’t understand the
technology.”
- Bruce Schneier (Born 1963)
In the previous chapter, we explained the basic architecture of WMN
and the security issues that make a WMN vulnerable to severe attacks.
In this chapter, we introduce our proposed authentication and protection
scheme called NETCLAW (NEighborhood Trust in CLustered Wireless
Mesh Networks) to provide adequate security and identification privacy
in clustered WMNs. This scheme is based on neighborhood trust, offers
lightweight security using hash chains, and does not require any trusted
authority.
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
WMNs are unquestionably providing real benefits in the field of wireless
communication because of their attractive characteristics of self-organization,
self-configuration, and reliability. However, the property of being a multi-hop
network with intermediate relay nodes puts the level of security in these
networks into high risk. Moreover, the absence of a centralized trusted
mechanism can also jeopardize the security of these networks. Hence, these
networks become extremely vulnerable to intense information disclosure and
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network misuse attacks such as eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks,
and DoS attacks. In addition, malicious nodes or users might also become a
threat. It is therefore required to have an efficient protection mechanism that
can mitigate the severity of these attacks and provide seamless authentication
scheme with least possible overhead.
Although different security schemes and protocols have already been
suggested for WMNs, they usually possess at least one of the following
limitations:
 They perform end-to-end authentication only. Hence, fabricated pack-
ets can merely be rejected at the destination nodes.
 They require a trusted authority (TA) for key distribution and authen-
tication. WMNs do not usually have any centralized trust.
 These keys are required to be distributed before deployment which is
infeasible for dynamically deployed networks such as WMNs.
 Public key encryption is needed for confidentiality which is computa-
tionally complex.
 They consider attacks from outsider nodes. Hence, trusted nodes that
are part of an existing network are assumed to be benign and considered
that they are not behaving maliciously.
We present a security solution for WMNs based on neighborhood trust
which provides hop-by-hop authentication with adequate privacy of nodes.
It does not need any trusted authority and is computationally efficient.
Although this mechanism is specifically designed for WMNs, it can be
modified a little to be used in different types of wireless networks. This is
discussed in the next chapter.
3.2 Existing Work and their Limitations
Redwan et al. [116] analyze the security characteristics of WMNs focusing
on its basic requirements and discuss the various security attacks in WMNs.
Salem et al. [15] have studied three key security challenges that need to
be dealt with in order to mitigate the possible security attacks in WMNs.
They elaborate detection of rogue or corrupted relay nodes, need of having
secure routing scheme, and fair bandwidth sharing mechanisms for these
networks by explaining examples of security attacks. One example given by
Salem et al. [15] considers a corrupt relay in the network while the other
explains DoS attack. Siddiqui et al. [124] also discuss the threats that exist in
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WMNs like signal jamming, sleep deprivation, and imprinting etc. Focusing
on special issues on anonymity and privacy in wireless ad hoc and mesh
networks, few approaches are quite relevant. Rajendran et al. [113] propose
a lightweight but secure anonymous routing mechanism for ad hoc networks.
They make use of the one-way hash function with shared secret key for secure
communication. They assume that the secret key has already been shared
for every pair of the two communicating parties but do not explain the key-
sharing scheme. Li et al. [77] provide an identity-based security (ISA) model
for a WMN. In their solution, a central private key generator (PKG) is usually
needed (normally a gateway router) which distributes the keys and manages
key revocation and removal. This puts a great burden on a single node as the
generation and distribution of keys are wearing tasks. Few other works have
also been proposed to mitigate the issues of anonymous routing and privacy.
Islam et al. [63] propose an anonymous routing strategy between clients and
mesh routers in a WMN. The scheme tries to protect identity disclosure
besides providing security in communication. This proposal does not cater
authentication mechanism for intermediate nodes if the communication is
multi-hop. It also lacks the ability to authenticate a foreign mesh client
(mobile) trying to get access in a foreign (visiting) mesh network. Ren et
al. [117] propose a privacy framework called PEACE. It is an authentication
and key management protocol and uses short group signature variation to
provide user privacy. This scheme depends on public key certificates that
should be provided by an off-line trusted third party.
Inspecting the work done in the area of message authentication and
hash chain based signatures and their usage, Perrig et al. [107] propose
authentication protocol for broadcast communication. It is developed using
hash chains and considering a loose time synchronization between sender
and receivers. Liu et al. [82] present another scheme based on TESLA,
supporting large number of senders for broadcast authentication in sensor
networks. They also propose methods for revocation in case of compromised
senders. Cheung [32] introduces a time-based signature for securing for link
state routing. Torvinen and Ylitalo [133] use hash-chain-based signatures for
mobility and multi-homing signaling in IPv6 networks. Anderson et al. [12]
introduce an interactive protocol called Guy Fawkes protocol that utilizes
delayed secret disclosure for integrity and authentication. For hop-by-hop
authentication, Zhang et al. [142] propose polynomial based cryptography
for packet authentication in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). The solution
is not suitable for decentralized environments as it assumes a central server
to distribute keys to all nodes (single point of failure). Zhu et al. [148]
propose a protocol for hop-by-hop authentication in ad hoc networks. It uses
TESLA to develop trust relationship between nodes while using tokens for
authentication in relaying data packets. Lu and Pooch [83] develop another
system HEAP that is based on [148] and secures data transmission between
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two adjacent routers. It uses pair-wise symmetric keys with modified HMAC
for hop-by-hop authentication. All of these proposals focus on protecting the
network from external attacks by unauthorized nodes, but do not discuss
internal attacks for example, maliciously altered messages or compromised
nodes which were previously trusted. Our proposed mechanism handles both
external and internal attacks.
3.3 Neighborhood Trust in Clustered Mesh
Networks
In this section, we explain our scheme consisting of robust authentication
of nodes and protection of the clustered mesh network from adversaries
through neighborhood based trust. In the beginning, we skim through some
definitions used to describe our model and later explain our model in detail.
3.3.1 Definitions
We consider a typical WMN as shown in Figure 3.1. The mesh gateways
behave in the same way as mesh routers except that these gateways are
directly connected to the Internet by wire. We use some notations to describe
our proposed security model. PKN denotes the public key of a node N,
used for special purposes such as initial handshake or for renewal of security
credentials. We use LHMN to refer to a sequence of hash chain values H0
to Hn. This chain is used for the authentication of the sequence of messages
exchanged by arbitrary nodes M and N . A hash chain is constructed by
repeatedly applying a one-way hash function sequentially to a seed value
H0. Hash chains are used extensively in cryptographic applications such as
one-time passwords, server supported signatures, and micro-payments etc.
H(K,m) is a fast and collision resistant hash function that takes a key (K)
and a message (m) as input and maps this input to a fixed length string
known as digest or checksum of the message. A hash function H for which it
is computationally infeasible to find any two messages m1 and m2 such that
H(m1) = H(m2) is called a strongly collision-free hash function. For detailed
information about hash functions, refer to the work by Lamport [74]. Another
notation LHMN(i) represents the i
th element of the hash chain sequence
while LKMN represents the link key (symmetric) shared between nodes M
and N for message encryption. BHN denotes the broadcast authentication
hash chain used by node N for broadcasting messages to its immediate
neighbors and BKN is the broadcast key for the same node. Similar to the
link hash element, BHN (i) denotes the i
th hash element of broadcast hash
BHN . A message authentication and integrity code (MAC) is included in
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each message for its integrity.
There are some notations associated with clustering as well. Ci represents
the ith cluster in the network. The cluster-head (CH) of Ci is represented by
CHi, set of neighbor clusters by NCi, and set of nodes that belong to Ci by
nCi. The broadcast key for CH i is denoted by CBKN and inter-cluster-head
keys between cluster-heads M and N by ICKMN . These notations are also
shown in Table 3.1. From here onwards, we use a single term node for both
mesh gateways and mesh routers unless stated otherwise.
Figure 3.1: A hierarchical structure of a wireless mesh network
After defining the terms used in model, now we introduce our authentica-
tion and protection mechanism for clustered WMNs. We start our discussion
with some assumptions.
3.3.2 Assumptions
For our proposed model, we have few simple assumptions:
 All mesh routers including gateway routers periodically broadcast their
self-generated public key (PK).
 Every node maintains a table called Neighbors Info Table that consists
of the credentials about its immediate or next-hop neighbor nodes.
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Table 3.1: Notations used in the proposed model NETCLAW
Symbol Definition
PKN Public key of node N
LHMN Link hash sequence of node M for message exchange with N
LKMN Link key for message exchange between nodes M and N
LHM(i) i
th element of link hash sequence (LHMN )
BHN Broadcast hash of node N
BHN(i) i
th element of broadcast hash sequence (BHN )
BKN Broadcast key of node N
CBKN Broadcast key for cluster-head
Ci Cluster i
CHi Cluster-head of i
th cluster
NCHi Set of neighbor cluster-heads of cluster-head i
nCi Set of nodes belonging to cluster i
ICKMN Inter-cluster-head key between cluster-heads M and N
NHN Next-hop node of node N
3.3.3 Phases of the Proposed Scheme
Our proposed scheme is divided into five sequential phases. These are
initial bootstrapping, clustering, inter-cluster key exchange, neighborhood
based trust management, and secure intra/inter-cluster message exchange.
In this subsection, we elaborate these steps further.
3.3.3.1 Initial Network Bootstrapping
For bootstrapping, consider an example as shown in Figure 3.2(a). It is a
modified version of the mechanism explained by Rajendran et al. [113]. As
shown in the figure, there are two nodes X and Y deployed by any service
provider and are directly connected to the Internet by wire. These two
nodes periodically broadcast their self-generated public keys PKX and PKY
respectively. Now the new node, that wants to join the network, makes a
handshake. In this example scenario (Figure 3.2(a)), the procedures to join
the network for nodes A and B are very similar. The only difference is that
the nodes A and B are in the range of different public key broadcasting
nodes (X and Y respectively).
Consider now the case of node A trying to join the network through node
X. When node A is booted within the transmission range of node X, the
following procedure is executed:
1. Node A receives the public key PKX from node X.
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(a) Bootstrapping (b) Initial handshake
Figure 3.2: Network bootstrapping and initial handshake
2. Node A generates its own link hash chain LHAX , a link key LKAX , a
broadcast hash chain BHA, and a broadcast key BKA.
3. Node A then encrypts the last element of its hash chain say LHAn,
the link key LKAX , the last element of broadcast hash BHAn, and
its broadcast key BKA with the public key of node X and sends it to
node X.
4. Node X decrypts the message received from node A and stores the
credentials of node A in its neighbors’ credential information table as
shown in Table 3.2.
5. Node X then generates its own link hash chain LHXA , a broadcast
hash BHX , and a broadcast key BKX .
6. Node X then encrypts the last element of its hash chain LHXn, link
key LKAX , last element of broadcast hash BHXn, and broadcast key
BKX , with the link key LKAX and sends the message with the hash
element LHXn to node A as a response.
7. Node A receives the message from node X, decrypts it using the link
key LKAX , and stores the credentials of node X in its neighbors’
information table.
8. Node A then sends an ACK back to node X using the next available
hash element.
This initial bootstrapping (handshake) is shown in Figure 3.2(b). After
this initial bootstrapping, nodes X and A are connected to each other. The
same procedure is followed by nodes Y and B. Considering that nodes A,
E, and F are immediate neighbors of node X, the entries of the neighbors’
credential information table for node X would be similar to those that are
shown in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Neighbors’ credential information table
Neighbor Node Credentials
A LHAn, LKA, BHAn, BKA
E LHEn, LKE , BHEn, BKE
F LHFn, LKF , BHFn, BKF
After joining the network, nodes A and B start broadcasting their public
keys for other nodes to join and the above-mentioned procedure is repeated.
Another new node C follows the same procedure as nodes A and B did
to join the network and performs initial handshake with either node A or
node B depending on from which node it first gets the public key broadcast
message. After the joining of several mesh routers, the resulting WMN would
look similar to the one shown in Figure 3.1.
3.3.3.2 Clustering
The next phase is called the clustering phase in which all the nodes present
in the network form clusters or each node becomes part of at least one cluster.
After the completion of the initial bootstrapping procedure, clustering is
performed using any of the suitable clustering algorithms which are discussed
by Abbasi et al. [5]. To carry out clustering, each node broadcasts its
messages and sends replies using the hash chain elements (one element with
each message) in reverse order i.e. LHNn, LHN(n−1), ... LHN0 and so on for
authentication. The reason for using the hash elements in reverse order is
the fact that these hash chains are generated by one-way hash functions. So
if any node gets nth element of a hash chain, it cannot predict the (n− 1)th
element, although the vice versa is possible. To encrypt these messages,
every node uses its broadcast key BKN already shared among immediate
neighbors. When the clustering step completes, the mesh network would
appear similar to the one shown in Figure 3.3. Finally, every cluster-head
node N of the clusters generates a cluster-broadcast-key CBKN and sends
it to each of its members using its link key LKNX and next available hash
element LHNi. If any node M among the member nodes does not receive
the key till a certain threshold time T , it generates a key request query to
the CH using its credentials and the cluster-head N replies with a uni-cast
message to the node M with its broadcast key using the appropriate security
credentials (a hash element and a link key).
3.3.3.3 Inter-cluster Key Exchange
From this point onwards, we use Figure 3.3 to describe the phases of our
proposed model. It is assumed that five clusters are connected to each other
3.3 Neighborhood Trust in Clustered Mesh Networks 29
Figure 3.3: A model of a clustered wireless mesh network
through border routers. Moreover, it is also assumed that cluster C5 only
has mesh clients within the cluster without any mesh router. This is the
reason that the cluster-head shown in cluster C5 is also a mesh routing client.
At this point, all the member nodes know the broadcast key as well as the
uni-cast (link) key for the CH. The members of a cluster also got information
about the key credentials of their one-hop neighbors during bootstrapping.
The next step is to exchange inter-cluster-head keys ICKMN which are used
by the CHs of different clusters to communicate with each other. Each
CH requests the neighboring CH to generate an inter-cluster-head key. In
order to make sure that the request is not forged by the intermediate nodes,
the CHs forwards this request to ‘n’ of their randomly-chosen members
and each of these members (immediate neighbors) forwards the request to
its next-hop neighbor till it reaches the destination (neighbor CH). This
limit is to prevent the network from getting exhausted with a lot of request
messages. For example, the request generated by cluster-head node G for
neighboring cluster-head M is forwarded to it using the possible routes shown
in Figure 3.4.
When the request-exchange between two neighbor CHs occurs, the CH
that receives the request earlier generates an inter-cluster-head communica-
tion key ICKMN (symmetric key) and replies, again using the same multiple
routes to the destination. It is assumed that all the routes are independent
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Figure 3.4: Possible routes for inter-cluster key request
and distinct and no two routes pass through a same node. This means that
the reply is sent using the above-mentioned routes in the reverse order (this
must be dealt with at the network layer using appropriate routing algorithm).
Node G waits for time T to receive all the replies from different routes. If any
of the replies does not reach node G, it sends a request query message n times
and then announces the route as dead if it does not get any answer. When
the replies from different paths reach the CH node G, it compares them. If
all the replies are the same, this means that no intermediate node behaved
maliciously and therefore an acknowledgment is sent by the cluster-head
node G to the corresponding cluster-head M with the same multiple replies.
A difference in replies show the possible presence of an adversary so some
preventive actions should be taken which are discussed in the next section.
At this point, all the CHs know the ICKMN keys. The advantage of this
key-exchange is that the CHs can send and control messages to each other by
encrypting the messages using ICKMN key. So in case of the network shown
in Figure 3.3, cluster-heads G, M , R, and U as well as the cluster-head of
C5 can communicate with each other using their mutual inter-cluster-head
key (ICK). To simplify and to limit the information disclosure, only one-hop
neighbor CHs exchange their mutual ICKs. All these messages, of course, use
the security credentials (LHXn and LKX). In our example of Figure 3.3,
cluster-head node G has ICK for cluster-heads M and U . Similarly, cluster-
head node M has ICK for nodes G and R and so on. The ICK requests
generated through multiple routes are shown in Figure 3.4.
3.3.3.4 Neighborhood Based Trust Management
Each node (both CHs and member nodes) maintains a history table about its
immediate next-hop neighbors for a certain period of random (variable) time
T1. This table contains information about the number of frames (request
messages) a node has previously sent using each of its immediate neighbors
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and the number of successful acknowledgments (reply or response messages)
it receives through the same nodes for the successful delivery of those packets.
An example for these types of messages is the ICK request message described
in subsubsection 3.3.3.3.
Table 3.3: Neighbors’ history table
NeighborNode S(lN,M , T ) R(lN,M , T ) PlN,M
C 1000 870 0.130
D 1500 775 0.483
E 850 300 0.647
This table also keeps information about the link quality of each wireless
link. To estimate the link quality, we use the packet loss probability as
explained in our previous work [89]. There are many reasons for packet loss.
These include the hidden terminal problem, interference with nearby nodes,
and physical environment interference (other wireless devices, walls, trees,
weather,. . . , etc.).
For these reasons, each node N counts all sent frames S(lN,M , T ) to each
next-hop neighbor M , and acknowledgment frames received R(lN,M , T ) for
those sent frames on the link lN,M during a specified time interval T . Since
some of the acknowledgment frames of those sent packets during T can be
received successfully at T2 > T , so these acknowledgment frames are counted
till T2 = T + ∆T, where 0 < ∆T < T . The frame loss probability on link
lN,M from the point of view of node N is given by the following equation:
P (loss on lN,M ) = 1−
(
R(lN,M , T )
S(lN,M , T )
)
(3.1)
Every sink node, while sending an encrypted acknowledgment of the frame
received through multiple routes (as discussed in subsubsection 3.3.3.3), also
includes a random nonce with acknowledgments from multiple routes. In
this way, when the source node receives the acknowledgments, it compares
the nonce received from different routes. A dissimilarity among nonces
received in the acknowledgment frames would render the frames erroneous
and unsuccessful. This means any altered message would be considered as
a lost or unsuccessful massage. Each node checks this periodically and so
maintains an approximate error rate based on the loss probability during the
previous few Td time durations. When a node N wants to send a message
to another node, it looks in this history table about the previous behavior
(successful) of its next-hop node NHN . If for a certain period T , the loss
probability becomes higher than the threshold loss probability for that link,
this indicates the corresponding node is possibly showing bad behavior.
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Moreover, after a certain period of random (variable) time T3, the sending
node queries from its other immediate-neighbor nodes except NHN (the node
under investigation), about the behavior of NHN (i.e. they are also NHN ’s
immediate neighbors). These neighbors, based on the available history about
NHN , reply to node N about NHN ’s behavior. This behavior is considered
as bad, good, or excellent depending on the average loss probability in their
history table as Pl1, Pl2, or Pl3 respectively (while Pl1 > Pl2 > Pl3). For
example, if the loss probability for declaring a node as bad for a certain node
N should be greater than 0.64, then according to Table 3.3, node N considers
node E as bad. Node N then informs the other nodes about its decision
with a broadcast message. The selection of the range of loss probabilities is
left to the designed and deployer of the network. This means that grading
a node as good or bad can be adjusted by the network designer according
to the environmental conditions of the network ( e.g. network congestion or
interference etc.). For example, the technique of fuzzy logic can be applied
for this purpose.
3.3.3.5 Secure Intra- and Inter-cluster Message Exchange
This is the last phase of our model. Since our proposed model is based on
clustering, there are two levels of data communication: intra-cluster and
inter-cluster communication. When a new node Z becomes member of the
cluster, the CH delivers the cluster broadcast key to this new node. The
message exchange within the cluster does not need to pass through the CH
if any other route is faster and more reliable. For example in Figure 3.3
member node A can send messages to node C through node B if this
route is faster than through the cluster-head node G. For inter-cluster
communication, the respective CH of each cluster is requested to forward
the messages using the already shared inter-cluster-head keys. Periodically,
possible routes are checked using neighborhood trust mechanism described
in subsubsection 3.3.3.4. For keeping enough node-identification privacy,
each node only knows about its immediate neighbors. In contrast, the CHs
also have information (credentials) about the CHs of neighboring clusters
(two-hops). In this way, network privacy as well as faster message delivery
for the network is ensured.
3.3.4 Renewal of Credentials
After a certain number of message exchanges, credentials such as link-hash
and broadcast-hash for each node expire. For this purpose, a renewal
mechanism is needed. The node whose link-hash elements are about to be
consumed, generates a new hash chain locally. It then sends the last element
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G(CH) A
LHG(0), LKAG < LHGn(new) >
LHA(i), LKAG < ACK >
(a) Link Hash (b) Link Key
Figure 3.5: Renewal of link hash and link key
A
G(CH) B, . . . , F
LHAG(i), LKAG < BKA(new) >
LHGA(i), LKAG < ACK >
BHG(i), CBKG < BKA(new) >
LHXG(i), LKXG < ACK >
Figure 3.6: Renewal of broadcast key
LHNn (final hash-value of the new hash chain) to the receiver, encrypting
it with the shared link-key and using the 0th element (last available) of
the currently used hash chain. The receiving node in turn sends back the
acknowledgment using the next available hash element and encrypts the
message with the link key. This is shown in Figure 3.5(a).
Similarly, the link and the broadcast key of each node with its neighbors
are required to be renewed after a certain period of time (say T3) or when
the keys are compromised. In case of link key renewal, when a node detects
that the link key is compromised or needs to be revoked, it sends a link-
key-revocation message. This message contains a newly generated link key
to the concerned corresponding node encrypted with the receiver’s public
key and the next available hash element for authentication. The receiving
node, after authenticating the message, updates the link key and sends an
acknowledgment using the new link-key. This is shown in Figure 3.5(b). For
broadcast-key renewal, the procedure is the same as of link-key renewal but
the message is sent to the CH. The CH then informs the other members of
the cluster about the node’s renewal of the broadcast key using its cluster
broadcast key CBKN as shown in Figure 3.6.
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3.4 Handling Security Threats and Privacy
This section discusses our provisions for the basic security requirements in
WMNs. It also explains how different internal (i.e. from a node which is
part of the network) and external (i.e. from a node which is not part of
the network) threats besides privacy issues are dealt within our proposed
solution. We briefly describe the types of threats and then discuss how to
deal with them.
3.4.1 Security and Privacy Requirements
In order to observe safe communication in WMNs, certain parameters of
security and privacy should be observed. We now briefly explain how each
of such security parameters is handled in our model.
3.4.1.1 Confidentiality
Information confidentiality is maintained in our scheme using encryption
with the pair-wise link keys LKMN (symmetric) in exchange messages. Only
the two communicating parties (including the valid intermediate nodes) can
read the exchanged information. Regular and on-demand renewal of these
link keys is performed to protect the network from compromised nodes.
3.4.1.2 Integrity
A usual method of message authentication code (MAC) is used with each
message to guarantee message integrity. Here we have used keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code (HMAC or KHMAC). Any change made by
the adversary can be detected at next-hop node or at the receiver’s end
(single-hop destination). Multi-route delivery mechanism (Figure 3.4) is
proposed to ensure message delivery and to detect the altered message or
the possible malicious node in the route.
3.4.1.3 Authenticity
Each node authenticates other corresponding node based on the hash chain
element it receives from the sender node in each message. The current
message received from a particular sender is authenticated by taking hash of
the hash-element associated with that message and then comparing it with
the previous message from the same source. These hash elements cannot be
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generated by the adversary as they are used in reverse order (i.e. from H(n)
to H(0)) as discussed in subsubsection 3.3.3.2.
3.4.1.4 Non-repudiation
Since a sequence of message-exchange from a particular source to a particular
destination node uses a single hash chain (till the chain elements expire), the
sender cannot deny the message with the correct hash element as it is the
only node which knows the correct value of that hash element.
3.4.1.5 Authorization
Authorization in our approach is based on trusted neighbors. A node is given
access rights by other nodes based on its reputation and behavior among its
immediate neighbors.
3.4.1.6 Anonymity
A certain level of anonymity is maintained by constructing the network in
such a way that only immediate neighbors know about each other. But
this anonymity becomes available at the cost of increased processing at
intermediate nodes provided the message has to travel through multiple
hops.
3.4.2 Principal Attacks and Privacy Protection
Various kind of adversary attacks are possible in a WMN. Our proposed
mechanism detects and mitigates few of these severe attacks by using the
neighborhood trust relationship. This is described in the following discussion.
3.4.2.1 Impersonation Attacks
In this kind of attacks, an adversary impersonates a trusted node that is
already part of the network. It can spread false information into the network.
Moreover, malicious nodes may join the network and start communicating
like a trusted node and may harm other nodes or information that belong to
the network. To extenuate this issue, a modified hash chain mechanism is
used through which each node is authenticated. This mechanism not only
authenticates the node but also provides functionality of non-repudiation as
the adversary cannot guess the next element LHMN(i−1) of the hash sequence
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(in reverse order) using the current element LHMN(i). Also, if the adversary
tries to forge the message, it is detected at the receiver using the message
authentication code (MAC) used.
3.4.2.2 Attack on Location Disclosure
Using this attack, an attacker can get information about the location of nodes
within the network and can possibly know how the network is structured.
This attack is mitigated by restricting the availability of credentials of each
node to its immediate neighbors only.
3.4.2.3 Denial of Service Attacks
In our model, if an adversary or compromised node continuously drops
the packets sent by any goodnode, then the neighborhood trust mechanism
detects this problem, informs the next-hop neighbors about that through
uni-cast messages, declares the node as blacklisted, and stops forwarding
messages through this node.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, a protected neighborhood-based trust mechanism in clustered
wireless mesh networks has been proposed. The performance analysis of our
model is presented in chapter 8. Our approach is secure, robust, and does
not require a trusted authority. However, this scheme has two limitations.
Firstly, it is restricted to clustered WMNs and secondly it does not cater for
nodes’ mobility. In the next chapter, we provide a scheme to handle these
limitations.
Chapter 4
Secure Mobility and
Connection Establishment
“The only truly secure system is
the one that is powered off, cast
in a block of concrete and sealed
in a lead-lined room with armed
guards.”
- Gene Spafford (Born 1956)
In the previous chapter, we introduced a scheme for trust-based security
in WMNs. That scheme is restricted to clustered WMNs and does not
consider the mobility aspect of mesh nodes. In this chapter, we propose an-
other mechanism known as MALMA (Mobility, Anonymity, and Lightweight
Security in Wireless Ad hoc and Mesh Networks) which is a generalized
trust-based security solution for both wireless mesh and ad hoc networks.
Moreover, this mechanism can be applicable to any topology (not restricted
to clustered topology) and accommodates the seamless security of mobile
nodes (usually clients) in wireless networks. Consequently, it provides a
seamless secure connection establishment between source and destination
nodes having multi-hop relay nodes between them. It also mitigates some ser-
ious denial of service (DoS) attacks such as packet dropping and misrouting
attacks in both types of networks.
4.1 Existing Solutions and their Limitations
Focusing on the special issues of anonymity and privacy in wireless ad hoc
and mesh networks, few schemes are quite relevant to our proposed approach.
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Rajendran et al. [113] propose a lightweight but secure anonymous routing
mechanism for ad hoc networks. They have made use of a one-way hash
function with a shared secret key for secure communication. Although their
proposal is efficient as it does not use complex public key cryptography, it
still has a limitation. They assume that the secret key has already been
shared for every pair of the two communicating parties which in reality is a
very strict assumption for WMNs.
Li et al. [77] provide an identity-based security model for WMNs. The
advantage of this type of architecture is to get rid of the certificate-based-
public-key distribution mechanism which is common in public key infra-
structure (PKI) based schemes. The problem is that a central private key
generator (PKG) is usually needed (normally within a gateway router) which
distributes the keys and manages key revocation and removal. This overloads
a single node as the generation and distribution of keys is computationally a
complex task.
Scrutinizing the work done in the area of message authentication and
hash-chain-based signatures and their usage, Cheung [32] introduce a time-
based signature for securing link-state routing. Perrig et al. [107] propose
an authentication protocol for broadcast communication. It is developed
considering hash chains and a loose time synchronization between sender
and receivers. Liu et al. [82] present another scheme based on µTESLA
supporting large number of senders for broadcast-authentication in wireless
sensor networks. They also propose methods for revocation in case of
compromised senders. Martignon et al. [92] provide a security architecture
called MobiSEC for WMNs. This architecture requires a central server
and is not a good choice because of the issue of a single point of failure.
Regarding the secure mobility management of nodes, Nikander et al. [103]
discuss a mechanism for security in multi-homing and mobility of end-hosts
using Host Identity Payload (HIP). Their proposed scheme is not a generic
application-level end-to-end security solution.
4.2 Definitions
To describe our model in detail, first some acronyms and notations need to
be discussed. A brief description about the notations used in this chapter is
provided in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Notations in our proposed model MALMA
Symbol Definition
PKn Public key of node n
Hn A sequence of hash values for node n
(Hash Chain from H0 to HK)
BHjn | BHjn ∈ {H0, . . . ,Hk} Broadcast authentication
hash element by node n
LHjnm jth element of the hash chain sequence
of link hash
BKn Broadcast key (symmetric) between node n
and its one-hop neighbors
LKnm Link key (symmetric) shared between
nodes n and m
CKsd Connection key from source s
to destination node d
H(CKsd) Hash of the connection key CKsd
4.3 Description of the System Model
In this section, we explain our proposed system. It consists of three phases:
initial bootstrapping and key distribution phase, connection establishment
phase, and secure data communication phase. All three phases are discussed
below.
4.3.1 Initial Bootstrapping and Key Distribution Phase
For bootstrapping, we consider an example as shown in Figure 4.1. Our
method of bootstrapping is a modified version of the mechanism explained
in [113]. As shown in the figure, there are two nodes (gateways) x and y
deployed by any service provider and are directly connected to the Internet
by a guided medium (wire). These two nodes periodically broadcast their
self-generated public keys PKx and PKy respectively.
Now we explain how a new node, that wants to join the network, makes
a handshake. Consider now the case of node a trying to join the network
through node x, where node a is in the range of node x. The following
procedure takes place:
1. Node a receives the public key PKx from x.
2. Node a generates its own link hash chain LHax, a link key LKax, a
broadcast hash chain BHa, and a broadcast key BKa.
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Figure 4.1: Initial network bootstrapping
3. Node a then encrypts the last element of its hash chain say LHkax,
the link key LKax, the last element of broadcast hash BH
k
a , and its
broadcast key BKa with the public key of node x and sends it to node
x.
4. Node x decrypts the message received from node a and stores the
credentials of node a in its neighbors’ credential information table.
5. Node x then generates its own link hash chain LHxa, a broadcast hash
BHx, and a broadcast key BKx.
6. Node x then encrypts the last element of its hash chain say LHkxa, link
key LKax, last element of broadcast hash BH
k
x , and broadcast key
BKx, with the link key LKax and sends the message to node a as a
response.
7. Node a receives the message from node x, decrypts it using the link key
LKax, and stores the credentials of node x in its neighbors’ information
table.
8. Node a then sends an ACK back to node x using the last available
hash element LHkax.
After this initial bootstrapping, nodes a and x are connected to each other.
Link hash elements will be used in reverse order (from LHkax to LH
0
ax) to
authenticate the messages sent from node a to x. The same procedure is
followed by all nodes in the networks.
4.3.2 Connection Establishment Phase
In this phase, we show how a connection is established from a source node s
that wants to transmit data to a destination node d in a wireless network.
These nodes have already exchanged their link keys and hash elements as
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s
i ∈ INsd d
BHs, Broadcast < PKs >
LHis, LKis < H(CKsd) >,
PKs < CKsd >
BHi, Broadcast < PKs >
LHdi, LKdi < H(CKsd) >,
PKs < CKsd >
Figure 4.2: Connection establishment
described in subsection 4.3.1. This set of nodes in the network is shown
in Figure 4.3. Source node s requests for a connection using its public key
PKs which is relayed by the set of intermediate nodes INsd till it reaches the
required destination node d by using respective broadcast hash values BHs
and BHi and all possible routes. The destination d generates a connection
key CKsd and its hash H(CKsd). It then encrypts the connection key CKsd
with its public key PKs. Then it replies back to the source encrypting the
CKsd and H(CKsd) values with the link key of next hop through the same
set of intermediate nodes INsd. During the transmission of this reply, each
intermediate node extracts the hash of connection key H(CKsd) decrypting
the message with its link key and saves it in a table corresponding to the
node from which it has received this value.
The intermediate nodes cannot decrypt the connection key as it is encryp-
ted with the public key PKs of node s. The reply message finally reaches the
node s which decrypts it to extract the H(CKsd) and CKsd values and saves
them. The same mechanism is used by node d to request s for a connection
key CKds for the reverse path. Now all the intermediate nodes have the
hash value H(CKsd) and a connection (route) Pathsd is established between
source and destination using the connection key and its hash.
The idea here is to inform all the intermediate nodes i ∈ Pathsd about
H(CKsd) so that when they receive a packet for this path, they just forward
it to the next-hop in Pathsd.
An example of a set of nodes for such a connection establishment is shown
in Figure 4.3.
4.3.3 Secure Data Communication Phase
In secure data communication phase, the established connection, as described
in subsection 4.3.2, is used by the nodes s and d to have secure data transmis-
sion between each other. This communication is shown in Figure 4.4. The
source s encrypts the data with connection key CKsd. It then encrypts the
H(CKsd) with the next hop node’s link key LKsi and sends these two values
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CKsd,H(CKsd)
cf
a
H(CKsd)
b
H(CKsd)
d
CKsd,H(CKsd)
Figure 4.3: Example of connection establishment
d i E Pathsd 
s 
LHli , LKsi < H(CKsd ) >, LHid , LKid < H(CKsd ) >, CKsd < data> CKsd < data> 
• LH~i' CKsd < ACK > LHfs, CKsd < ACK > 
Figure 4.4: Secure data communication
together with the next available hash element LHjsi to the next hop node i
which is one of the intermediate nodes i ∈ Pathsd. This intermediate node i
decrypts the incoming encrypted value of H(CKsd) and compares it with the
hash value that it has previously received during connection establishment
phase.
After this comparison, node i looks into its table about the node that
sent this hash to node i during connection establishment. It then forwards
the packet to that next hop node by using the appropriate link hash and link
key. Finally, this data packet will reach the destination node d which verifies
the H(CKsd) value and then decrypts the data using the connection key. It
then sends the acknowledgment encrypted with the reverse connection key
CKds back to source s using the appropriate link hash.
4.4 Mobility Management
In this section, we explain how our scheme reacts to mobility of nodes.
Consider a scenario of six nodes connected together as shown in Figure 4.5.
Suppose node s is a mobile node currently connected to node a. After a while,
it moves in the direction of node f but it is unknown to node f . During this
movement, node a sends the connection-key hash H(CKsd) to all its next
hop neighbors using its broadcast key BKa and broadcast hash BH
j
a. With
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Figure 4.5: Seamless and secure mobility
this message, it also sends its link key LKsa to the next-hop neighbors of
node s and the recent link hash element LHjsa. Node f can then authenticate
node s. So the first data message of the type shown in Figure 4.4 from node
s to node f will be encrypted with link key LKsa and with next available
link hash element LHj−1sa from node s.
Node a also informs f about the next-hop node i.e. node b which was
used by node a for this connection. Once node f authenticates node s
using the credentials of node a, it immediately updates node s with its
new link hash element LHfs and link key LKfs using the method described
in subsection 4.3.1. In this way, node s seamlessly moves (makes a new
connection) from node a to node f without being disconnected and without
using complex authentication messages.
4.5 Renewal of Security Credentials
After a certain number of message exchanges, credentials like link hash
and broadcast hash for each node will expire. For this purpose, a renewal
mechanism is needed. The node (mesh router or client), whose link hash
elements are about to be consumed, generates a new hash chain locally. It
then sends the last hash element LHkn to the receiving node, encrypting it
with the link key and using the jth element of the currently used hash chain.
The receiving node in turn sends back an acknowledgment using the next
available hash element and encrypts the message with the link key. This is
shown in Figure 4.6(a).
Similarly, the link and the broadcast key of each node with its neighbors
are required to be renewed after a certain period of time (say T1) or when
the keys are compromised. In case of a link key renewal, a node sends a
link-key revocation message containing a newly generated link key to the
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. k LH~a' LKax < new LHxa > 
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(a) Renewal of link hash (b) Renewal of link key
Figure 4.6: Renewal of link hash and link key
corresponding node encrypted with the receiver’s public key and the next
available hash element for authentication. The receiving node after authen-
ticating the message, updates the link key and sends an acknowledgment
using the new link key. This exchange of messages is shown in Figure 4.6(b).
For broadcast key renewal, the procedure is the same as of link key renewal
but the message is sent to all the immediate next hop neighbors.
4.6 Monitoring the Behavior of Nodes
In order to continuously monitor a node for its behavior, we have proposed a
neighborhood based trust management in our model which we explain in this
section. Each node in the wireless network maintains a history table about
its immediate next-hop neighbors for a certain period of random (variable)
time T . This table has information about the number of frames (request
messages) a node has previously sent to each of its immediate neighbors and
the number of successful acknowledgments (reply or response messages) it
receives through the same nodes for the successful delivery of those packets.
Similar to the description in chapter 3, each node n counts all sent
frames S(ln,m, T ) to each next-hop neighbor m, and acknowledgment frames
received R(ln,m, T ) for those sent frames on the link ln,m during a specified
time interval T . The frame loss probability on link ln,m from the point of
view of view of node n is given by:
Pln,m = 1−
(
R(ln,m, T )
S(ln,m, T )
)
(4.1)
This includes the probability of the dropped packets due to interference
or other reasons. If for a certain period T , the loss probability becomes
much higher than the threshold loss probability Plths observed through
history or previous experience for that link (Pln,m > Plths) under normal
conditions, then that next hop node m is possibly compromised. Moreover,
after a certain period of random (variable) time T3, the sending node n
4.7 Security against Attacks 45
queries from its other immediate neighbor nodes (Nn ∩Nm) besides the node
under investigation, about the behavior of m. These neighbors, based on
the history they have about their neighbors, reply to the node n, about m’s
behavior as bad, good, or excellent according to the loss probability. If most
of these neighbors (Nn ∩ Nm) declare that node m is a bad node, then n
stops forwarding messages through this node and selects another good node.
To check whether the first next-hop node m is really forwarding the frames
from n to the second next-hop node in a path (Pathnd) between source n
and destination d in this case, every hop in Pathnd sends an encrypted
acknowledgment of all frames received during a random time T through
multiple routes to the source node n. In this way, when the source node n
receives these acknowledgments, it compares the nonce received from different
routes and a dissimilarity between the received nonce and the nonces in
the other acknowledgment frames would render the frame as erroneous and
unsuccessful. Based on this information, n will decide whether there is a
malicious node in the path or not. For simplicity, in case of detection of a
malicious node in Pathnd, n selects another path.
4.7 Security against Attacks
This section discusses various kind of adversary attacks that are possible
in wireless networks and privacy issues that are dealt with in our proposed
solution. Our proposed mechanism detects and mitigates these severe attacks
by using user privacy and anonymity of network nodes. A few of them have
already been discussed in chapter 3. A few more are discussed below.
4.7.1 Active Eavesdropping or Packet Alteration
With each transfer of control and data messages, the link key and link hash
(which are both unknown to adversary) with a complete message hash and
message sequence number are sent to each next-hop neighbor. Any alteration
of the message is immediately detected at the next receiving node of that
message.
4.7.2 Packet Drop Attack
Packet drop attack is mitigated in our solution by using the trust based
neighborhood mechanism. Every node, while monitoring its immediate
neighbors using the mechanism described in section 4.6, identifies the
dropping of packets or ignoring of the request and reply packets based on
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Figure 4.7: Malicious rerouting attack
the given criteria. This misbehavior of node is immediately notified to the
neighbors.
4.7.3 Malicious Packet Re-routing Attack
This attack is depicted in Figure 4.7. Here, we consider that node s wants to
send some data to node d as shown in Figure 4.4. However, the intermediate
node a acts as a compromised node or an attacker and maliciously re-routes
the data packet to node c by using the hashed connection key H(CKsc)
of another pre-established connection between a and c. Node c treats the
incoming data packet depending on how node a has manipulated the data
packet. If a alters only the connection key H(CKsd) to H(CKsc) then node
c, using the sequence number in the encrypted data field, knows that this
packet is not for it and based on neighborhood trust management informs its
neighbors about node a’s malicious forwarding. On the other hand, if node a
alters the whole packet c notifies the neighbor about node a when queried.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, a lightweight and mobility- and anonymity- friendly model
has been proposed to secure wireless ad hoc and mesh networks. This
model provides a communication between source and destination nodes
by establishing a secure connection with low overhead and computational
delay. The intermediate nodes (for this connection) do not require to encrypt
or decrypt data packets completely which makes the approach efficient.
Moreover, it also provides secure seamless mobility of nodes without requiring
re-authentication and new connection establishment. In addition, it also
mitigates malicious DoS attacks (e.g. packet dropping and false packet
routing) by using neighborhood trust approach. The performance of our
scheme is analyzed in chapter 8. As a succeeding work, researchers can
focus on the seamless authentication of mobile nodes that belong to different
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domains or networks.

Chapter 5
Adaptive Security
Association in Mesh
Networks
“If you want total security, go to
prison. There you’re fed, clothed,
given medical care and so on.
The only thing lacking ... is
freedom.”
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
(1890-1969)
State-of-the-art wireless networks such as mesh networks and ad hoc net-
works can consist of various types of network nodes such as mesh routers, sta-
tionary and mobile routing, and non-routing clients. Each type of nodes can
have its own security requirements depending on the available resources and
network services or applications it provides or uses. In the previous chapters,
we introduced lightweight security mechanisms based on neighborhood trust
for WMNs. This chapter presents a requirement- and resource-friendly se-
curity framework for wireless mesh networks established on Merkle hash
trees (MHTs) and puts forward an adaptive security service-level association
mechanism to provide fast authentication and tunable security association for
nodes in these networks. The nodes in WMNs might have distinct resources
available (e.g. hardware) and undergo distinguishable security requirements.
The ability of WMNs to provide multiple types of network services and
the presence of distinct resources in these networks raise the importance of
having different levels of security services. The customers using the network
services should be able to chose the required security level based on the
their needs (e.g. based on the type of service/application) and availability of
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resources. Although our proposed framework can be used for any type of
wireless network, we explain it using the example of WMNs.
5.1 Introduction
Mobile Wireless Networks have emerged as one of the very significant tech-
nologies to dominate the world of wireless networking for years to come.
They provide seamless, adaptive, and flexible network connectivity to net-
work nodes anywhere and anytime [9]. Mobile networks, while rendering
variety of benefits also bring forth some staggeringly inevitable and vulner-
able security issues because of their very features. The features such as
dynamic deployment and increased mobility put forward the demand of a
Distributed and Dynamic Trusted Authority (DTA) to efficiently authenticate
these mobile nodes. Moreover, they invoke the need of a resource-adaptive
security mechanism for these nodes to communicate. This mechanism can
play a vital role in mobile wireless networks, as mobile nodes mostly have
restrained resources (battery power, memory, and processing power etc.).
Now we present a robust and efficient authentication method based on MHTs
combined with resource adaptive security model (ASSA) in WMNs. Our
solution is described for WMNs in particular, however, it is also applicable
to all mobile wireless networks in general.
As one of the efficient authentication mechanisms, authentication method
using MHTs has been widely discussed by researchers. Du et al. [44] suggest
authentication of nodes using MHTs in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). A
MHT is constructed by binding a sensor’s ID with its public key and the root
of this tree is registered by every node. Zhao et al. [145] propose a method
to dynamically construct a MHT to verify the privileges of a mobile sink in a
WSN. Moreover, Kondratieva et al. [72] present an optimal MHT structure
for authentication of public keys that minimizes the amount of authentication
information transmitted between sensor nodes. Although these proposals
provide fast authentication, none of them considers offering security services
to the nodes matching their requirements and resource limitations. In the
next section, we present our proposed model which provides a solution for
this problem.
5.2 System Model
In this section, we describe the system model considering a DTA. We consider
a network as shown in Figure 5.1 with three gateways namely GWA, GWB,
and GWC , each securely connected to a DTA in the network. We assume that
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Table 5.1: Notations used in our ASSA model
Symbol Meaning
X Any network node X (in block letters/alphabets)
x Any node x in a Merkle hash tree (MHT) (small letters/alphabets)
IDX Unique identity of any node X
GWX Gateway node X
xlt/xrt Left/Right child of node x in MHT
a0, a1, a2, ...a2H−1 Authentication pre-images or token keys(random values)
h(ai) Hash of i
th authentication pre-image or token
xj [k] k
thnode of jthheight in Merkle tree
m(X→Y ) A message from X to Y
PWX Password possessed by X for initial authentication
PKX Public key of node X
SKXY Symmetric key between any two nodes X and Y
Apath(X→Y ) Authentication path in MHT used by X to authenticate itself to Y
EPKY /ESKXY Encrypting a message with PKY /SKXY
there are two types of nodes in our network namely proprietary and private
nodes. Proprietary nodes are the nodes that belong to any service providing
company and are already registered with DTA. Private nodes are the property
of commons and do not belong to any organization (e.g. a private router or
laptop with or without routing abilities). Each of the proprietary nodes (say
N) is issued a unique identity IDN and a digital certificate signed by DTA
for initial authentication within the network. For these proprietary nodes, we
assume that an initial association using MHT credentials, similar to the one
shown in section 5.5, is executed at the time of its registration. Later on, they
can change the security service level by executing a new handshake. We start
our discussion considering that only gateways DTAA, DTAB, and DTAC
(directly connected with trusted authorities) are present in the networks.
The notations used throughout this chapter are shown in Table 5.1. For fast
authentication of new nodes, our framework uses Merkle hash trees [94]. A
MHT is constructed using computed values based on hash functions and
assumed to be resistant to attacks by quantum computers. It is one of the
most interesting post-quantum signature schemes and its security can be
reduced to the collision resistance of the used hash functions [37]. The best
known quantum algorithm to detect collisions of hash functions achieves only
a square root speed-up compared to the birthday attack [48]. The reason for
using MHT is that hash functions use algorithms that are computationally
cheaper than symmetric and public key algorithms [132, 16].
5.2.1 Construction of a Merkle Hash Tree
A MHT (T ) is a complete binary tree of nodes constructed from a set of
hashed tokens or keys and each of its internal nodes is a hash of the left
(xlt) and right (xrt) child of that node. A MHT of height H ≥ 2 has 2H
leaves and 2H − 1 interior nodes (including root). The height of a MHT is
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Figure 5.1: A WMN with distributed trusted authorities
3
22
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 00
Figure 5.2: A Merkle hash tree of height ‘H’=3
the length of the path from the root to the leaves in the tree. An example
of a MHT with height H = 3 is shown in Figure 5.2. The values shown in
squares at the bottom of the tree (a0, a1, a2, ...a2H−1) represent the tokens
keys or pre-images that can be hashed to compute the values of the leaves
and serve for authentication. We call them authentication keys. Each leaf
node contains the hash of a single authentication key. We represent each
node in the tree with the notation xj [k], where j represents level of the node
in the tree and k represents position of the node with number increasing
from left to right. These two parameters (i.e. j and k) together show the
location of the node in the tree. For example, in the figure, x1[3] represents
the node located at level 1 and is the 4th node in sequence from left to right
(x1[0] being the first node). For every authentication key ai, h(ai) is the
hashed value of ai. Additionally, each internal node of the tree possesses
a hash value which is calculated by applying a hash function on the hash
values of its left (xlt) and right (xrt) children concatenated together. The
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same applies for the root node. Precisely, nodes in a MHT can be denoted by
xj [k], 0 ≤ k < 2H−j , where j ∈ {0, 1, ...,H} is the height of the node. Then
the digest or hash of each node is calculated as follows.
For leaves:
xj [k] = h
(
ak
)
, j = 0 and 0 ≤ k < 2H
For Internal Nodes:
xj [k] = h(xj−1[2k] ‖ xj−1[2k + 1])
where 1 ≤ j ≤ H, 0 ≤ k < 2H−j
The symbol ‖ represents concatenation of two values. By applying these
hash functions recursively moving from leaves upwards to the root, a MHT
of height H is generated as shown in Figure 5.2. The root node of a MHT is
a special type of internal node having j = H and k = 0.
To prove to another node its authenticity, the sender (signer) sends one
of the hashed authentication keys h(ak) possessed by one of the leaves x0[k]
in the MHT and an authentication path Apath(S→R) for that key to the
receiver (verifier). This authentication path is the sequence of nodes in the
MHT from leaves towards the root which are used by the receiver or verifier
to authenticate the key. For example, in Figure 5.2, to authenticate the key
x0[0], the Apath is given by the values:
Apath(X→Y )(x0[1], x1[1], x2[1]))
In this example, we need the hashed values possessed by these three
nodes to compute the root value of the tree. The root, if comes out to be
valid, verifies the key. The nodes in the authentication path for x0[0] are
shown in red in Figure 5.2.
5.3 Authentication of Nodes
In this section, we use MHT structure to authenticate nodes joining the
network. Initially, we explain the authentication of proprietary nodes and
later on that of private nodes.
5.3.1 Authentication of Proprietary Nodes
Authentication of proprietary nodes can be single- or multi-hop. We now
describe both in detail.
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5.3.1.1 Authentication of Proprietary Nodes in Single-hop
Referring again to Figure 5.1, suppose that node D (proprietary node) wants
to join the network. Here we assume that before a private node requests
to join the network, at least k proprietary nodes (k ≥ 3) join each of the
distributed authorities (i.e. A, B, and C). This is shown in Figure 5.1 for
k=3. After being authenticated by DTA through gateways (A, B, or C),
each directly connected proprietary node starts broadcasting the public key
of its respective gateway i.e. PKA, PKB, or PKC in addition to its own
public key. When node D is in the range of gateway node A, it receives
the public key PKA and node identity IDA of node A. Firstly, D verifies
the public key of node A using its digital certificate (signed by DTA) and
then stores these values against node A in its information table. A change
in PKA by node A, if needed, can be informed by node A to others through
various means such as email or post etc. Secondly, D generates a random
nonce n1 and a symmetric key SKAD and combines them with its identity
IDD. It then uses a hashed value stored in the leaf of its MHT (say x0[2])
and the authentication path Apath(D→A) from x0[2] to the root to get itself
authenticated by node A. For example, in Figure 5.2, this authentication
path has values ((x0[3]) ‖ (x1[0]) ‖ (x2[1])).
Apath(D→A) =
(
(x0[3]) ‖ (x1[0]) ‖ (x2[1])
)
(Authentication Path)
These parameters, as message m(D→A) encrypted with PKA, are sent to
node A as a payload.
m(D→A)
〈
EPKA < n1, IDD, SKAD, x0[2], Apath(D→A) >
〉
(Authentication Request by Proprietary Node)
After receiving the message m(D→A) from node D, node A first decrypts
it and then computes the root using the received value (x0[0]) and the
authentication path Apath(D→A). It then compares the computed root with
the registered root that it has corresponding to that proprietary node D. If
both have the same value, it authenticates node D. In this case, the root is
calculated by computing the hash (((x0[0] ‖ (x0[1])) ‖ (x1[1])) ‖ x2[1])).
root = h
(
((x0[0] ‖ (x0[1])) ‖ (x1[1])) ‖ x2[1]
)
Now, node A sends an acknowledgment to D by sending an encrypted
message m(A→D) (using SKAD) which offers the security-level association as
described in section 5.5.
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5.3.1.2 Authentication of Proprietary Nodes in Multi-hop
Now we consider the case when a proprietary node outside the range of a
trusted authority wants to get authenticated and therefore it is more than
one-hop away from the DTA. This node is shown as node M in Figure 5.1.
The authentication procedure is as follows:
When node M is in the range of one or more already authenticated
proprietary nodes (e.g. nodes E and F in Figure 5.1), it receives the public
key PKA of the gateway node A through these nodes. Node M after
authenticating the signature of the public key, generate messages m(M→E)
and m(M→F ) for E and F respectively. It then sends these messages through
one or more neighbor nodes (node E and F in our case) to the gateway, if
possible. This is to minimize the chances of authentication refusal, if one of
the directly connected nodes is compromised or cannot serve authentication
request due to heavy traffic.
m(M→E)
〈
EPKE < n1, IDM , SKME >,
EPKA < n2, x0[0], Apath(M→A) >
〉
m(M→F )
〈
EPKF < n3, IDM , SKMF >,
EPKA < n4, x0[0], Apath(M→A) >
〉
Nodes E and F , after receiving the appropriate message, decrypt the first
half of the message, save the three credentials of M , add IDM to the new
message, and relay it (encrypted with PKA) to the gateway DTAA. The
gateway DTAA decrypts the message and checks the authenticity of M by
computing the root using the two received parameters and compares it with
the root saved previously for M at the time of registration. If authenticated,
it sends back a positive acknowledgment ACK to both E and F which in
turn authenticates node M . Node M associates itself to the node from which
it gets the authenticated message first and then joins the network.
5.3.2 Authentication of Private Nodes
In this section, we describe how a private node joins the network. We assume
that these types of nodes possibly want to join the network to access the
Internet or get other network services for a certain period of time. The
network can provide free and paid services. It is also assumed that every
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private node does have a temporary authentication password PWN (bought
from the provider in the form of a scratch card or received per email) to
inform the authenticator that the owner (of private node) has credential for
paid services. In addition to this password, it also has some information
(such as a digitally signed certificate), received in the card or email to validate
the public key of gateways.
When a private node P receives the hello message containing the public
key from any of the proprietary nodes e.g. M in Figure 5.1, it sends (after
verifying PKM ) an authentication request m(P→M) to M . This request
contains a nonce n1 , node identity IDP , a symmetric key SKMP , and a
flag Stype (‘0’ for free and ‘1’ for paid) showing the request of non-paid or
paid services to M . It encrypts these parameters with the public key PKM .
Moreover, while requesting for a paid service, it also sends the temporary
password PWP encrypted with the public key of gateway i.e. PKA. For free
services, this field is blank. The authentication request message is shown
below:
m(P→M)
〈
EPKM < n1, IDP , SKMP , Stype >,
EPKA < n2, IDP , PWP >
〉
Node M , after receiving m(P→M), decrypts its first part and by noticing
the service type Stype parameter, understands that the requesting node is
a private node. Node M then generates two messages. Firstly, it sends
an acknowledgment message ACK1 back to P which means that initially
P can enjoy the free services provided by the network. Secondly, for the
authentication of paid services, it sends the credentials of node P to the
corresponding DTA (gateway) A through gateway. ACK1 is sent to P to let
it know that its authentication request has been partly accepted (free service
can be used) and is sent to the DTA for full authentication (to provide paid
services).
After authenticating the password information of node P , node A sends an
authentication reply to node M using the symmetric key SKAM confirming
the node P to be a valid node. Node M then sends the full authentication
acknowledgment ACK2 to P in the form of an encrypted message m(M→P ),
using the symmetric key SKMP . In this message, it sends the MHT root xH [0]
signed by DTAA and the security-service request described in section 5.5 to
P . The tree root is used to authenticate the next coming messages from P
containing the authentication credentials (hash key and authentication path).
Additionally, security-service offer message is used to propose the adaptive
security service-level that a node can choose based on its requirements and
resource limitations. This message, which is known as ASSA offer message,
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leads to the adaptive security service association explained in section 5.5.
m(M→P )
〈
ESKMP < n2, IDM , Apath(M→P ),
xH [0], ASSA Service Parameters >
〉
A MHT with a very large number of randomly generated tokens which
are hashed to create leaves may create storage problem. To overcome this
problem, a random number generator method can be used for generating
leaves which is discussed in [28].
5.3.3 Mutual Authentication of Nodes
Now we briefly discuss, how the non-gateway nodes authenticate each other.
Let us first take an example of two proprietary nodes E and F in Figure 5.1.
Assume that node F wants to authenticate node E. The procedure that can
be executed by node F to authenticate E or vice versa is almost exactly the
same as described for the authentication of proprietary nodes by the gateway
in a multi-hop setup. The only difference is that a node being authenticated
(node E) will just send the request m(E→F ) to the authenticator (node
F ) using the secret credentials it received from gateway at the time of
registration.
m(E→F )
〈
EPKF < n1, IDE , SKEF >,
EPKA < n2, x0[3], Apath(E→A) >
〉
Node F in return forwards the secret credentials to node A as a message
m(F→A) to verify the valid identity of node E.
m(F→A)
〈
ESKAF < n1, IDF , x0[6](F ), Apath(F→A) >,
EPKA < n2, x0[3](E), Apath(E→A) >
〉
58 Adaptive Security Association in Mesh Networks
m(F→E)
〈
ESKEF < n3, IDF , x0[0](F ), Apath(F→E),
ASSA Service Parameters >
〉
When node F receives a validity confirmation from node A, it generates
its MHT credentials for node E (to get itself authenticated by node E
later) containing a signed MHT root and security service parameters for
node E. Node F then sends all this information to node E in the form
of ASSA offer message m(F→E) using the symmetric key SKEF . After
receiving the message, node E generates ASSA reply message to send back
the chosen security service parameters to F . These offer and reply messages
are explained in section 5.5. Node E can authenticate F in exactly the same
way. In case of a private node, for example node P in Figure 5.1, the same
procedure described above for proprietary nodes can be used. The only
difference would be that the authentication request will be sent using the
password PWP of the private node that needs to be authenticated rather
than the MHT credentials.
5.3.4 Authentication of Mobile Nodes
Finally, we explain how the authentication is done when a node moves
from its current location to a foreign location. For this purpose, we again
consider Figure 5.1. Let us assume that node P moves from its current
location (M ′s range) towards node H, which is attached to gateway B.
When the node P moves completely out of the range of M , node M sends
secure notifications to its one-hop neighbors and to gateway DTAA informing
that P is no more accessible to it. In this notification, node A also sends
the certified root value of P ′s MHT and the remaining unused hashed
authentication keys to node A. It waits for time t and then erases the
credentials about node P from its memory. The value t can be chosen
according to the situation of network traffic. This notification, which is based
on our neighborhood trust mechanism (NTM) discussed in our previous
work [90, 88], is further propagated to gateway A and possibly to the nodes
attached to gateway B as well. The later will be true if some nodes attached
to gateway node A have one-hop neighbors which are attached to gateway
node B.
When node A comes to know that node P is no more accessible to
node M , it sends a notification of the possible handover to its one-hop
gateways (B in our case). In this notification, node A also sends to node
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B, the certified root value of node P ′s MHT and the related unused hashed
authentication keys which it received from node M . When node P moves
into the range of node H, it uses its identity IDP , one of the next unused
hashed authentication keys it received from node M , its authentication path
Apath(P→M), and its secret password (private node) to authenticate itself to
node H. After receiving this authentication request from node P , node H
forwards the request to gateway B, which having the knowledge of node P ′s
credentials authenticates P and sends a positive reply to node H. Node H
then continues its communication with H and later receives MHT credentials
from node P to authenticate itself to P established on the method described
earlier in subsection 5.3.3.
5.4 Security Service Parameters
To provide efficient security mechanism by making best use of the resources
and requirements, an adaptive security service-level policy can be agreed
upon between the communicating nodes. This policy, requires the nodes to
choose some security services each having few parameters shown in Table 5.2.
These services are based on ISO 7498-2 recommendations [2]. We briefly
explain here these services and their parameters.
5.4.1 Pre-defined Level of Security Services
To have a smooth association, the parameters of security service should be
understandable by both the customers (expert or inexperienced) and the
service providers. For this reason, a predefined security-level with one qualit-
ative parameter called Quality can be offered. The possible values of this
parameter can be high(level−3), medium(level−2), low/default(level−1),
and no−security(level−0). If one of these options is chosen, then the rest of
the parameters are set to default settings corresponding to the chosen security
level. Otherwise, customized parameters values are chosen separately.
5.4.2 Confidentiality Service
Confidentiality service offers parameters to select a particular confidentiality
algorithm and tacks the arguments related to it. The most important
parameters include identity of the algorithm (AlgoID), its type (per block or
stream), block size, mode of operation (Electronic Code Book and Cipher
Block Chaining etc.), encryption key length (variable or fixed), and the
number of rounds for cipher transformation (fixed or variable).
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Table 5.2: Security services and parameters
Service Parameters
Security Level Quality (High, Medium, Low/Default, No)
Confidentiality AlgorithmID, Category (block/flow), Size of
Block, Mode of Operation, ConfKeyLength
Integrity, Authentication and Non-
repudiation
AuthType, AuthAlgo, Authkeylength, Hash-
Func, NonRepFlag
Optional Billing ( {Pack1, Price}, {Pack2, Price}, {Pack3,
Price}, ....), TunnelingFlag, ...
5.4.3 Authentication, Integrity, and Non-repudiation
Service
For authentication, a number of mechanisms are possible, such as digital
signatures (DS), message authentication codes (MAC), or a shared secret
like passwords (PW) etc. Few significant parameters for this service are type
of authentication (DS, MAC, PW) and the algorithm identity which is a
number showing the particular algorithm used. Integrity is provided using a
MAC (hash function) over the message or a part of it (mutable fields). The
possible parameters are the length of the key and the hash function type.
For non-repudiation service, a flag-bit having values ‘1’ or ‘0’ can be used to
show service in-use and not-in-use respectively.
5.4.4 Optional Services and Parameters
In addition to some mandatory security-services, there can be some optional
services as well. One of the most important services is billing service that
offers varying security levels based on different payment options. A service
provider may charge a customer for different levels of security (e.g. high,
medium, or low/default). For this purpose, we propose two parameters
namely package type (based on security strength) and the price of that
package. Another service can be tunneling service whose parameter is also a
flag-bit like in non-repudiation service.
5.5 Adaptive Security Service-Level Association
In this section, we first briefly present our proposed mechanism and then
describe with an example how adaptive security service association takes
place between two nodes after MHT based authentication. We use Figure 5.3
for this purpose.
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Battery Power
Memory Space
CPU Speed
Bandwidth 
...
Delay
Throughput
Confidentiality
...
ASSA BSSA
Figure 5.3: Adaptive security service-level association- a handshake
5.5.1 Adaptive Security Handshake
This handshake is a three-way-message exchange between the two concerned
nodes after the execution of authentication process. An existing node in
the network requests or offers the newly joined node to accept one of the
possible levels of security services (ASSA offer message) using the security
service parameters discussed in section 5.4. The sender offers these services
based on its resource limitations and the type of network services it provides.
This offer is sent to the receiving node in the form of a message already
discussed in section 5.3. When the newly joined node receives this message,
it first authenticates the sender and saves the MHT credentials. It then
checks the possible options for each security service that it has been offered
by the sender. Based on the resources and network application requirements
that the newly joined node has, it selects at least the mandatory parameters
values from the offer which it agrees to use after the handshake. It then
sends the reply message (ASSA reply) back to the sender with its chosen
security parameter values. The offerer node, after authenticating the reply
message, verifies the chosen options and saves this information. If everything
sent in the reply message is in order, it sends back an acknowledgment to
the peer node completing the handshake successfully.
5.5.2 An Example of Adaptive Security Service-level
Association
Now we explain the handshake discussed in the last subsection with an
example shown in Figure 5.3. Consider that there are two nodes A and B
in a network and both have already executed the authentication process
62 Adaptive Security Association in Mesh Networks
discussed in section 5.3. Let us assume that node B wanted to get the
services of the network through node A. Therefore, in this scenario, node
A sends the ASSA offer message to node B offering the available security
services. This message m(A→B) (ASSA offer message) consists of the security
services with parameter values that node A can provide to node B along with
the MHT credentials for node B to authenticate node A and its message.
m(A→B)
〈
ESKAB < n2, IDA, x0[1](A), Apath(A→B)
ASSA Service Parameters >
〉
(ASSA Offer Message)
Now, assume that node A can offer three different packages of security
services to B with high, medium, and low-level security protocols. Therefore,
it also offers each security service with three different options. For example,
it offers RSA, AES, and DES algorithms for confidentiality (encryption).
For authentication, it offers RSA, SHA − 1, and simple passwords. It
provides MD5, SHA− 1, and SHA− 2 for integrity. Moreover, it also offers
optional non-repudiation service. In addition, other parameter values for
these algorithms are also set. Finally, each security level is charged with
different package prices which we call Phigh, Pmedium, and Plow respectively.
These offers are placed inside the message m(A→B) in a compact form (e.g.,
using bits representing each parameter value) and are sent to B as an ASSA
offer message ASSA. When B receives the ASSA offer message, it checks
the possible options it is offered by node A. It then selects those security
service options which fit best to its resource limitations and application
demands. For example, if it is using the live streaming network service, it
would probably not require high security, rather it would need uninterrupted
and delay efficient streaming. So it might choose the options which provide
the lowest security but least delay. In our example, these would be DES
(confidentiality) and simple password (authentication). For this purpose, it
will be charged with the lowest price Plow. After choosing these options, it
will send a ASSA reply BSSA again in a compact form (e.g., by setting only
those bits which represent the chosen values).
m(B→A)
〈
ESKAB < n3, IDB, x0[1](B), Apath(B→A),
ASSA Chosen Parameters >
〉
(ASSA Reply Message)
5.5 Adaptive Security Service-Level Association 63
Node A, after receiving the ASSA reply, saves the chosen security service
values and sends an acknowledgment back to B for the successful handshake.
m(A→B)
〈
ESKAB < n4, IDA, x0[2](A), Apath(A→B), ACKSSA >
〉
(ASSA ACK Message)
5.5.3 Adaptive Reassociation between Nodes
One important fact in our proposed mechanism is that after using a particular
ASSA package, a node based on the change in requirements or resources,
may need to alter the service level association. For example, a node initially
being stationary but later having high mobility may require to lower its
currently used security level with another nodes. Another example is that a
node currently using a service dealing with highly confidential information
(e.g. online banking) wants to stop using this service and switch to another
network service such as live video streaming or weather reports. These nodes
may require re-association or alteration of the security level. To fulfill this, a
node N requiring the change just sends an ASSA re-association request to
its peer using a fresh hashed authentication key x0[i] and its authentication
path Apath(X→Y ). This message is similar to the one described earlier in
ASSA handshake ( subsection 5.5.2).
There is a strong possibility that a malicious or compromised node may
flood the network by sending association or re-association requests for DoS.
Moreover, a node with sufficient processing and battery power may send a
fake request to change its currently used security-level to a lower one. If
such issues occur, then based on our neighborhood based trust mechanism
discussed in chapter 3 and chapter 4, the receiving node will reject the fake
requests by the sender node.
5.5.4 Revocation of Keys
In our proposal, authentication keys and certified root used in MHT need to
be updated when revoked. In addition, the same is required for symmetric
and public keys. When a node is left with its last authentication key, it
uses this key to send a message encrypted with symmetric or public key
of peer node as a key update message. This is similar to the ASSA offer
or reply message including the currently set ASSA service parameters. For
symmetric and public key updates, one key type can be used to update the
other. Alternatively, any of the well-known key-update techniques [46] can
also be used.
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5.6 Discussion
In this section, we mention the possible improvement techniques of MHT
based authentication mechanism and later discuss the advantage of adaptive
(based on resources and requirements) security. Merkle tree based authen-
tication incurs low cost authentication for the mesh nodes. As it uses hash
functions, it provides a light-weight and computationally fast authentication
mechanism with adequate level of security. For improved performance in
computing authentication proofs, efficient MHT traversal techniques [126]
can be utilized to produce authentication proofs based on the requirements
instead of storing the whole tree in the node’s memory. To save memory
space, a deterministic pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) [29] can
be used which requires storing only the seed of that PRNG but with two-
fold generation of signature key. For efficient authentication, hash chains
could also be used but they have a drawback. These chains produce sig-
nificant burden by recursively computing the hash functions. However, a
MHT with q leaves requires to compute log(q) proofs only. Some traversal
techniques are explained by Buchmann et al. [28]. These techniques are
usually called classical, fractal traversal and log space, and time traversal
techniques. Any of these techniques can be chosen based on simplicity, space,
and time complexity requirements. Moreover, if the height of the tree ‘H’ is
large, the generation of root requires the computation of a complete MHT.
To counteract this issue, the tree chaining method or distributed signature
generation [26] can be used.
Our proposed mechanism provides on-demand flexibility to both network
nodes and each individual user who wants to access the network based on
varying security level. In addition to authenticate themselves to the net-
work using the fast MHT based authentication mechanism, they (nodes
and users) are adjustable to security services according to their needs and
available resources. By using this approach, nodes with mobility can tune
their communication-security level according to varying conditions and re-
quirements.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a novel approach to provide fast authentication
and secure information communication using secure service level association.
Our solution allows nodes in wireless mesh networks with varying security
requirements and resources to adjust the security service level according to
their abilities and needs. The performance analysis of this approach is shown
in chapter 8.
Chapter 6
Palliating Channel
Assignment Attacks
“The opposite of security is
insecurity, and the only way to
overcome insecurity is to take
risks”
- Theodore Forstmann (Born
1940)
In the previous chapters, we mainly presented lightweight and trust-based
authentication and efficient service-level-association mechanisms in WMNs
without discussing severe DoS attacks in details. In the current chapter and
the next one, we will discuss some proposed frameworks for mitigating some
brutal Denial of Service (DoS) attacks such as Channel Assignment (CA)
and JellyFish (JF) attacks which can make a WMN extremely vulnerable.
In this chapter, we explain different types of CA Attacks in detail and
the proposed remedy for them in WMNs. We introduce an efficient and
lightweight framework called PiCAT (Palliating Channel Assignment assaults
using adjustable Trust) to secure Dynamic CA (DCA) in multi-radio and
multi-channel WMNs. We elaborate the JF Attacks and their possible cures
in the next chapter.
6.1 Introduction
To provide increased aggregate bandwidth, the concept of multi-radio and
multi-channel WMNs (MR-MC WMNs) has been proposed (See Figure 6.1).
DCA schemes are used to efficiently allocate frequency channels among these
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radios. Many of these schemes consider channel allocation only, without
taking the security threats into account that may arise because of the presence
of malicious or compromised nodes. Insecure CA methods can be utilized by
attackers to jeopardize the network by decreasing the available bandwidth.
An adversary or a malicious node pretending to be a valid node can pose
serious threats to the other nodes that require a new channel, by incorrectly
assigning frequently-used or heavily-loaded channels. Despite having enough
channels with sufficient bandwidth resources, a victim node may suffer
from link congestion and bandwidth decrease which leads to dropping of
information packets. These nodes can manipulate the CA procedure for their
own benefits and then the networks become exposed to various DoS attacks
such as link dis-connectivity and spam requests. Although researchers who
are working in the area of security in WMNs have proposed various solutions
for mitigating different kinds of attacks in WMNs, the problem of securing
CA procedure still lacks sufficient investigation. While the quondam CA
schemes have mostly used dynamic CA (DCA) methods, these schemes do not
consider the security threats that exist while assigning these channels to the
available wireless links. So in order to manage the network connectivity and
throughput efficiently, securing CA is inevitable. In this chapter, we discuss
an efficient and lightweight mechanism for the detection and protection of
CA attacks in MR-MC WMNs. This mechanism is based on monitoring the
behavior of the neighbor nodes and does not rely on a central system for
authentication and authorization.
6.2 Currently Existing Schemes
6.2.1 Channel Assignment Approaches
Several schemes have been proposed for CA in WMNs. The main focus of
these schemes is to enhance the overall network performance by reducing
the interference and maximizing the throughput. Raniwala et al. [115]
proposed a multi-channel and multi-hop WMN architecture with centralized
CA. Ramachandran et al. [114] propose a centralized CA algorithm, that runs
on a central server and dynamically collects changing channel interference
information at regular intervals. Makram et al. [86] propose a distributed
CA based on clustering. Features of this approach include: fully distributed
channel assignment, fair channel distribution for the clusters based on the
number of the nodes within a cluster and re-assignment with consideration of
the distance. While many different models have been proposed, none of them
consider the security aspects during the CA planning. For example, handling
the effects of misbehaving, malicious and compromised nodes, and hence the
loss of confidentiality are not considered in the previously developed schemes
6.3 Network Model 67
[100].
6.2.2 Security Approaches
Lin et al. [79] present a collective authentication system for WMN. This
system is based on threshold signature technique in which ‘t’ out of ‘n’
servers are used for authentication. This system is specially useful in those
areas where large number of nodes work together under a single authority.
In WMNs, it is usual to have many different authorities. Jin et al. [68]
propose a group key agreement protocol for authentication of WMN. This is
an improved version and is more efficient then Tseng’s group key agreement
protocol. However, the protocol lacks description about group member
events like joining and leaving of nodes. Sun et al. [129] explained an
architecture providing a balance between anonymity and traceability while
keeping the basic security requirements intact. The authors suggest a solution
with identity-based cryptography using bilinear pairings on elliptic curves.
Xuyang et al. [139] propose a risk avoidance scheme using multi-path routing
to assist encryption schemes in mitigating the damages of security attacks.
This is based on node identification. None of these approaches cater for the
security in DCA.
Haq et al. [50] provide a solution for securing CA in WMNs. Their
approach assumes the structure of the network as a spanning tree with
gateway as the root node. In their solution, only parent nodes are monitored
by child nodes for security attacks considering most of the traffic to and
from the Internet. However, in WMNs, a client node may also require to
communicate with other clients in addition to the Internet. Their approach
does not provide any solution to this problem.
6.3 Network Model
A WMN can be represented as an undirected graph G(V,E,K) known as
the connectivity graph, where V = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of vertices in the
graph representing mesh routers, K = {k1, k2, . . . , kc} is the set of available
channels, and E = {(i, j, ki)|i, j ∈ V ∧ ki ∈ K} is the set of wireless links
between the mesh router i and its neighbors ∀j ∈ Ni using channel ki where
Ni denotes the neighbors of node i. The wireless link l
ki
ij is constructed
between any two mesh routers i, j if they are located within each other’s
transmission range and agreed on a common channel ki. A mesh router
i with multiple WNICs, i.e. Ri = {r1, r2, . . . , rm}, may allocate different
channels which should not exceed the number of WNICs, if available. Ki is
the set of channels assigned to node i. This makes a typical MR-MC WMN
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Internet
Figure 6.1: An example of multi-channel and multi-radio WMN
as illustrated in Figure 6.1. Using this concept, each routing node, using
multiple wireless network interface cards (WNICs) and distinct channels, can
communicate with more than one neighbor at a time.
6.3.1 Clustered Channel Assignment
In this chapter, we make use of the Cluster Channel Assignment (CCA)
algorithm introduced by Makram et al. [87]. In CCA, the available channels
in the network are equally distributed among the clusters in such a way that
two neighboring clusters get disjoint sets of channels, if possible. KCi is the
subset of channels K (KCi ⊂ K) to be assigned to cluster Ci.
CCA algorithm consists of two phases: static phase and on-demand
(dynamic) phase. In the static phase, each cluster-head (CH) assigns a
default common channel to all nodes (routers) belonging to its cluster.
After this static phase, each router periodically estimates the load of all
its communication links and exchanges this information with its neighbors
and the CH. This information contains the link status P (loss on lkij) and the
channel usage B(ik, t) which is illustrated in Figure 6.2a. We also assume
that a CH has an overview of the load estimation and channel usage of the
neighboring clusters, as it can exchange this information with its neighbors.
The router i shifts to the on-demand phase in two cases. Either it
experiences a loss rate P (loss on lkij) ≥ σ (σ is the threshold) on the current
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Ch_INFO 
Ch_REQUEST 
Ch_SWITCH 
Ch_BORROW 
Figure 6.2: Channel assignment - control messages
link lkij , or the link usage reaches the link capacity on link k which is not
sufficient for the requested bandwidth. Node i then requests a free channel
from the CH by sending a CH REQUESTmessage. In the second phase,
the CH detects the nodes having a high load and then tries to assign them
new channels. These new channels can not only be taken from the unused
channels of KCi , but can also be borrowed from neighboring clusters having
enough free channels. The contents of the control messages of CCA algorithm
are shown in Figure 6.2.
After selecting a suitable channel and suitable neighbor j|j ∈ Ni, the CH
informs both the requested node i and its neighbor j about the new channel
by sending a CH SWITCH message. When i and j receive this message
they execute the channel switching on their respective links and send back a
CH ACK message. For more details about this algorithm, refer to [87].
6.4 Security Vulnerabilities in Channel
Assignment
Many of the CA algorithms do not consider the security aspects and assume
that the mesh nodes are trusted nodes. Furthermore, the CA decision for
such a node is based on the information received from the neighboring nodes
especially in dynamic and distributed algorithms [50]. Since this information
about the neighbors is not verified, the attacker can easily influence the CA
procedure and hence the network’s performance.
Some of these attacks have been identified by Naveed et al. [100]. In gen-
eral, we can summarize these attacks that exploit the security vulnerabilities
in two ways. First, a malicious node can modify the CA on its interfaces
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(a) Maximizing interference (b) Link disconnectivity (c) Misinformation attack
(d) No attacks
Figure 6.3: Example of some channel assignment attacks
without informing its neighbors or switch to a higher priority channel which
effects the performance in terms of available bandwidth. Second, a malicious
node can transmit wrong information to its neighbors informing them that
it has changed the assigned channel while actually it has not. So, a secure
control message exchange mechanism between the nodes is required.
An example of these attacks is shown in Figure 6.3. Consider that there
is a set of nodes (A,B, . . . , E), where node E is an attacker. If node E is
selected to coordinate channel assignment for its neighbors, it can attack CA
by assigning channel 1 to all neighbors as shown in Figure 6.3(a). In this
case, the attacker influences the CA and increases the interference which
leads to a poor performance. A different kind of attack which is called link
disconnectivity attack is shown in Figure 6.3(b). Here, E assigns channel 1
to node B, channel 2 to node A, and so on. In this case, nodes A and B have
no common channel between them and therefore cannot communicate with
each other directly. This attack leads to disconnectivity or at least increases
the number of hops to reach A and vice versa. In case of a misinformation-
attack, node E sends wrong information about its assigned channels to its
neighbors as shown in Figure 6.3(c). Here, E informs node D that it uses
channel 4 while it actually uses channel 2. In this case, these nodes cannot
communicate directly. An attack-free CA is shown in Figure 6.3(d).
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Figure 6.4: An example of misinformation attack
Some of the CA schemes assign the channels based on the expected traffic
load on each link in the network. This is to avoid bottleneck links and to
increase throughput. The consideration of traffic load is a very important
issue in CA. In a variant of CA attacks, a malicious node can send false
information about its expected link loads and/or the expected load from
previous-hop nodes, to next-hop nodes. This attack affects the decision of
CA for next hop nodes, leading to an inefficient utilization of the channels
and poor performance.
In this chapter, we use two phrases namely unassigned nodes and assigned
nodes referring to the nodes with ‘still unassigned’ and ‘already assigned’
channels respectively for their links under investigation. A misinforma-
tion attack is illustrated in Figure 6.4. Here, each assigned link is labeled
with a channel number and its expected load. In Figure 6.4(a), the links
lBA, lBE , lAC , and lCE have already been assigned appropriate channels based
on their expected link loads which are 150, 250, 120, 200 Kbps respectively.
Here, we assume that a malicious node E tries to send wrong information
about CA to its neighbors. This information includes expected loads on its
own links with the previously assigned neighbors. Node E sends these loads
to the unassigned neighbors, i.e., D,G, and F . For example, it modifies
the expected loads on links lAC and lBE , from 120 Kbps to 500 Kbps, and
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from 250 Kbps to 400 Kbps respectively as shown in Figure 6.4(a). If the
unassigned neighboring nodes select the lightly loaded channel based on the
information coming from E, then they will select channel 2 and 1 as shown in
Figure 6.4(b) and Figure 6.4(c). As a result of this attack, the overloaded
channels are selected instead of the unused or lightly loaded channels as
shown in Figure 6.4(d).
6.5 Attacks Detection Scheme
In this section, we first explain the techniques of detecting CA attacks
mentioned in section 6.4 and then explain the prevention mechanism. Note
that the information exchange between neighbors can be sent using the
previously used channels or a default common channel.
6.5.1 Behavior Observation of Neighboring Nodes
Each node observes the behavior of its neighbors in terms of packet loss
(Pl), packet drop (Pd), CA attacks (spam request, wrong information, false
assignment, etc.) and other attacks. Each node maintains a reputation state
for every neighbor. For this purpose, every node wields a history table about
its immediate neighbors which is updated periodically after time T (variable).
Referring to the example shown in Figure 6.3, when node A detects that
node E is behaving maliciously by sending wrong information about CA,
node A puts a negative mark ‘-’ in the table as shown in Table 6.1 (CA
Attacks column). On the other hand, node A puts a positive mark ‘+’ for
the good behavior if no malicious activity is detected for that random time
T . This table keeps the information about the packet loss, packet drop, and
neighbors’ behavior for a certain period of random time (T1, T2, ...). In multi-
hop networks, a malicious node can disrupt the packet delivery functionality
by dropping the packets or forwarding packets to false routes. Packet delivery
attacks refer to any intentional disruption of the data forwarding activity
where packet loss refers to any loss due to interference, node mobility, hidden
and exposed terminal problems, etc. To detect packet delivery attacks, each
node should exchange information about the packet delivery of the next
hop with its neighbors (typically one-hop or two-hops). Let us assume that
A transmits information to C through the intermediate node E. Node C
sends acknowledgments (ACKs) for the sent packets periodically after every
unit time T (e.g. T=10sec). This is done through multiple/different paths
or intermediate nodes (i.e., nods B and D) to A. When these ACKs from
different paths reach A, it compares them. If all ACKs including the ACK
from E are same, this means that E did not behave maliciously. A difference
in ACKs shows the possible presence of adversary. Here, we assume that E
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Table 6.1: Behavior observation of neighboring nodes (by node A)
Behavior marks
Time Plij Pdij Packet
drop
CA
attacks
Other
attacks
ADT
T1 0.215 0.007 + + + 1.00
T2 0.275 0.080 + + + 1.00
T3 0.770 0.551 − + + 0.67
T4 0.810 0.591 − + + 0.67
T5 0.853 0.633 − − + 0.33
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
drops the forwarding packets and that the ACK from node E is dissimilar
to the ACKs from nodes C and D. Thus, node A can detect the malicious
behavior of node E. If this is the case, node A stops forwarding the packets
to E and puts a negative mark for E in its neighbor behavior table. Table 6.1
illustrates an example of neighbor E’s behavior from node A’s point of view.
Here, in the beginning, E behaves normally and the packet drop (as well
as the packet loss) is low and acceptable based on the previous history (a
threshold bandwidth drop and loss). Between times T2 and T3, the packet
drop rapidly increases. After observing this increase in packet drop, node
A doubts about E’s behavior and puts a negative mark (or point) in the
behavior table. During time T4 and T5, E assigns an overloaded channel for
the link between E and A. As a result, the packet loss further increases.
Therefore, A assigns another negative point to node E.
The average degree of trust (ADT ) is the ratio between the number
of positive points and the overall points (negative and positive), where
0 ≤ ADT ≤ 1. For example, the average degree of trust at T1 is ADTT1 =
3(+)/3 = 1.00, and at T5 is ADTT5 = 1(+)/3 = 0.33. Value of ADT = 1
means the node is well-behaved while the value of ADT = 0 shows the
opposite. The intermediate values mark the node as suspicious. The behavior
of a node can be varied over time. Therefore, node A, based on the history
it has about its neighbors, can decide about E’s behavior as bad, good, or
excellent using the experienced degree of trust. An example of A’s history
table about its neighbors is shown in Figure 6.3(d). In this example, we
assume that node E behaves maliciously. If so, A declares that node E is a
bad node, and stops dealing or forwarding messages through this node and
selects another good node. The grading of a node to be called as good or
bad can be adjusted by the network designer according to the environmental
conditions of the network (e.g. network congestion or interference etc.). The
technique of fuzzy logic can be applied for this purpose.
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Table 6.2: History table of neighbor nodes (at node A)
Neighbor Node Experienced Deg. of Trust Trust Status
B 0.96 Excellent
E 0.33 Bad
D 0.77 Good
6.5.2 Channel Assignment Attacks - Detection Mechanism
In this section, we provide the detection mechanism in detail to mitigate
channel assignment attacks in WMN.
6.5.2.1 False Assignment Detection
In the example shown in Figure 6.3(a), a malicious node E assigns an
overloaded channel 1 to all the links of its neighbors. This kind of attack is
difficult to detect especially if there is a heavy load on nodes located within
E’s range. Furthermore, neighbors of node E (i.e., A,B,C, andD) may think
that node E assigns channel 1 to them because it has limited interfaces and
it wants to keep the connectivity with all of them.
The possible solution to this problem is that the neighboring nodes should
exchange the information about the number of interfaces and the number
of assigned channels per node. According to this information and their
experience (history), they can decide whether E is malicious or not. For
example, if E always assigns one overloaded channel (e.g. channel 1) to
its neighbors having multiple interface, these neighbors discover that their
interfaces are unable to communicate and are always assigned the common
overloaded channel. Based on information exchange between them about
their interfaces, the neighboring nodes can detect that E behaves maliciously.
6.5.2.2 Link Disconnectivity Detection
Consider the example shown in Figure 6.3(b), where the CA coordinator i.e.
node E behaves maliciously and assigns channel 1 to node B, channel 2 to
node A, and so on. In this case, if nodes (A and B) tune their radio interfaces
to these assigned channels, it leads to disconnectivity on the current link
(lAB) between nodes A and B. Here the question arises that how the nodes
(A and B) can detect that node E is a malicious node? The answer is that
when nodes A and B receive the message from E about the new assigned
channels (i.e. channel 2 and channel 1 respectively), they should wait and
should not directly start reassignment. Both of them (i.e., A and B) should
coordinate with each other and agree to use the new channel assigned by
node E. Since link lAB still uses the old channel, node A sends an encrypted
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message to node B which contains the information about the newly assigned
channel (i.e. channel 2). Node B checks if the information about the newly
assigned channel coming from nodes A and E is the same or not. If it not
the same, node B can detect that either node A or E behaves maliciously.
In this example, we assume that E is a malicious node, because it assigns
different channels (channel 1 6= channel 2) to A and B. If so, B informs A
that E is a malicious node.
One may argue that it is possible that E sends the right information
concerning channel reassignment but either node A or node B behaves
maliciously. This can also be easily detected as follows. Let us assume that
node B is a malicious instead of node E. Node A starts reassignment and
tunes its radio interface to the new channel 2. It then transmits for a while
by sending packets (called probes) to B on the new channel 2. Since both
nodes A and B have different channels and there is no common channel
between them, those sent packets do not reach node B. This can easily be
detected by node A because it would not receive any acknowledgments for
those sent packets. Thus, node A detects that node B is a malicious node
rather than node E. Due to mobility, it may happen that node B moves out
of the range of node A during the CA. Therefore, node A asks its neighbors
about the behavior and location of node B in order to distinguish between
these situations.
6.5.2.3 Misinformation Detection
An example of misinformation attack (or self attack) in channel assignment
is shown in Figure 6.3(c). In this example, E sends a wrong information
concerning the new reassignment to its neighbors. As shown in the figure,
the previous channel assigned to both links lEA and lED is channel 2. When
node E behaves maliciously, it can tune its interface to a different channel
(e.g. channel 4) without informing A and D about this reassignment which
continue to use the old channel 2. This can easily be detected as follows.
According to the history table maintaining packet loss for those links lEA
and lED, when node E switches to channel 4, packet loss increases rapidly.
Then, A and/or B can detect that E is a malicious node.
Another kind of wrong information attack is shown in Figure 6.4. This
kind of attack can be prevented if nodes within two-hops exchange the
information about the current CA and the expected load. An example
of how nodes can exchange this information and detect false information
sent by malicious node E is shown in Figure 6.5. In the example shown
in Figure 6.5(a), unassigned nodes D and G check the CA information
coming from previously assigned nodes (B,E, and C,E respectively). In
this example, node D compares the information from E and B and detects
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Figure 6.5: An example of misinformation detection
a conflict. For example, E provides the information that the expected load
on link lBE is 400 Kbps whereas B provides an expected load of only 250
Kbps. Similarly, node G also detects a conflict in the information coming
from E and C as shown in Figure 6.5(a). As a result, node D doubts the
behavior of E and B and does not know which one of these is a malicious
node. Therefore, it sends a query message to the trusted neighbors G and F
asking them about E and B as shown in Figure 6.5(b). Since G also doubts
E’s behavior, it replies D that E is the possible malicious node. This reply
is based on G’s experience and its history table about the neighbors.
6.6 Secure Channel Assignment
In this section, we briefly explain the security model, where each node in the
network exchanges the link keys and hash sequence with neighbors. After
this model, we explain how to secure control messages in CA.
Table 6.3: Notations in PiCAT
Symbol Definition
CHi A cluster-head of cluster Ci
NCi Set of neighbor clusters of cluster Ci
BCij Set of border nodes between Ci and Cj
ICKij An inter-cluster key between Ci and Cj
LKij Link key for message exchange between nodes i and j
LHij Link hash sequence of node i with node j
LHrij r
th element from LHij
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6.6.1 Security Model
The advantages of our proposed scheme are low computation and low delay
as compared to schemes using public key cryptography. Public key crypto-
graphy is a scheme that requires complex computation and is more secure,
however, it may affect the performance of DCA. The DCA procedure would
become an overhead if it requires high bandwidth or delay. Our scheme
uses a hash sequence function to authenticate the messages sent from one
node to another and it uses a symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt the
messages. For a detailed discussion of this model, refer to chapter 4 and
our published work [90]. To provide stronger confidentiality (at the cost of
increased computational complexity), our scheme is adaptable to public key
cryptography. Link keys are replaced by public/private key pair appropriately
for this purpose.
6.6.2 Secure Clustered Channel Assignment
In this section, we explain how to secure CCA algorithm which was explained
in subsection 6.3.1.
6.6.2.1 Intra-cluster Channel Availability
The node having bandwidth overload or suffering from packet drops be-
cause of interference, would request the CH for a new channel by sending
a CH REQUEST message. The bandwidth usage information is sent to
the CH by the node requiring new channel that leads the CH to have an
overview of all the traffic of its members nodes. This CH INFO message
is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The CH after authenticating the member node,
checks whether it has a free channel available. In case of an availability,
it compiles the CH SWITCH message and sends it to the interested node.
These messages are encrypted with link keys (LK) as shown in Figure 6.6.
The node after allocating new channel (based on the CCA algorithm), replies
with an acknowledgment. The CH records this updated info (time, requested
node, and the new allocated channel) in its database.
6.6.2.2 Inter-cluster Channel Availability
On getting a channel request, if the CH (CHi) does not have any available
free channel for the member node i ∈ Ci, it requests for an available free
channel from its neighboring clusters NCi. For this purpose, CHi sends a
CH BORROW message to all its neighbors, which can be relayed by border
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Figure 6.6: Secure cluster channel assignment
nodes BCij , to borrow a free channel frequency. Therefore, CHi sends this
message to a possible border node b ∈ BCij after encrypting it with the
inter-cluster-key ICKij and also with link key LKxi between x(CHi) and b.
When b receives this message, it decrypts the message. It then encrypts it
with LKby and forwards it to y(CHj), as shown in Figure 6.6.
After authenticating the CHi request, CHj checks for a free channel
or a least-used channel within its cluster. It then compiles a CH INFO
message with this information and replies to the CH BORROW message,
as shown in Figure 6.6. When CHi receives replies from its neighbors, it
selects a suitable free channel or at least a least used channel within its
neighbors for the requested node based on CCA algorithm. CHi then sends
a CH SWITCH with this free channel to the requested node i and updates
its database.
6.6.3 Secure Channel Assignment - A Generalized Scheme
In this section, we explain how to secure CA algorithms in general. Many of
the distributed CA algorithms [89, 115] rely on the local information and
use all or some of the messages illustrated in Figure 6.2. Two nodes (i and
its neighbor j) exchanging the information about their assigned channels are
shown in Figure 6.7. When node i requests a free channel from j, it sends
a CH REQUEST message which is encrypted with the link key LKji, and
the next available hash element LHrij . If j has a free channel or less loaded
channel, it replies with a CH INFO message which is encrypted with the
link key LKji, and the next available hash element LH
r
ji.
As node i receives the information about the channels, it selects the suit-
able free channel or at least the minimum used channel within its neighbors.
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Figure 6.7: Secure channel assignment (generalized)
It then informs the appropriate neighbor node j about the channel switching
by sending a CH SWITCH with this free channel which is encrypted with
the link key LKji, and the last available hash element LH
r−1
ji . When j
receives the channel switch and agrees to use the new channel, it sends an
acknowledgment CH ACK back to node i. After the channel switching,
nodes i and j can use this new channel for communication.
6.7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how our proposed solution provides sufficient
security to DCA in Wireless Mesh Networks. Firstly, we discuss the common
types of attacks possible during the channel assignment of wireless mesh
networks and then briefly the prevention scheme. This prevention mechanism
can be used both for clustered and unclustered wireless mesh networks.
6.7.1 Link Dis-connectivity Attacks and Prevention
This attack occurs if the two neighboring nodes within a cluster that want to
communicate do not have one common channel-link available. For example,
suppose an attacker gets control of one of the communicating nodes (victim).
This attacker can then try to deny the availability of a particular channel
at an interface of that victim node, although in reality that channel is
available to be allocated. The method to prevent these types of attacks is
that when the channel assignment is done, the node is authenticated and
the CH maintains a list of the channels associated with each member node
of its cluster in a tabular form.
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6.7.2 False Assignment and its Prevention
If an attacker impersonates the CH and tries to issue an overloaded channel
to the member nodes, the communication on this channel may lead to chaos.
The member node to which this channel is assigned would not be able to
avail full channel bandwidth since the channel would already be overloaded.
In our model, it is impossible as the CH would also authenticate itself each
time to the member nodes and the attacker cannot guess the corresponding
session’s link key of the CH. Additionally, if the CA coordinator (i.e. CH)
behaves maliciously by assigning overloaded channels or different channels for
the same link leading to disconnectivity, neighborhood trust and information
exchanged by the neighboring nodes is be used to prevent it.
6.7.3 Spam Request and its Prevention
An adversary node may try to obtain a new channel associated with it by
requesting it from the CH. Since the CH maintains a complete list of the
channels associated with each member node, it simply rejects the request
of the adversary. The reason is that the adversary would not be able to
guess the private keys and the session key of the real member node which it
impersonates. The malicious node can send spam request messages to the
CH for applying a free channel where actually it does not need it. Since
the CH has an overview of the load estimation and channel usage of all its
cluster members, it would simply not reply to these spam messages.
6.7.4 Other Security Issues and Attacks
Besides all the security issues mentioned above, our proposed approach also
handles the general security issues and attacks which are not specific to
channel assignment. These issues and attacks include active eavesdropping,
information leakage, and unauthorized access. Active eavesdropping can
easily be prevented because prior to message encryption, the hash value (last
parameter) with each transferred message keeps the integrity and any change
can be observed on the receiving side. Information leakage is not possible as
all the information regarding channel assignment is encrypted. Unauthorized
access requires the adversary to know the key-pair of the sender and the
session key (in case of communication within the cluster) that are unknown
to it and are difficult to be compromised.
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6.8 Summary
In this chapter, a secure DCA architecture for WMNs has been proposed.
The proposed solution is lightweight and mitigates the security issues of CA
in WMNs. The performance of MR-MC wireless networks can be enhanced
by subjugating the security problems during CA in these networks. Future
work of this approach includes measuring it on a real-testbed and enhancing
it for mobile ad hoc networks.

Chapter 7
Mitigating Jellyfish Attacks
“Wisdom consists in being able
to distinguish among dangers and
make a choice of the least
harmful.”
- Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
(1469-1527)
In this chapter we propose an attack mitigation scheme called JAM
(Jellyfish Attack Mitigator) for another type of DoS attacks in wireless
networks. This scheme can be used to detect, penalize, and hence mitigate
Jellyfish attacks and is applicable to both WMNs and Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs). We explain our solution using example of MANETs because
nodes in these networks are considered to have higher mobility than those in
WMNs. In WMNs, the routers are usually less mobile or even stationary,
while in MANETs, they can usually move without any restrictions.
7.1 Motivation
In recent years, MANETs have become very popular due to wide range of ap-
plications and their ability to be deployed under normal and harsh conditions
while supporting high data rates. However, the absence of a centralized-trust
mechanism in MANETs, coerce nodes to develop trust on each other when
routing data packets. This required mutual trust makes it vulnerable due
to the presence of faulty, selfish, and misbehaving nodes. Although many
intrusion detection and trust-based systems have been developed to protect
MANETs against misbehaviors such as rushing attack, query-flood attacks,
and selfish behaviors, these defense mechanisms are not able to detect a set of
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protocol compliant attacks called Jellyfish (JF) attacks. These attacks target
closed-loop flows such as TCP that are responsive to network conditions like
delay and packet losses. On successful execution, jellyfish attacks can easily
partition the network.
Significant progress has been made in securing ad hoc networks by
developing secure routing protocols [141, 69] that ensure different security
concepts such as authentication and data integrity. Moreover, intrusion
detection and trust-based systems [96, 20, 110, 39, 150, 149, 67, 135] have
been developed to protect MANETs against misbehaviors such as rushing
attack, query-flood attacks, and selfish behaviors. Yet, most of the defense
mechanisms are not able to detect a set of protocol compliant attacks called
jellyfish (JF) attacks [4].
Figure 7.1: A typical jellyfish
Similar to the jellyfish in Figure 7.1 which is difficult to be detected until
after the sting, jellyfish attacks in ad hoc networks are hard to detect because
they conform to all existing protocol specifications. Jellyfish attackers (JF
nodes) can severely reduce the goodput of all traversing closed-loop flows
to near zero by periodically dropping a small fraction of packets, reordering
them, or delaying them. A JF attack can severely degrade the performance
of a network by preventing long-range communication and can also partition
the network.
Here we present a scheme for detecting and mitigating jellyfish attacks by
exploiting the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. Nodes set themselves
in promiscuous mode in order to observe each others’ activities, i.e. each
packet’s reception/forwarding event can be observed by neighbors. Thus,
a malicious JF node can be detected by its neighbors simultaneously. We
introduce detection and penalization schemes that detect and circumvent
malicious nodes and thus successfully establish routes free from malicious
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nodes.
7.2 Existing Schemes
There are many existing schemes for attacks prevention in MANETs. We
discuss some of the well-known schemes in this section.
7.2.1 Schemes Based on Central Entities
Nadeem and Howarth [96] introduce an anomaly-based intrusion detection
system (ABIDS). ABIDSs assume the existence of a central entity (CE) that
collects events from all nodes at the end of each time interval and checks
them for deviation from an initial normal profile. They introduce an ABIDS
based on chi-square for intrusion detection. Their technique consists of
two phases: training and testing. Training phase is assumed to be free of
anomalies and reflects the initial normal behavior of the network. In the
testing phase, the CE gathers information from all nodes after each time
interval. If no anomalies are found, the CE updates the network’s normal
behavior, otherwise anomalies are detected by applying a chi-square test on
the collected information, and then the CE instructs all nodes to blacklist the
detected malicious nodes. However, this technique relies on a CE to detect
anomalies which is not practical in MANETs due to the distributed nature
of MANETs. It also incurs a large information gathering and processing
overhead at the end of each time interval. Moreover, the CE is a single point
of failure.
7.2.2 Trust Based Mechanisms
Detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes should be done in a distrib-
uted way to fit the dynamic nature of MANETs. Therefore, trust-based
technologies have been developed.
Pirzada and McDonald [110] present a trust-based mechanism (TBM) for
establishing and managing trust in pure ad-hoc networks where no CE exists
and the nodes are not required to be pre-configured. They modify routing
protocols such as Dynamic State Routing (DSR) and Ad-hoc On-demand
Distance Vector (AODV) protocols in a way that allows establishing routes
with a certain level of confidence. The main idea is that each node forwards
data packets to the next hop as long as the trust value in the next hop node
is equal to or greater than a specified threshold value; otherwise it tries to
avoid that path to the destination node or sends an error message to the
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source node. The main drawback of their approach is that the detected
malicious nodes are not penalized and isolated from the network.
Zouridaki et al. [150, 149] introduce robust cooperative trust establish-
ment schemes in MANETs called Hermes and E-Hermes respectively. In
addition to trust values, they offer a confidence value, which is the measure
of the level of assurance in the trust relationship, and then map the trust
and confidence values in a trustworthiness value with respect to packet
forwarding, that can be incorporated within routing protocols. They also
show how an opinion can be built in non-neighbor nodes and routes. The
schemes can successfully but slowly identify malicious nodes. Moreover, the
destination must acknowledge (ACK) each packet and intermediate nodes
must set timers. They incur a large overhead by sending a message authen-
tication code (MAC) for each intermediate node on a route to assure packets’
integrity. They identify malicious nodes very slowly. Moreover, the detected
malicious nodes are not penalized and isolated from the network.
De Rango and Marano [39] improve the usage of a well-known secure
AODV routing protocol (SAODV) [141] in terms of reducing the number of
applied signatures and their verification by intermediate nodes in order to
achieve a longer network life. They use a TBM to reduce computational time
at nodes. The higher the trust value in a neighbor node, the lesser is the
frequency of signature verification of messages coming from it and vice-versa.
This leads to a longer network life. Their protocol can be used to secure
AODV that we use in our simulations.
Jiang, Hua, and Liu [67] introduce a scalable and a robust approach to
enforce collaboration in MANETs. Each node observes its neighbors’ activit-
ies directly without the need of recommendations from others. Misbehaving
nodes are penalized within their localities. If a node drops a packet, the ratio
of dropped packets within a time window is computed. If it exceeds some
threshold value, the misbehaving node is isolated by its one-hop neighbors
for a specific time. The approach does not have a generalized mechanism for
the detection of a variety of security attacks and there is no guarantee that
a misbehaving node will be simultaneously penalized by all of its one-hop
neighbors.
All the above mentioned trust models are not suitable for detecting
jellyfish attacks due to the nature of TCP flows that are responsive to
network conditions such as delay and packet loss. A JF node attacks TCP
flows for a short time to force them to enter the slow-start state, during
which only one segment is sent and the RTO is too high. In such cases, the
above mentioned TBMs fail because they would not penalize a node that
drops only one packet every few seconds.
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7.2.3 Attacks against TCP Flows
Zhang et al. [143] investigate the impacts of a set of TCP packet dropping
attack patterns on a TCP session delay and propose a statistic-based approach
applied on the sending node to detect the attack. The authors have also
shown that random packet dropping attacks, which emulate congestion cases,
cause the least damage.
7.3 Jellyfish Attacks
Jellyfish attacks are a set of protocol compliant attacks which target closed-
loop flows such as TCP and TCP Friendly Rate Control (TFRC) that are
responsive to network conditions. They target the end-to-end congestion
control.
In general, jellyfish attacks do not have fixed forms. Such attacks are
protocol compliant and are therefore hard to detect. Three variants of JF
attacks have been defined by Aad et al. [4]. The defined variants of JF
attacks are JF reorder attack, JF periodic dropping, and JF delay variance
attacks. In this work, we only focus on JF attacks that target the whole
network. In the following discussion, the above-mentioned attack variants
are described in detail.
7.3.1 Jellyfish Reorder Attack
Figure 7.2: An example of JF-reorder attack
As depicted in Figure 7.2, a JF-reorder node targets the congestion
control of victim flows by buffering incoming packets of a victim flow and
then randomly choosing a buffered packet and forwarding it to the next hop.
TCP protocols use cumulative sequence numbers to identify each byte
of the payload. This enables the receiver to construct the received data
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in the right order and to drop duplicates. They also use a cumulative
acknowledgment scheme, in which the receiver sends a message ACK −N
to indicate that it has successfully received all segments up to the (N − 1)th
segment. When the receiver receives an out-of-order message, it acknowledges
the last segment that has arrived in order. In case of persistent reordering of
packets by an intermediate node, the receiver will continue acknowledging
the same segment with a high probability depending on the reorder buffer
size and the number of JF-reorder attackers on the path. Persistent packet
reordering will force the victim flow to enter the slow-start phase sooner or
later. Thus, a successful JF-reorder attack causes a victim flow to have a
near-zero goodput.
JF-reorder nodes cannot be easily detected in case of encrypted segments.
To detect reordering attacks, observing nodes need bigger buffer size to store
each packet that the observed node receives and to compare the reception
time of outgoing packets with the reception time of stored packets. But
how long should an observer store the packets and how big should be the
buffer size? What if the observed node drops some packets? For example, an
observed node receives packet p1 and then p2. It drops p1 due to congestion
and forwards p2. How would the observing nodes know if it is a reorder
attack? Moreover, the reordering action does not last until forcing victim
flows to enter the slow-start state. It seems that detection of JF-reorder
attacks is time- and space- consuming if existing TCP protocols are not
modified.
7.3.2 Jellyfish Delay Variance Attack
In JF-delay-variance attacks, an attacker delays each incoming packet for
a certain time (can also be variable) before forwarding it to the next hop
(preserving FIFO order). This makes TCP to wrongly estimate the available
bandwidth because a large number of timeouts would occur for small RTO
values.
Delaying packets is common in MANETs when a node has many neigh-
bors:
 When collisions occur, affected nodes would back off for a longer time
(MAC protocol-dependent such as IEEE 802.11). This leads to high
delay periods.
 If the medium is shared among several nodes, the stored packets will
be delayed longer until they are forwarded.
For these reasons, there is a need to estimate the capacity (bandwidth)
available for the observed nodes in order to know the reason of delayed
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Figure 7.3: An example of JF-delay-variance attack
packets. Detecting JF-delay-variance attacks is beyond the scope of this
work.
7.3.3 Jellyfish Periodic Dropping Attack
A JF-periodic-dropping node targets the congestion control of victim flows
by estimating the RTO of victim flows and periodically (at the scale of the
RTO value) dropping victim flows’ packets for a short time and forwarding
the rest, as depicted in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4: A strategy for JF-periodic-dropping attack
JF-periodic-dropping attacks target the retransmitted packets such as
in the case of retransmission packet dropping attack discussed by Zhang
et al. [143]. Dropping a specific retransmitted packet for K times severely
degrades the TCP’s performance even for small Ks. This is because dropping
a retransmitted packet leads to a timeout occurrence at the sender and the
TCP protocol infers severe network congestion. It therefore enters the slow-
start state, in which the smallest sent (i.e. of smallest sequence number) but
not-yet-acknowledged segment is retransmitted, the RTO value is doubled
until reaching a threshold value (usually 64 seconds), and the TCP connection
is terminated. Unlike the retransmission packet dropping attack, the JF-
periodic-dropping attack works easily in the presence of encrypted segments.
A JF-periodic-dropping attacker does not need to know the sequence number
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of a segment in order to drop it. An attacker only estimates the RTO value
of a TCP flow so that when it drops a segment, it knows when it will be
retransmitted again and drops it with high probability.
JF-periodic-dropping attacks are not easy to detect because of the diffi-
culty in distinguishing malicious packet dropping action from benign packet
dropping action due to congestion which is common in MANETs. Moreover,
JF-periodic-dropping nodes drop a very small fraction of packets even much
lesser than in congestion cases. For instance, a congestion at a node might
last 10 seconds or even longer and all received packets will be dropped while
a JF-periodic-dropping node might, for example, only drop 9% of all received
packets. The studied trust-based systems in subsection 7.2.2 are still not
able to detect JF-periodic-dropping attacks even for UDP flows due to the
low drop rates. In case of TCP flows, a few number of packets are sent
over long periods which makes it very difficult for trust-based systems to
detect JF-periodic-dropping attacks without the help of other tools that, for
example, estimate the available capacity for an observed node.
7.4 Impact of Jellyfish Attacks in MANETs
This section discusses the main features of jellyfish attacks and their impact
on the following three metrics: number of hops for received packets, total
system throughput, and ratio of compromised routes to the total number
of established routes. Moreover, the impact of the system size and the
placement of JF nodes on the effectiveness of the JF attack are explored. We
will make use of the analytical model defined by Aad et al. [4] that relates
system properties such as the probability that a flow encounters a JF node
in its path.
Unless otherwise specified, the results shown in the following subsection
correspond to the baseline defined in the previous work [4], in which 200
nodes move randomly in a 2000m x 2000m topology at a maximum velocity
of 10m/s. 100 of these nodes communicate for 500 seconds to create 50 UDP
flows. The rest of the nodes are pure routers. After a warm up period of 100
seconds, the results are collected. Each node sends a 100 byte packet per
second. For the baseline, JF nodes are statically placed on a grid at equal
distances from each other. The attack conducted in the simulations against
the baseline is the black-hole attack which emulates the effect of successful
JF attacks on TCP flows [4]. JF attacks are conducted against both 5 and
50 TCP flows to emulate different loads. The nodes use the IEEE 802.11
MAC protocol at 1 Mb/s with a node transmission range of 250m. DSR is
used as the routing protocol.
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7.4.1 Average Number of Hops for Received Packets
Jellyfish attacks have the effect of starving multi-hop flows. Therefore,
depending on the number of jellyfish attackers, JF attacks have a network
partitioning effect. The higher is the number of JF nodes, the lower will be
the average number of hops. More and more multi-hop paths are intercepted
by JF nodes and therefore, most of the packets belong to short paths. The
results are similar to the case when nodes send with higher rates [4]. When
only TCP flows are considered, the behavior of the average number of hops
does not have to be monotonically decreasing. This is because TCP protocol
does not try to provide a constant throughput. Instead, it seeks to provide
throughput that is inversely proportional to RTT. TCP protocol also uses a
congestion control mechanism to prevent overloading of the networks. This
means that irrespective of the route length, some flows in the network might
have high sending rates if the relay nodes are not congested, and some flows
might have low sending rates if some relay nodes are congested.
7.4.2 Total System Goodput
There is no firm dependency of total system goodput on the number of JF
nodes in the network. This is because the total system goodput depends
on the network topology and node movement. If an intercepted victim flow
contends or interferes with other flows, more capacity is allocated to other
flows which increases their goodput. Otherwise the total system goodput
decreases.
7.4.3 System Fairness
The Jain’s fairness index [64] is used to measure the impact of JF attacks on
individual flows. It is computed as follows:
FJ =
(
∑m
i=1γi)
2
m ·∑mi=1 γi2 (7.1)
where m is the total number of flows and γi shows the magnitude of
successfully received packets by the source node (ACKed segments) of the
i-th flow during the simulation time. Locally, equal partitioning of bandwidth
achieves an index of 1. If only k out of m flows monopolize the network and
receive equal bandwidth, the index will be k/m.
92 Mitigating Jellyfish Attacks
7.4.4 Ratio of Compromised Routes
We conducted several simulations in network simulator (ns). In our simula-
tions, 50 nodes are randomly located in a 700m x 700m topology. 10, 12, 14,
and 16 different nodes communicate to create 5, 6, 7, and 8 TCP flows. The
number of flows emulates a low- to moderate-congested networks. The nodes
use the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol at 11 Mb/s with a node transmission
range of 250m. AODV is used as the routing protocol. The results are
collected after a warm up period of 20 seconds. We assume that all JF
attackers are wise and force all flows traversing through them to suffer from
near-zero goodput. To achieve this, we make use of JF-periodic-dropping
attacks with a drop rate of 60% after every one second of simulation. The
high drop ratio has similar impact on TCP flows as the optimal JF attacks
especially the JF-periodic-dropping attack because both drop retransmitted
packets and force victim TCP flows to enter the slow-start state and back
off aggressively.
Figure 7.5: Compromised routes w.r.t. percentage of JF nodes
The impact of JF attacks on the established routes is depicted in Fig-
ure 7.5. Victim flows always try to establish routes each time they want to
send a packet and there is no fresh route established with the destination.
The ratio of compromised routes is very high even for a small number of
attackers. With only 5 JF attackers, the ratio of compromised routes is over
40% in all simulations. In severe attacks, when 50% of nodes are malicious,
the ratio of the compromised routes is too high in all simulations (about
90%). This indicates that victim connections do not succeed in establishing
routes free from malicious nodes. After some time, the victim connections
terminate and do not contribute to the ratio of compromised routes any
more.
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7.4.5 Placement of Jellyfish Nodes
The baseline scenario considers grid placement with the JF nodes placed at
equal distances from each other. The authors in the work [4] analyze the
effect of different JF node-placement methods on the effectiveness of the JF
attack and consider two additional methods:
(a) Random static placement in which stationary JF nodes are randomly
placed within the geographical area, and
(b) Mobile JF node placement in which JF nodes have the same mobility
characteristics as all other nodes.
7.4.6 System Size
The scaling of the attack with the percentage of JF nodes remains largely
unaffected for large vs. small scale networks. Yet, the absolute performance
is quite different, as without attack, the performance of a small-scale network
is significantly better than that of a large-scale network. A 1000m x 1000m
system vs. a 2000m x 2000m case of the baseline is considered and the node
density is kept constant with 50 nodes.
7.5 Proposed Detection and Penalization Model
In this section, we present our proposed detection and penalization model.
7.5.1 Notations
There are some notations which have been used to describe our model. Some
of the commonly used notations are formulated in Table 7.1.
7.5.2 Assumptions for the Proposed Model
In our proposed model, a general mobile ad-hoc network is considered. MAC
layer acknowledgments are sent by a destination node to notify the source
that the sent frame has been successfully received. When a MAC ACK is
not received, the source has to resend the unacknowledged frame. Moreover,
nodes are considered to operate in promiscuous mode as well. Additionally,
a secure AODV protocol such as SAODV for authentication and message
integrity is supposed to be working. As we consider intermediate nodes to be
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Table 7.1: Notations used in JAM
Symbol Definition
RREQ Route request packet
RREP Route reply packet
RERR Route error packet
RTO Retransmission timeout
CHP Catalyst helper packets
GPTlow Threshold goodput of a flow
lesser than which CHPs are sent
T 1h Threshold RTO value of a TCP connection
above which CHPs are sent
T 2h An RTO value greater than T
1
h
Tgt Time period in which average goodput
of a flow is observed
Tpd Observing nodes check for JF attacks
after every Tpd seconds
Twchp Duration for which no CHPs are sent
on a route after RREQ message
MIN INV S Minimum Threshold for repeatedly
detected drop intervals
NUM FWD Threshold number of evidences
between specific intervals
Qmax Maximum queues managed by observer nodes
to log packet forwarding actions and reception time
ETH Threshold value of overall evidences
required to be collected
tex The catalyst-helper packets (CHPs) are sent
periodically after tex + δt seconds
attackers, source and destination nodes are assumed to be trusted. Finally,
we do not handle colluding nodes in our proposed solution.
7.5.3 Detecting Jellyfish Attacks
The main difficulty in detecting JF attacks consists of the non-continuous
misbehavior of attackers. That is, an attacker quickly forces all victim
TCP flows to enter the slow-start state so that a few packets will be sent
over long periods. This makes it difficult for observing nodes to distinguish
between malicious behaviors (packet dropping, reordering, and delaying)
and benign behaviors due to network events such as congestion and route
change. Therefore, in our proposed model, the TCP protocol is modified so
7.5 Proposed Detection and Penalization Model 95
that when it faces a very low goodput or high RTO values, it starts sending
packets called catalyst-helper packets (CHPs) in a constant ratio to check if a
congestion is still there or not. This avoids long waiting times if there is no
longer network congestion and allows observing nodes to detect misbehaviors
by attackers and hence those nodes can be isolated.
To identify packets in the network, they are supplied with cumulative
sequence numbers (SEQs) in clear text. That is, when the routing agent
receives a segment from layer 4, the SEQ field of the packet is incremented
by one. Moreover, each new flow is supplied with a unique id number (flow
id). This allows observing nodes to identify packets by 3-tuple values (IP
address, flow id, SEQ) and to reduce the amount of bytes needed to store
information about each observed packet by only storing these 3-tuple values.
Moreover, observing nodes are easily able to detect JF-reorder attacks by
comparing the SEQs of outgoing packets only.
In order to detect JF-periodic-dropping attacks, observing nodes store
the reception time of each packet at observed nodes. A packet that is not
forwarded within a specific period is considered as dropped. Observing nodes
also collect a set of distances between two successive observed drop intervals to
emulate the malicious periodic drop interval. When many forwarded packets
are observed, the set of offsets relative to the set of distances is determined
and the biggest gap is computed. When the found gap contains several drop
intervals within it, a JF-periodic-droppping attack is detected. The accuracy
of detection improves with an increase in the number of forwarded packets
considered.
The next subsections will describe the detection scheme of JF-periodic-
dropping and JF-reorder attacks in detail. The detection of JF-delay attacks
is beyond the scope of this work.
7.5.3.1 Modification of TCP Protocol
TCP congestion control has two main limitations during the slow-start state:
 Nodes back-off exponentially
 Only one segment is sent between two successive retransmission timeouts
(when congestion window cwnd = 1).
For instance, in severe cases it sends one segment and waits for 32
seconds, it then sends another segment and waits for 64 seconds, and then
the connection terminates.
Backing off exponentially and waiting for longer periods is not necessary
in most cases. Moreover, sending a few segments during back off time does
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not bring the whole network down (unless the whole network is congested).
Furthermore, when a relay node in a MANET is congested for a long time, it
is likely that a link-breakage event would occur and a router error message
RERR is sent to the source node. Therefore, there is a need to modify the
TCP protocol to get rid of the above mentioned limitations of the protocol.
Yet, the modification should not be in the core functionality of TCP in order
to make it adaptable to the existing, wide-spread TCP variants.
We denote the last sent segment with the lowest sequence number that
is not yet acknowledged by a catalyst-helper packet (CHP). Sending one
CHP during back off time can avoid long waiting times. When this CHP
is acknowledged, the RTO is reset to the minimal RTO and the congestion
window is doubled. If the congested relay node is freed or another route is
established, then the TCP flow resumes sending of the packets.
As depicted in Figure 7.6, the TCP protocol is modified to send CHPs
periodically with a small variation of every tex + δt seconds in the following
cases:
 As long as the RTO value of a TCP connection is greater than a
threshold value T 1h and there exists an established path to the destina-
tion.
 The average goodput (in Kbps) during the last Tgt seconds (GPTgt) is
too low, that is, less than a threshold value GPTlow.
Moreover, if the RTO value is higher than a threshold value T 2h > T
1
h ,
which means that it is high enough to indicate a severe congestion/attack,
the source node will initiate the route discovery procedure by sending a
route request (RREQ) packet towards the destination node. Additionally,
the sending time T sRQ is stored and no other CHPs on the same route will
be sent for Twchp seconds.
High values of T 1h and Tgt slow down the detection speed of malicious
nodes while small values result in sending unnecessary CHPs which increases
the congestion in the network if there is no attack. If the RTO is too
high, then it is very likely that the route to the destination contains a
congested node. Therefore, the source node will try to establish another
route by initiating the route discovery procedure. The modification can be
incorporated in existing TCP protocols via a patch.
We illustrate the effect of TCP-modification with an example. Consider
an experiment conducted on a three-node chain with one relay node and one
TCP connection. The results are shown in Figure 7.7. In this experiment, the
AODV routing protocol and the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol at 11 Mb/sec
are used. To achieve the null (zero) goodput, the malicious node (relay node)
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Figure 7.6: The modification done on TCP (Flow Diagram). NOW = current
time
drops all received packets for 22.5 milliseconds after every 250 milliseconds
and forwards the rest. The JF-periodic-dropping attack starts from the 10-th
second and the simulation duration is 100 seconds. The values of the modified
TCP parameters are: tex = 1sec, T
1
h = 3sec, Tgt = 5sec, GPTlow = 10Kbps,
and Twchp = 5sec.
When no CHPs are sent, the attacker achieves a successful attack and
brings the goodput of the victim flow to null (red line in the figure). All the
retransmitted segments have been dropped by the attacker and the RTO
timer doubles each time when a retransmission timeout occurs. The second
graph (green line) describes the goodput when only one CHP is sent. At 15
sec, when the RTO is equal to 4, the sender sends a CHP which is successfully
acknowledged. This causes the RTO value to be reset to the minimal RTO
value (0.2 sec) and the congestion window to be doubled. The attack forces
the TCP agent to have small RTO- and congestion window values which
saves longer waiting time and thus results in a goodput of 50 Kbps. This
is equal to 20% of the peak value. This allows nodes to detect attackers by
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Figure 7.7: Impact of sending CHPs on goodput
observing a persistent dropping/reordering patterns. During the simulation,
only one CHP is sent which incurs a very small overhead.
In case of severe JF-periodic-dropping and JF-reorder attacks, the sender
needs to send more CHPs per second to accelerate the detection and isolation
processes and thus establishes a new route free from malicious nodes.
TCP modification on client side is only a means to help network nodes to
detect malicious nodes. For all their neighbors to detect jellyfish attackers,
additional information has to be supplied with each IP packet and with each
link layer acknowledgment to identify the reception time of each packet. The
next subsections discuss the additional information needed for IP packets
and link layer acknowledgments in order to detect JF-periodic-dropping and
JF-reorder attacks.
7.5.3.2 Additional Information for IP Packets
Figure 7.8 describes the structure of the IP header. Segments that are
received by the network layer from the TCP agent are supplied with cu-
mulative 16-bit sequence numbers (SEQs) starting from a random number.
Moreover, each flow is identified with a unique 16-bit number (flow id). A
3-tuple value (IP address, flow id, SEQ) is used to identify IP packets in
the network. The uniqueness is guaranteed because no two nodes exist that
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Figure 7.8: Structure of the IP header
share the same IP. Each new flow gets a unique flow id by the network layer.
Moreover, the flow id and the SEQs are sent in clear text to allow network
nodes to identify the packets. Flow ids and SEQs can be incorporated in IP
packets by exploiting the option field of IP packets.
7.5.3.3 Additional Information for Link Layer Acknowledgments
Link layer acknowledgments (ACKs) are sent by the destination to notify the
source that the sent frame has been successfully received. When a link layer
ACK is not received, the source has to resend the unacknowledged frame.
As the name implies, link layer ACKs are small frames that contain only
link layer information. That is, observing nodes would not be able to detect
when and which packet an observed node has received. Moreover, in some
MAC protocols such as the famous IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol, it is not
possible for observing nodes to know the originator of a link layer ACK due
to the missing ACK-sender address as shown in Figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9: Structure of the IEEE 802.11 MAC acknowledgment
Therefore, link layer ACKs are modified to include the following informa-
tion:
 MAC address of the acknowledging node,
 Source address of the acknowledged packet,
 Flow id of the acknowledged packet, and
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 SEQ field of the acknowledged packet.
After modification, IEEE 802.11 ACKs would look as shown in Figure 7.10.
Figure 7.10: Structure of the modified IEEE 802.11 MAC acknowledgment
Figure 7.11: Example of detecting actions using the new modifications
In this way, each packet’s reception and forwarding can be detected
and identified by all one-hop nodes. We illustrate it here with an example.
As shown in Figure 7.11, nodes A, C, D, and E are located within the
transmission range of node B. When B receives a packet from node A (step
1), B sends a link layer ACK to node A (step 2). Nodes C and E can
identify the packet received by B and store the reception time. In step 3,
node B forwards the packet to node C. Nodes A, D, and E can see the
forwarding action of the same packet. If node B is a JF attacker, it will be
detected and isolated simultaneously by all of its one-hop neighbors. When
B tries to establish a new route through it by forwarding route request/reply
(RREQ/RREP) packets, one-hop neighbors will refuse to process them by
dropping them.
One advantage of the new IP and MAC ACK formats is the reduction of
the amount of buffer space needed by observing nodes to store information
about observed packets. Observing nodes in traditional trust based systems
[20, 110, 39, 150, 149, 67, 135] store each observed received packet for t
seconds. If the observed node does not forward the packet within t seconds,
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then the packet is considered dropped. For example, if 500 packets of size
500 bytes are observed within t = 2sec, the maximal amount of buffer space
needed is then 250 Kbytes, whereas the amount of buffer space needed in our
scheme is very small. For example, an observing node needs to store the IP,
flow id, and the first seen SEQ of a flow only once and then stores the SEQ
offsets of observed packets relative to the first seen SEQ. However, a question
arises that how would node E identify that node B has received a packet if
the packet identification- and the MAC sender-fields are unknown? Another
problem arises if nodes collect second-hand-information (recommendations)
about each other: How to detect spurious recommendations?
7.5.3.4 Detecting Jellyfish Periodic Dropping Attack
The difficulty in detecting JF-periodic-dropping attacks is in differentiating
between malicious dropping and dropping due to network events such as
congestion. We see this problem from another aspect. If packets are dropped
in periodic intervals, then no packets are forwarded in these intervals and
all packet forwarding actions occur in other periodic intervals as shown in
Figure 7.12.
Figure 7.12: A JF-periodic-dropping attack
The detection scheme exploits two features:
(a) Packet reception time is independent of the receiver, that is, a node
cannot control when to receive packets.
(b) Packet forwarding actions occur periodically in constant intervals.
The first feature is routing protocol dependent. When a small number of
packet retransmission-attempts fail, a link-breakage error occurs and a RERR
packet is sent towards source nodes, which is not desired by JF attackers.
The second feature is used to distinguish between malicious packet dropping
and packet dropping due to network events. When the number of observed
forwarded packets is high enough, the reception time of these packets is
distributed over the examined periodic interval with high probability and
there will be no periodic gaps, which are free from forwarding actions.
Observing nodes periodically check for JF attacks after every Tpd seconds,
e.g. each 1 second. They have to log observed actions in terms of packet
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dropping/forwarding. They then compute a set of candidate periodic intervals
as shown in Figure 7.12. A JF-periodic-dropping attack is detected if there
is a gap in all intervals in which no packet has been forwarded and in which
several pure drop intervals are located. We now describe the detection scheme
in detail.
Logging Actions of Neighbors Each node in the network keeps track
of its neighbors’ actions on information packets. Recall that packets are
identified by a 3-tuple value (IP address, flow id, SEQ). We define the possible
actions that can be performed on a packet with a specific SEQ number as
follows:
 NOT SEEN: Packet has not been observed by an observing node
(default value).
 RECEIVED: Observed node has received the packet, but has not yet
forwarded it and the observer has started a RECEIVE TIMEOUT
timer.
 DROPPED: Packet received by an observed node and no forwarding
action has been observed by the observer till the RECEIVE TIMEOUT
expires.
 FORWARDED: Observed node has forwarded the packet within RE-
CEIVE TIMEOUT seconds.
Figure 7.13: An example of logging of actions
Logging neighbors’ actions is illustrated in an example in Figure 7.13.
Consider that A→ B means sent from node A to B, B → C means sent from
node B to C, and so on. Let all nodes be relay nodes and direct neighbors
of each other. Furthermore, we denote the action performed by node o on
packet p and seen by node n by actno (p). Consider only the updating of node
B′s actions by nodes D, E, F , and G. Moreover, assume that:
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 node D has seen action 2.
 node E has only seen action 3.
 node F has only seen action 4.
 node G has only seen action 5.
 When node D observes action 2, it sets actDB(p) =RECEIVED and
after RECEIVE TIMEOUT seconds it sets actDB (p) =DROPPED.
 When node E observes action 3, it sets actEB(p) =FORWARDED.
 When node F observes action 4, it sets actFB(p) =FORWARDED.
 When node G observes action 5, it sets actGB(p) =FORWARDED.
Formally, when an observing node detects an ACK of packet p sent by
the observed node o, it stores the reception time, sets actno (p) =RECEIVED,
and starts a timer which expires in RECEIVE TIMEOUT seconds. When
the timer expires and the action value is still RECEIVED, node n sets
actno (p) =DROPPED. Remember that node o is not the destination of the
flow. Furthermore, node n sets actnx(p) =FORWARDED for each relay node
x located before node o in the route from the source to the destination
(distinguished by the time to live (TTL) value), because the action would
not be observed at o if x has not forwarded it. This is optional if the
TTL values are not trusted. When n detects that o forwards packet p, it
sets actn(o,x)(p) =FORWARDED for nodes n and x (optional for x). The
transition system in Figure 7.14 illustrates the updating process of actno (p).
That is, after RECEIVE TIMEOUT seconds only two actions are available:
either DROPPED or FORWARDED.
Figure 7.14: Transition system depicting actno (p) update
As mentioned earlier, we only concentrate on JF attacks that target the
whole network. Therefore, each observing node n manages a queue Qno for
all flows that traverse an observed neighbor o. Queue Qno contains the logged
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actions together with the reception time of each logged packet (monotonically
increasing) that has been observed until RECEIVE TIMEOUT expires.
Moreover, Qno has a maximum size of Qmax, which plays an important role
in the speed of detecting malicious nodes and it will be discussed in the next
subsections. An entry of the queue Qno consists of the following tuple:
Reception time of packet p action ∈ {DROP,FORWARD}
Collecting Candidate Periodic Intervals (DISTANCES) Conges-
tions and thus packet dropping actions are inevitable in MANETs. Therefore,
JF-periodic-dropping attackers might also drop packets during the forwarding
phase due to congestion. This makes it harder for observing nodes to detect
constant periodic intervals that consist of pure packet forwarding and pure
packet dropping subintervals as shown in Figure 7.12.
We transform the queue Qno into a list of intervals denoted by ltr that
consists of alternating pure drop- and forward-intervals. That is, each two
successive equal actions belong to the same interval. Both of the successive
equal actions are either in drop or in forward intervals. Each interval x has
the following parameters:
 x.stime : start time of interval x,
 x.etime : end time of interval x,
 x.middle : middle time of interval x.
The set of candidate periodic intervals (DISTANCES) is then collected.
For each drop interval x in ltr and for each drop interval y in ltr which is
close to x, that is
|y.stime− x.stime| < Tinv, (7.2)
where Tinv is a threshold value that expresses the distance between the
intervals x and y, the differences between the start-, middle- and the end
times of x and y are inserted into DISTANCES.
The flow chart in Figure 7.15 illustrates how the set DISTANCES is
formed. For small values of Tinv (Tinv is smaller than the periodic drop
interval length), it is very likely that the JF-periodic-dropping attack is not
detected, while high values of Tinv may lead to unnecessary computational
overhead.
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Detection Mechanism The detection mechanism is based on collecting
FORWARDED actions, denoted by evidences. The more evidences are
collected, the more accurate will be the detection of JF-periodic-dropping
attacks. The detection mechanism is run for each distance in DISTANCES.
Figure 7.15: Setting value of DISTANCES
When the number of evidences is greater than a threshold value ETH ,
the following steps are carried out:
(a) The time axis starting from the oldest action in Qno till the most recent
action in Qno is divided into intervals of length distance ( Figure 7.16 a).
(b) A new empty interval of length distance is created, denoted by INV .
(c) The offset of each evidence relative to the start time of its interval is
computed ( Figure 7.16 b).
(d) Each computed offset is then added to INV ( Figure 7.16 c).
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Figure 7.16: Detection mechanism of JF-periodic-dropping attacks
(e) The maximum gap g1 between two successive evidences in INV is
determined.
(f) Let g2 be the difference between distance+the lowest offset in INV and
the highest offset in INV . The maximum gap g is then equal to the
maximum between g1 and g2.
(g) Let num be the number of drop intervals in ltr that are smaller than the
gap g and are really located inside the found gap (offsets compared). If
num is greater than a threshold value MIN NUM , then a JF-periodic-
dropping attack is detected.
The higher is the ETH , the more accurate will be the detection scheme. If
the observed node o is benign, then the evidences in INV will be distributed
throughout the whole interval and the maximum gap g will be very small
so that it will not contain any drop intervals. If node o is malicious, the
value of g will be high enough to include several pure drop intervals within
it. Empirical results show that when ETH > 300 · distance, there will be
no false positives. This means that there will be no benign nodes that are
detected as JF-periodic-dropping attackers. Lower values might consider one
or two benign nodes as attackers.
Qmax, the maximum size of Q
n
o , plays an important role in the detection
speed of JF-periodic-dropping attackers. High values of Qmax achieve more
accuracy in the detection mechanism. On the other hand, the detection
speed gets slower because the queue Qno would contain old actions that have
been observed before the attack has started. These actions will be considered
in the detection algorithm and will therefore result in smaller values of gap
g and num. Hence, the probability to detect the attacks gets lower.
Accelerating the Detection Mechanism In order to accelerate the
detection scheme, the stale information that has been collected before the
beginning of the attack should not be considered. The idea of the detection is
to divide the time axis. Drop intervals in ltr are considered starting from the
most recent one i.e. x. It is then checked if x repeats in multiples of distance
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seconds. This means that it is examined whether the offsets of the repeated
drop intervals intersect with the offsets of x relative to the interval(s) in
which they are located. This is shown in Figure 7.16. A JF-periodic-dropping
attack is found if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) The number of the detected repeating drop intervals is greater than a
threshold value MIN INV S.
(b) The number of evidences between x and the last detected drop interval
is greater than a threshold value NUM FWD.
(c) There is no offset of considered evidences that is located within the
offsets of x.
The higher the threshold value NUM FWD is, the more similar this
approach to the previous one will be. Empirical results show that when
MIN INV S ≥ 7 and NUM FWD > 150 · distance, no false positives are
detected. Lower values might consider one or two benign nodes as attackers.
7.5.4 Detecting Jellyfish Reorder Attack
Including flow ids and cumulative SEQ numbers in IP packets makes the
detection of JF-reorder attacks very easy. This is because observing nodes
can detect persistent reordering of packets by comparing the SEQ numbers of
outgoing packets (of the same flow). If an observed node sends packets with
SEQ number lower than the maximum sent one, a misbehavior is detected.
If misbehaviors continue for at least Treorder seconds, a JF-reorder attack is
detected. If a victim flow suffers from a very low goodput, it starts sending
CHPs and the attacker continues reordering packets and thus the attack will
be detected by one-hop neighbors.
Packet reordering events in MANETs are rare, short-lived, and occur
due to network events such as route changes [4]. The threshold time Treorder
should be longer than the duration of packet reordering due to these network
events.
7.5.5 Penalization Mechanism
When a malicious node is detected, it should be penalized and isolated from
the network. This can have several forms depending on the nature and the
requirements of MANETs such as:
(a) Centralized trusted authority (CTA) revokes the certificates of malicious
nodes.
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(b) Malicious nodes are prevented from being part of established routes
(of others) by dropping all control and data packets that have been
forwarded by them.
(c) In addition to case b, malicious nodes are prevented from sending and
receiving data by dropping all control and data packets originated by
them.
If there is a CTA in the network, the detecting nodes notify the CTA
about the detected node. When the CTA receives several notifications about
a malicious node, it can revoke its certificate or penalize it in other ways such
as in cases b and c. In case b, neighbors of malicious nodes will not forward
control packets such as RREQ/RREP that have been forwarded (and not
originated) by malicious nodes, in order to prevent them from being part
of new routes and thus preventing JF attacks. They also refuse to receive
data packets that have been forwarded by malicious nodes by not sending a
MAC acknowledgment. In this case, an RERR packet is sent by malicious
nodes to inform others about the assumed link breakage. In this way, benign
nodes that refused to receive data packets from malicious nodes are not
classified as attackers or selfish nodes by their one-hop neighbors. Even when
case b holds, malicious nodes can still communicate with other nodes in the
network. In case c, control and data packets originated by malicious nodes
are also dropped to prevent them from communicating with other nodes in
the network.
We believe that the existence of a CTA is neither practical nor feasible
in MANETs. The actual aim of MANETs is to establish improvised net-
works, which have no pre-planned infrastructure and are created on-the-fly.
Therefore, we chose to isolate malicious nodes.
It is hard to evaluate the efficiency of the chosen penalization scheme
in MANETs because it depends on the topology of the network, movement
of nodes, and placement of attackers. If the network is dense and there
exist many redundant paths to destinations, the average hop number might
increase and the system fairness would not decrease remarkably. On the
other hand, if there are not enough redundant paths, the network might
get partitioned and therefore the affected connections would terminate and
thus the system fairness would decrease remarkably. The average number
of hops might increase or decrease depending on the affected connections
and the new established routes. The ratio of compromised routes will stay
small relative to the case when the detection mechanism is not applied. The
reason is that when a malicious node is isolated by its neighbors, it will be
less probable for it to be included in new routes.
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7.5.6 Overhead of the Detection Mechanism
The detection scheme incurs extra overhead to enable the detection and
isolation of malicious nodes. The overhead is computed as follows:
(a) Four bytes of information that represents the flow id and the SEQ fields
is added to each IP data packet.
(b) At least 8 bytes of information is added in each link layer acknowledgment
depending on the used MAC protocol. For example, the size of an ACK
in the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol is equal to 14 bytes. The modified
ACK contains additional 14 bytes: 8 bytes of information about each
IP packet and 6 bytes of information about the MAC address of the
transmitter i.e. twofold overhead incurred with each ACK.
Our scheme incurs an adequate overhead by sending CHPs when it faces
a high RTO value or a very low goodput. We also investigate the average
number of sent CHPs per second per flow. Simulations in section 8.5 show
that this overhead is small. For example, when 5 CHPs per second are used,
then the overhead is between 1.5 and 2.2 CHP/(sec · flow).
7.5.7 Limitations of the Detection Mechanism
In best cases, JF-periodic-dropping attackers will be detected and isolated
by their one-hop neighbors simultaneously. In reality, there exist two reasons
that prevent the simultaneous detection by all neighbors:
 Collisions in wireless networks.
 The delay incurred by queuing the packets in the data link layer until
they are transmitted and the retransmission mechanism of the MAC
protocol.
7.5.7.1 Collisions in Wireless Networks
The absence of a central entity that coordinates the medium access among
all contending nodes leads to a common collision occurrence in MANETs.
Some nodes would be able to observe activities of others while other nodes
that suffer from collisions would not be able to log others’ activities. This
leads to an inconsistency in the logged information. Two main strategies can
be used to mitigate collisions in MANETs:
 Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance for Wireless (MACAW)
110 Mitigating Jellyfish Attacks
 Decreasing the carrier sense threshold (CST) in the physical layer.
7.5.7.2 Limitation due to Delay in Data Link Layer
Figure 7.17: Limitation of JAM
The second limitation (in detecting JF-periodic-dropping attacks) is that
when a packet is received, it is scheduled in the interface queue of the data
link layer until it is processed and forwarded to the MAC module. The
MAC layer waits for a free medium and sends the corresponding frame and
then waits for the corresponding MAC ACK from the receiver. If no ACK
arrives within a specific time, the sender backs off and then resends the
unacknowledged frame. If no ACK is received after a limited number of
failed retransmission tries, the frame is dropped and the network layer is
informed.
The total delay of packets in data link layer allows JF-periodic-dropping
attackers to transmit packets during the dropping phase. This makes the
detection of misbehaviors more difficult for high delay values which are rare.
This is because backing off period is in terms of micro-seconds while the
dropping period’s duration is in terms of milli-seconds. This is illustrated in
Figure 7.17. When a packet is transmitted in the middle of only one periodic
drop interval (the purple line in Figure 7.17), the gap length g is reduced to
the half, which decreases the chance to find pure drop intervals within g. If
a packet is transmitted at the edges of a periodic drop interval (the rose line
in Figure 7.17), which is more likely than the former case (purple line), the
gap length g is still big enough to include pure drop intervals within it.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, a set of protocol compliant attacks called jellyfish (JF)
attacks and their impact in MANETs have been studied. A detection
and penalization scheme has been introduced which increases the system’s
performance remarkably while incurring a low overhead.
Future work includes the development of a new security scheme to detect
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and isolate colluding nodes, to enable source nodes to detect jellyfish nodes,
and to exclude them from being part of new routes. The new fields that have
been added to each IP packet and to each link layer acknowledgment allow
the detection of other attacks such as black-hole attacks. Moreover, JAM
can be integrated into trust-based-systems [20, 110, 39, 150, 149, 67, 135] to
get mutual benefits.

Chapter 8
Performance Analysis
“In theory, one can build
provably secure systems. In
theory, theory can be applied to
practice but in practice, it can’t.”
- M. Dacier, Eurecom Institute
(Born 1965)
In the previous chapters, we presented various schemes to handle different
security issues and attacks in WMNs and MANETs. NETCLAW provides
lightweight security and identification privacy in clustered WMN. This scheme
is based on neighborhood trust, offers lightweight security using hash chains,
and does not require any trusted authority. Another mechanism called
MALMA is a generalized trust based security solution in both wireless
mesh and ad hoc networks. Moreover, this mechanism can be applicable
to any topology (not restricted to clustered topology) and accommodates
the seamless security of mobile nodes (usually clients) in wireless networks.
Consequently, it provides a seamless secure connection establishment between
source and destination nodes having multi-hop relay nodes between them.
ASSA presents a requirement- and resource- friendly security framework
established on Merkle trees for mobile wireless networks and puts forward
an adaptive security service-level association mechanism to provide fast
authentication and tunable security association for nodes in mobile wireless
networks. Finally, PiCAT and JAM mitigate several DoS vulnerabilities
related to channel assignment and jellyfish attacks.
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of these proposed schemes.
Various performance metrics are used to prove the efficiency of our pro-
posed schemes. We show the performance of each scheme separately and
sequentially.
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Figure 8.1: Overhead of initial bootstrapping messages
8.1 Assessing NETCLAW’s Performance
In this section, some measurements depicting the performance of our proposed
security model are presented. To estimate the performance, the overhead
produced by initial handshake is calculated. Only those fields in the MAC
frame that contain important security parameters are considered. In the
initial handshake, there are two types of messages. One is the periodic
broadcast message (BRCST) containing the public key of a member node
and the other three messages are collectively called as bootstrap exchange
messages (BSTs). The acronyms used for the used messages are shown
in Table 8.1. The overhead (in terms of bytes) produced by these two types
of messages is shown in Figure 8.1. It is obvious from the figure that for
BRCST at least 128 extra bytes (public key) and for BSTs 200 extra bytes
per message are required.
Table 8.1: Acronyms used for exchanged messages
Acronym Meaning
BRCST Broadcast message
BST Bootstrap exchange message
BSTREQ Bootstrap request message
BSTREP Bootstrap reply message
BSTACK Bootstrap acknowledgment message
CM Clustering message
CBK Clustering broadcast-key message
NT Neighborhood trust message
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Figure 8.2: Overhead ratio of security messages
In addition, the overhead ratio is estimated for the extra bytes that
are required per frame payload size for a message. We consider a variable
payload size for the frames. Overhead ratios of different types of messages
with varying payload sizes are shown in Figure 8.2. In this figure, BSTREQ
is the bootstrap request, BSTREP is the bootstrap reply, and BSTACK is
the bootstrap acknowledgment message. Additionally, CM represents the
clustering messages, CBK the clustering broadcast key message, and NT
the neighborhood trust messages. The ratio has been calculated using the
following equation:
Overhead Ratio =
no.of extra bytes(includingHMAC)
payload size
(8.1)
It is shown in Figure 8.2 that for each type of messages, as the frame size
increases, the overhead ratio decreases. The reason is that the overhead
of each type of message is fixed. To estimate the delay for cryptographic
computation, assume that each encryption and decryption of a certain
message of size δs together takes time δt approximately. Since the source
node only encrypts the message and the sink or destination only decrypts it,
these two nodes together will take time δt for cryptographic computation.
If there are n intermediate nodes in the path from source to destination
and in the worst case each intermediate node will perform encryption and
decryption (for example not in CH to CH communication), the time taken
for this computation at all intermediate nodes together will be n ∗ δt. Now
considering that we have variable message sizes, then for each message of
size S (where S >> δs) the cryptographic computation time Tcc for sending
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a message from source to destination is given by the following equation:
Tcc = (S/δs) ∗ (δt+ n ∗ δt) (8.2)
8.2 Evaluating MALMA
In the following subsections, we evaluate the performance of our model
according to computation time, delay, and overhead which influence the
performance of the network.
8.2.1 Computational Delay
At the beginning, almost all phases of our model only use hash chains and a
symmetric key during its processing in order to decrease the computation
time as compared to public key usage. The public key is used only once for
each of the initial bootstrapping and connection establishment phases. This
results in lesser delay and higher efficiency during the communication.
For secure data transmission, the source and destination nodes use a
shared connection key and the decryption of data should be done only
at the destination node, not by the intermediate nodes in the path. For
packet verification, the intermediate nodes (∀i ∈ Pathsd) just encrypt and
decrypt the H(CKsd) from the whole packet which on average means 20
bytes. To estimate the delay for cryptographic computation, assume that
each encryption and decryption of a certain message of size 20 bytes together
takes time λ µs approximately. In our scheme, the size of H(CKsd) is 20
bytes which takes λ µsec for one time encryption/decryption at one of the
intermediate nodes. In this way, the time taken for this computation at all
intermediate nodes together will be τc = No. of intermediate nodes × λ µsec.
The general computation time for node-to-node encryption/decryption by
other security schemes is given by:
τi =
Packet Size in bytes
20 bytes
× λ µsec (8.3)
τc =
∑
∀i∈Pathsd
τi (8.4)
τ =
∑
∀c∈Network
τc (8.5)
Our proposed model is compared with Rajendran’s model [113]. This
model, to the best of our best knowledge, is one of the most efficient solutions.
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(a) Computational delay (b) Re-authentication delay
Figure 8.3: Performance of MALMA
Let us assume that the average number of intermediate nodes is h = 5
nodes per connection c in the network. In this case, our scheme requires
τc = 5λ µsec, and if there are 10 connections, it requires τ = 50λ µsec.
However, Rajendran’s model requires the encryption and decryption of the
whole data packet. For example, if the packet payload size is 512 bytes,
the estimated average time based on previous equations (Equation 8.3-
Equation 8.5), is τ = 1250λ µsec approximately. For both models, the
estimated average computational time required for encryption and decryption
of packets at intermediate nodes is illustrated in Figure 8.3(a). As evident
from the figure, our model requires very low computation time as compared
to Rajendran’s model.
8.2.2 Overhead
Our proposed model produces low overhead especially in data transmis-
sion. We have only considered those fields in the packet which contain
some important security parameters. The additional overhead (in terms
of bytes produced by intermediate nodes for packet forwarding) is only 40
bytes (20bytes LHjnm + 20bytes LKnm < H(CKsd) >), and only 20 bytes
of LKnm < H(CKsd) > when compared to Rajendran model [113]. In
neighborhood based trust phase, every node monitors the behavior of its
neighbors in terms of packet drops and misdirection (refer to section 4.6).
Since this information about the neighbors is only exchanged on demand but
not periodically, so the overhead is low.
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8.2.3 Mobility
One of the important issues in wireless networks is the mobility of the
nodes. Our proposed method provides seamless and robust connectivity
when a mobile client moves its location of attachment in the network from
one place to the other. Let σ µsec is the time taken to re-authenticate a
mobile node and γ µsec to re-establish a connection. The overall time taken
to re-authenticate and re-establish connections for r mobile nodes and c
connections per node is given by the following equations:
T ire−auth = r × σ µsec (8.6)
T ire−conn = c× γ µsec (8.7)
T =
∑
∀i∈Network
T ire−auth + T
i
re−conn (8.8)
For comparing our scheme to other schemes (e.g. Rajendran’s model [113]),
let us assume that the average number of clients that access a mesh router
(i = 1) is 10 clients per mesh router where 5 clients are mobile (r = 5) and
each mobile has 2 connections (c = 2). In this case, Rajendran’s model
requires T 1re−auth = 5σ µsec, and T
1
re−conn = 2γ µsec. So the total taken
time is T = 5σ + 2γ µsec. Figure 8.3(b) illustrates the estimated average
required time for re-authentication of mobile nodes in both models. As shown
in the figure, our model requires very low authentication time compared to
Rajendran’s model.
8.3 Performance Evaluation of ASSA
We discuss the performance analysis of ASSA scheme in a few steps. Firstly,
the performance of hash algorithms is compared with other cryptographic
algorithms. Secondly, we discuss the cost (in time and space) of constructing
a Merkle tree by calculating the cost of computing hashes from leaves up
to the root of the tree and storing them. Finally, we discourse the cost of
generating, signing, relaying and verifying ASSA messages in our proposed
approach.
8.3.1 Comparison of Cryptographic Signature Schemes
In this subsection, we provide the comparison of hashing schemes with other
cryptographic signature schemes. For this purpose, we used the implement-
ation of these schemes present in the well-known library of cryptographic
algorithms called Crypto++. Version 5.6.0 of this library has been utilized
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to obtain the results. Each algorithm is run 50000 times on two different
machines have unlike CPU power, available memory, and energy resources
and finally the averages are taken to get the estimated values. The perform-
ance is compared between a 2.53 Ghz IBM Thinkpad Intel Core 2 Duo CPU
running MS Visual C++ 6.0 2008 under Windows XP (named as M1) and
an 1.66 Ghz IBM Thinkpad Intel Centrino Duo CPU running GCC compiler
under Ubuntu’s version 10.04 using kernel 2.6.32-21 (named as M2). A block
size (tokens) of 1024 bytes with random values are considered to compute
hash values for the leaves of the tree. Other bigger block sizes can also be
constructed by grouping data packets together which are to be sent. The
comparison of execution time is shown in Table 8.2. These execution times
are approximations to show the efficiency of the algorithms and do not reflect
the exact computational time as other factors such read/write events and
scheduling are also included in these approximations. It is obvious from the
average execution times mentioned in Table 8.2 that signatures using hashing
schemes are much faster to compute than other signature schemes.
Table 8.2: Average speed approximations
Algorithms/Operation Avg. Execution Speed (in msecs)
M1 M2
SHA-1 0.01 0.01
SHA-256 0.02 0.01
SHA-512 0.03 0.02
RSA 1024 signing 2.47 3.00
RSA 1024 verification 0.23 0.13
RSA 2048 signing 7.54 14.49
RSA 2048 verification 0.35 0.31
DSA 1024 signing 0.59 1.13
DSA 1024 verification 0.63 1.32
8.3.2 Construction and Traversal of a Merkle Tree
To construct a Merkle tree a node has to perform a number of hash compu-
tations. Let SIBx be the value of the sibling of the node x at height i on
the path from the leaf to the root. Suppose that all the leaves have height 0,
the direct parents of these leaves have height 1 and the root has height H.
Hence, this tree has N = 2H leaves and 2H − 1 interior nodes. Note that for
a Merkle tree, the number of leaves should always be a power of 2. In order
to build a tree, a signer node has calculate the hash values from the leaves
to the root. This means to build a complete tree of height H, the number
of hash computations required are 2H+1 − 1. The authentication data or
path of a leaf consists of one node at each height and these nodes are the
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siblings of the nodes on the path connecting the leaf to the root. Merkle tree
traversal problem discusses the efficient techniques to compute and output
the authentication path for successive leaves in a MHT. The solution of
storing every node value in memory requires very large space. Additionally,
the approach of computing the authentication nodes on their respective
rounds will be very expensive for some nodes [130]. The task of Merkle tree
traversal techniques is to economize both space and computational time by
keeping the cost of such expensive nodes as low as possible. By the virtue of
utilizing efficient traversal techniques and the benefit of not requiring any
number theoretic assumptions for cryptographic constructions, Merkle trees
have become an appealing choice.
In order to efficiently solve the MHT traversal problem several techniques
have been proposed [36, 65, 80, 66, 98, 131, 130, 27, 17]. These techniques
also include the simple traversal technique proposed by Merkle [93]. Broadly,
two different approaches are used to compute the authentication paths.
Merkle uses the method to compute each authentication node separately.
Similar idea is acquired by Szydlo [130] in which he implements an improved
scheduling of the node calculations and attains the optimal trade-off of O(H)
time and O(H) space. Szydlo proposes another algorithm [131] with better
constants. This algorithm computes H nodes for each authentication and
needs storage capacity of 3H − 2 nodes. Second approach is to use fractal
Merkle tree traversal [66]. In this method, the Merkle tree is split into smaller
sub-trees and a stacked series of these sub-trees are stored which contain
authentication paths of various succeeding leaves. A trade-off between time
and space for tree traversal is maintained by varying the height h of the
sub-trees. To save more space than time a solution with h = logH needs
O(H/logH) time and O(H2/logH) space. An improved constants version
of this algorithm and prove of the optimality of the fractal time-memory
trade-off is presented by Berman et al. [18].
Let us first discuss the average costs of classic Merkle tree traversal. As
every node in the tree becomes a part of an authentication path, measuring
the total cost of calculating the value of each node exactly once has worth.
At height h, there are 2H−h right (or left) nodes. Each node costs 2H+1 − 1
operations when computed independently. Rounding it up makes 2H+1 = 2N
operations which means 2 operations per round. If we add the costs for each
height h(0 ≤ h < H) together and average of 2H = 2log(N) operations per
round are required.
In order to compute the MHT, we now discuss two of the most efficient
and well-known techniques for tree traversal. These are the techniques that
are proposed by Szydlo [131] and Buchmann et al. [27]. Szydlo presents an
algorithm that needs log2(N) one-way hash functions per round (i.e. time)
and a maximum storage of 3log2(N) while another algorithm proposed by
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him requires 2log2(N) time for leaf calculations. Buchmann et al. [27] present
an improved algorithm by balancing the number of leaves computer in each
step. This algorithm in the worst case requires to compute H/2 leaves and
3/2(H − 3) + 1) inner nodes. However, in average case, it needs (H − 1)/2
leaves and (H − 3)/2 inner nodes respectively.
Now we show the comparison of Szydlo’s algorithm [131] with the al-
gorithm proposed by Buchmann et al. [27] in Figure 8.4. The number of
leaves, inner nodes, and computation of hash function evaluations per step
are compared for the worst and average cases discussed above. This com-
parison is done by Buchmann et al. [27] after experimentation. The values
in parenthesis show the results based on the theoretical evaluation. The
Merkle tree construction rule implies that one hash function evaluation is
the cost for the computation of an inner node. However, in terms of hash
function evaluation, the cost of one leaf depends on the one-time signature
scheme used. In the comparison, a cost of 100 hash functions (suggested by
Buchmann et al. [27]) are used for computing a single leaf.
It is shown in the table that most of the hash calculations in a MHT are
done for leaf calculations. Buchmann’s algorithm reduces the total number
of hash computations drastically for trees of different heights and specially
for smaller values of H. It is recommended to construct MHTs of height up
to H = 20 because the key generation becomes too inefficient for H > 20
in practical [25]. In terms of storage capacity, Szydlo’s algorithm needs
to store 10,28,40,58 nodes while Buchmann’s algorithm needs 10,31,45,66
nodes for H = 4,10,14,and 20 respectively. This means that Buchmann’s
algorithm needs a slightly more storage as compared to Szydlo’s algorithm.
However, Szydlo’s algorithm requires extra implementing effort and overhead
when used on platforms without dynamic memory allocation. The worst
case runtime of Buchmann’s algorithm is very close to Szydlo’s average case
runtime which shows the balanced timing nature of Buchmann’s algorithm.
Any of these algorithms can be used based on the available resources and
suitability. Additionally, fractal MHT traversal techniques [17] can also be
used.
8.3.3 Computational Costs and Memory Requirements of
ASSA Messages
In this subsection, we evaluate the cost of constructing ASSA messages used
in our proposed approach. We assume that change of resources and services
are not very frequent, so adaptive association is also not very frequent. Since
the computational cost of a Merkle tree is already shown in the previous
step ( subsection 8.3.2), it is not included in the message construction cost.
We discuss the computational cost cc of message-contents that a node has to
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Szydlo's Algorithm Buchmann's Algorithm
Height of the tree H leaves inner nodes hashes leaves inner nodes hashes
Worst case
4 4 0 400 2 (2) 1 (2.5) 201
10 7 4 704 5 (5) 8 (11.5) 508
14 10 4 1000 7 (7) 14 (17.5) 714
20 12 8 1208 10 (10) 24 (26.5) 1024
Average case
4 1.5 0.6 150.6 1.2 (1.5) 0.6 (0.5) 120.6
10 4.5 3.5 453.5 4.0 (4.5) 3.0 (3.5) 403.0
14 6.5 5.5 655.5 6.0 (6.5) 5.0 (5.5) 605.0
20 9.5 8.5 958.5 9.0 (9.5) 8.0 (8.5) 908.0
Figure 8.4: Comparison of Szydlo’s and Buchmann’s algorithms (worst and
average cases runtime) [27]
generate. Let Noncecc is the cost of computing a single nonce of size Sn and
xcc is the cost of a single hash key of size Sh in the Merkle tree. The ASSA
security services mentioned in chapter 5 would also have some computational
cost specially to compute the service package price (billing). Let this cost be
Servciescc. Similarly, there are other notations and costs as well. These are
shown in the Table 8.3.
Table 8.3: Costs and notations associated with ASSA messages
Symbol Meaning
Noncecc Computing a single nonce of size Sn
xcc Computing a single hash key value of size Sh
SKcc Computing a symmetric key of size Ssk
ESKcc Encrypting a message of size m with a symmetric key SK
EPKcc Encrypting a message of size m with a public key PK
DSKcc Decrypting a message of size m with a symmetric key SK
DRKcc Decrypting a message of size m with a private key RK
Apathcc Computing an authentication path in Merkle tree
Servicescc Computing service parameters
Sh Size of hash value in bytes
Sid Size of node ID in bytes
Sn Size of nonce in bytes
Ssk Size of symmetric key in bytes
Spm Size of parameter values
n number of times
Using the information shown in Table 8.3, we calculate the cost of
messages exchanged in our proposed model. All the messages that we have
used in our proposed approach need computations at three locations of
nodes. These locations are source, relay, and destination locations. The
computations required by each type of message are shown by the following
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equations.
Authentication Messages at source = EPKcc +Noncecc +ESKcc + n ∗ xcc
Authentication Messages at relay = Noncecc + ESKcc + n ∗ xcc
Authentication Messages at destination = DRKcc + n ∗ xcc
ASSA Offercc at source = ESKcc +Noncecc + n ∗ xcc + Servicescc
ASSA Offercc at destination = DSKcc + n ∗ xcc
ASSA Replycc at source = ESKcc +Noncecc + n ∗ xcc
ASSA Replycc at destination = DSKcc + n ∗ xcc
ASSA ACKcc at source = ESKcc +Noncecc + n ∗ xcc
ASSA ACKcc at destination = DSKcc + n ∗ xcc
We neglect the cost of choosing service parameters by the receiver of
ASSA offer message as it only requires to set some bits in the message.
Based on the security algorithms and techniques used, each message can
have varying computational costs.
In terms of memory, the requirement for each type of message again
depends on the cryptographic algorithms used. The memory requirements
of each message discussed above are shown in the following equations.
Authentication Messages = Sn + Sid + Ssk + n ∗ Sh
ASSA Offercc = Sn + Sid + n ∗ Sh + Spm
ASSA Replycc = Sn + Sid + n ∗ Sh + Spm
ASSA ACKcc = Sn + Sid + n ∗ Sh + 1
It is obvious from the equations above that different lengths of nonce,
node ID, hash values and optional service parameters would result in different
lengths or sizes of messages.
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(a) No attacks
C tunes its interface to
a different channel “1”
F tries to switch to an 
overloaded channel “1”
(b) CA under attacks
Figure 8.5: An example of CA attacks
8.4 Analyzing PiCAT’s Performance
Now we show some results of evaluating the performance of our scheme
called PiCAT. We have performed simulations using the ns-2[1] simulator
with both small and large network topologies.
8.4.1 Small Network Topology
For simplicity and clarifying the issues of CA attacks, we simulate a small
network topology as illustrated in Figure 8.5. In this figure, there are 8
nodes (mesh routers) A,B, . . . ,H and each router has three WNICs. In this
example, there are 3 available channels and the initial assignment is shown
in Figure 8.5(a). The physical and MAC layers of ns-2 are set up to simulate
IEEE 802.11b with a maximum bit rate of 11Mbps.
To generate traffic loads, we use constant bit-rate sources, with a packet
size of 1000 bytes. In this simulation, we have five flows B → D, H → D,
B → F , A→ D, and E → H. These flows generate a traffic load of 2Mbps,
1Mbps, 1Mbps, 1Mbps, and 2Mbps respectively. We run the simulation for
this topology with and without CA security for a duration of 300 seconds. In
the scenario without security, we assume routers C and F are attacker nodes.
After 100 seconds, router C launches a CA attack by tuning its interface from
channel 3 to a different channel (e.g., ‘1’) on the link lBC without informing
its neighbor (i.e., router B) about this change. This will eventually result in
an increased packet loss rate on router B because it still uses channel 3 and
a disconnectivity occurs on the link lBC (see Figure 8.6(a)). After that, at
time 200 seconds, router F launches a CA attack by trying to switch from
channel 2 to an overloaded channel (e.g., ‘1’) on the link lEF . Therefore, node
F sends wrong information to neighbor E about the load on the currently
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Figure 8.6: Securing CA performance in a small topology
used channel 2 and requests to switch to a different (lightly loaded) channel
‘1’. As a result of using this wrong information, they will actually use an
overloaded channel which leads to an increase in the interference. Moreover,
the packet loss increases on the link lEF (see Figure 8.6(a)) and the other
links on the same channel in the interference range.
Using this scenario, we compare the aggregate throughput with and
without CA security mechanism. The average aggregate throughput of all
flows in the network is plotted as shown in Figure 8.6(b). It is shown in the
graph that after attacks are launched at t = 100s and t = 200s, the aggregate
throughput in CA without security mechanism decreases. The effectiveness
of securing CA against these attacks is also shown in the figure. At t = 100s,
node C suddenly decides to switch to a different channel ‘1’ without any
coordination with node B. The possible solution of this case is to stop the
forwarding or packets to router C and change to another possible route, e.g.,
E → F → D. Then, node B puts a negative mark (or point) for neighbor
C in its history table. According to this table, B has the experience about
the neighbors’ behaviors and prevents any type of such attacks in the future.
At t = 200s, it is shown in the figure that the aggregate throughput is not
affected by CA security. This is because node E is aware of the channel
usage based on the exchanged information with trusted neighbors and does
not respond to the requester node F to switch to an overloaded channel ‘1’.
As a result of securing CA, the network achieves higher aggregate throughput
and improved channel utilization.
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Figure 8.7: Securing CA performance in a large topology
8.4.2 Large Network Topology
In this section, we evaluate the proposed approach for securing CA in a
large-scale evaluation. We distribute 50 routers randomly in a terrain of
1000m× 1000m. With grid topology, the inter-router spacing is 75 meters.
Each router is equipped with 3 WNICs of 802.11a with a maximum bit rate of
24 Mbps. There are 12 available channels and 4 routers are randomly selected
as gateways. The communication range is 250m. The CCA algorithm [87]
is used as an initial static CA in this simulation. The routes are computed
manually using the shortest path as metric. To generate traffic loads, we
use constant bit-rate sources, with a packet size of 1000 byte. There are 25
flows (10 internal and 15 Internet), each flow generates traffic load with a
rate of 1 Mbps. For internal flow (within mesh), both non-gateway nodes are
randomly selected to be the source and destination nodes, whereas for the
Internet flow, one of the gateway nodes is selected as a source or destination.
This simulation is run for a duration of 600 seconds. In this simulation, we
have generated high traffic load and 3 nodes are randomly selected to behave
as attacker nodes, in order to measure the performance of secure CA in the
worst case. These attacker nodes try to influence the network performance
by different types of attacks discussed in section 6.4 during the simulation
time. Our proposed security scheme tries to detect and prevent these attacks
based on adjustable neighborhood trust as discussed in subsection 6.5.2. The
result of this simulation is shown in Figure 8.7. Note that, this result can
be repeated using different scenarios. Here we are mentioning only one of
these scenarios as the results vary based on the attacker model. This means
that different attacker models produce different results. The throughput
improvement of securing CA compared to CA without security is shown in
Figure 8.7(a). As an average, secured CA performs better than CA without
security. CA with security improves the aggregate throughput because the
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mesh router detects the increased interference and/or CA attacks. Therefore
it re-assigns its channels to less-used links (less-loaded links) and finds a
suitable route with the trusted next-hop neighbor. This is also reflected
by the increase in the average packet delivery with secured CA as shown
in Figure 8.7(b). This figure depicts that secured CA has higher packet
delivery than CA without security but cannot reach the result of packet
delivery in case of no attacks in the network. This is because when a node
detects a malicious neighboring-node (next-hop), it tries to improve the
aggregate throughput by selecting a different path through another trusted
neighbor which may have longer delay.
Our secure CA scheme has some limitations as well. If clients or node’s
neighbors move at high speed, the proposed approach cannot detect the
false assignment attack especially in the case of overloaded channels. This is
because our approach is based on local information from the node’s neighbors
about the channel usage. In addition, if the deployed DCA for the node’s
neighbors changes frequently and quickly, then the proposed approach does
not work well. Therefore, it is better to use the channels for longer time
period (e.g., one hour) otherwise it can also influence the routing protocols.
While our proposed approach cannot reach the optimal trusted network of
CA with no attacks as shown in Figure 8.7(a), it is very close in performance
to the trusted network with no attacks and performs much better than CA
without security. Regarding the overhead, we use just few extra bytes for
the encryption of the control CA messages which is acceptable.
8.5 Performance Analysis of Jellyfish Attack
Mitigator
In this section we put forward the performance analysis of our proposed
model JAM which is used to detect and mitigate Jellyfish attacks. At first
we describe the metrics used for evaluation and the simulation setup. Later
on, we analyze the simulation results.
8.5.1 Metrics
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme JAM, we consider the
following metrics:
 Detection speed: It determines the ratio of the detection time of the
last detected attacker to the attack time.
 Ratio of detected attackers.
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 Ratio of compromised routes: This metric characterizes whether mali-
cious nodes have been correctly isolated.
 System fairness: To measure fairness, we use Jain’s fairness index as
described in section 7.3.
 Average number of hops for received packets: It characterizes network
partitioning in which multi-hop communication becomes impossible.
 Total system goodput in Mbytes.
 Overhead of sending CHPs: It denotes the average number of sent
CHPs per second per flow.
The total system goodput depends on the topology and node movement
and therefore provides no relevant information to be considered in our analysis
if it is analyzed separately. But it gives an overview on the behavior of the
network if it is combined with other metrics.
8.5.2 Notations
To make it easier for the reader to comprehend the simulation results, we
again provide the list of notations used to describe our proposed model
in Table 8.4.
8.5.3 Simulation Setup
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed detection scheme, we simulated
it in network simulator (NS) [1] using the AODV routing protocol and the
IEEE MAC 802.11 protocol at 11 Mb/s. The simulation parameters are
listed in Table 8.5. Moreover, the simulation code is written in C++. Each
simulation is run 10 times in total on 3 different machines and an average
is taken and confidence intervals are shown. As the CHP sent mechanism
is tuned by random seeds, the confidence intervals are only possible in case
of CHP mechanism enabled. In case of pure AODV and disabled CHP
mechanism (no CHP sending), the simulations for same topology always has
exactly the same results.
Fifty (50) nodes are randomly distributed in a 700x700 m2 area. Simula-
tions with different number of JF-periodic-dropping attackers and different
number of CHPs per second have been conducted. Results are obtained after
a warm up period of 20 sec. In overload cases, received packets are discarded
directly. To emulate a successful JF-periodic-dropping attack, the malicious
nodes drop all incoming packets for 60% of every second. A high drop ratio
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Table 8.4: Notations used to analyze JAM’s performance
Symbol Definition
RREQ Route request packet
RREP Route reply packet
RERR Route error packet
RTO Retransmission timeout
CHP Catalyst helper packets
GPTlow Threshold goodput of a flow
lesser than which CHPs are sent
T 1h Threshold RTO value of a TCP connection
above which CHPs are sent
T 2h An RTO value greater than T
1
h
Tgt Time period in which average goodput
of a flow is observed
Tpd Observing nodes check for JF attacks
after every Tpd seconds
Twchp Duration for which no CHPs are sent
on a route after RREQ message
MIN INV S Minimum Threshold for repeatedly
detected drop intervals
NUM FWD Threshold number of evidences
between specific intervals
Qmax Maximum number of queues managed by observer nodes
to log packet forwarding actions and reception time
ETH Threshold value of overall evidences
required to be collected
tex The catalyst-helper packets (CHPs) are sent
periodically after tex + δt seconds
has a similar impact on TCP flows as the optimal JF attacks have on the
flows because both dropped and retransmitted packets force victim TCP
flows to enter the slow-start state and to back off aggressively.
8.5.4 Results and Analysis
In this subsection, we show the results of our simulations and do the analysis
simultaneously. Firstly, we explain the results of simulation for static topology
and then analyze the topology having mobile nodes.
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Table 8.5: Simulation parameters
Simulator NS Source FTP
Protocol AODV MAC protocol IEEE 802.11
Link capacity 11 Mb/sec Simulation time 600 secs
Simulation area 700 x 700 m2 No. of nodes 50 randomly placed
Transmission
range 250 m Traffic TCP New Reno
Payload size 100 bytes CHPs/sec 0, 5, 10 pkts/sec
Warm up period 20 secs Tpd 1 sec
Figure 8.8: Ratio of detected attackers
8.5.4.1 Ratio and Speed of Detection
The ratio of detected attackers is shown in Figure 8.8 and the detection speed
of malicious nodes is depicted in Figure 8.9. The advantage of introducing
the CHP mechanism is presented in both the figures. When no CHPs
are sent, the detection ratio of attackers stays very low irrespective of the
number of the attackers in the network. This is because victim flows back
off aggressively and do not send packets for a long time. This makes the
detection of misbehaviors by observing nodes difficult and requires very long
Figure 8.9: Detection speed
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time to collect the minimal number of evidences.
The higher the number of sent CHPs per second, the faster the detection
of attackers would be, because observing nodes would collect the minimal
number of evidences faster. This can be seen obviously when the percentage
of attackers is 10%, 30%, and 40%. In these cases, the same number of
attackers is detected when 5 and 10 CHPs per second are used, but attackers
are detected faster for a higher number of CHPs. For example, when 40%
of the nodes are attackers, 85% of them have been successfully detected
when 5 and 10 CHPs are used within 50% and 100% of the attack time
respectively. Similarly, when 20% of the nodes are attackers, 90% of them
have been successfully detected within 80% of the attack time using 10 CHPs
per second while 60% have been detected within 90% of the attack time using
5 CHPs per second. This explains the difference in the ratio of detected
attackers when 20% of the nodes are attackers.
The detection ratio of malicious nodes is very low when the CHP mech-
anism is disabled. They are detected when they start the attack and there
exist flows with high congestion window through them or when a flow with
a high congestion window establishes a route through malicious nodes. This
is because forcing a TCP flow with high congestion windows to enter the
slow-start state takes some time, during which a large number of packets are
sent especially when several TCP flows traverse the malicious nodes. Recall
that a TCP flow is bi-directional and the established routes are symmetric in
many routing protocols such as DSR and AODV. This allows observing nodes
to collect more evidences in a short time and thus increases the probability
of detecting the malicious nodes.
8.5.4.2 Ratio of Compromised Routes
Figure 8.10: Impact of JAM on established routes
The ability of the detection and isolation scheme to establish clean routes
in comparison to the pure AODV protocol is shown in Figure 8.10. In AODV,
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most of the established routes suffer greatly from the attack even when
having one attacker within the route and thus have a near-zero goodput.
For example, when the number of attackers is 5, more than 40% of the
established routes are compromised. 70% of the routes are compromised
when 40% of the nodes are attackers. On the other hand, the JAM scheme
succeeds in detecting and circumventing malicious nodes and establishes
routes free from the malicious nodes even when the CHP mechanism is
disabled. When no CHPs are used, the JAM scheme succeeds in reducing
the ratio of compromised routes remarkably. This is due to the small number
(percentage) of detected attackers by observers. For instance, when only 10%
on the nodes are attackers, the rate of the compromised routes falls from
40% to less than a quarter and from 70% to almost half when 40% of the
nodes are attackers. This indicates a remarkable improvement over AODV
protocol.
The higher the number of CHPs sent per second, the faster would the
malicious nodes be detected, circumvented, and excluded from next routes.
Thus, the ratio of compromised routes decreases. When there are 5 attackers,
only 4% of the established routes are compromised by using 5 CHPs per
seconds and even 2.7% by using 10 CHPs per second. This means an
improvement of 90% and 94% respectively, when compared to AODV. The
improvement remains high even for a higher number of attackers. For
instance, when there are 20 attackers, the ratio of the compromised routes is
14% for both cases when 5 and 10 CHPs per seconds are used which means
an improvement of 75% compared to AODV.
8.5.4.3 System Fairness
Figure 8.11: Impact of JAM on system fairness
The impact of the detection and isolation schemes on the system fairness
is depicted in Figure 8.11. JAM succeeds in keeping the system fairness
moderate even under severe attacks when 40% of the nodes are malicious.
This means that the system successfully detects and circumvents malicious
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nodes and allows affected connections to establish routes free from attackers.
For instance, when there are 20 attackers, the system fairness is approximately
0.66 when 10 CHPs per second are used (84% of the peak value in AODV)
while it is approximately 0.52 in AODV (65% of the peak value) which means
an improvement of 28%.
When there are no attackers in the network and CHPs are not used, the
system fairness using JAM is lower than while using AODV. This is due to the
overhead incurred by including information about each packet in link layer
acknowledgments and including the SEQ field in each IP packet. Sending a
small number of CHPs per second (e.g. 5 CHP/s) may increase the system
fairness but if this number is too high (e.g. 10 CHP/s), the system fairness
starts decreasing due to the increase in contention, interference among nodes,
and the high number of resent CHPs.
One can observe how a small number of attackers affects the system
fairness remarkably using AODV. It falls to almost half of the peak value (in
the case of no attack), from approximately 0.79 to approximately 0.47 which
means that some connections monopolize the network and that the network
might be already partitioned. When the number of attackers and the rate of
compromised routes are too high, the system fairness would converge to k/m
in best cases, where k is the number of non-compromised flows and m is the
number of total flows in the network. On the other hand, JAM keeps higher
fairness values than in AODV when the network is under attack even with a
high number of attackers. For example, if 40% of the nodes are attackers and
no CHPs are sent, the system fairness is about 16% higher than in AODV.
The improvement in the system fairness in JAM depends on two factors:
 Number of sent CHPs per second and
 Number of attackers in the network.
This can be seen in Figure 8.11. Consider the cases when there are at
most 5 attackers. JAM provides the highest system fairness when 5 CHPs
per second are used. In other cases where there are at least 10 attackers,
JAM provides the highest system fairness using 10 CHPs per second. If there
is a CA in the network that collects information about the entire network
and knows the total number of detected attackers, it can control the rate
on which nodes should send CHPs. For instance, if the CA detects that less
than 10% of the nodes are malicious, it instructs nodes to send 5 CHPs per
second in order to achieve higher system fairness, otherwise it instructs them
to send 10 CHPs per second to keep the system fairness high.
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8.5.4.4 Average Number of Hops
Figure 8.12: Impact of JAM on average number of hops
Jellyfish attacks have the effect of starving multi-hop flows. Therefore,
depending on the number of jellyfish attackers, JF attacks have a network
partitioning effect. This can be seen in Figure 8.12 when AODV protocol
is used. As the number of JF attackers increases, the average number of
hops stays lower than in the case when no attackers exist. This means that
several long-range flows face near-zero goodput and thus do not increase the
average number of hops. The behavior of the average number of hops must
not be monotonically decreasing. This is because TCP protocol does not try
to provide a constant throughput. Instead, it seeks to provide throughput
that is inversely proportional to RTT. TCP protocol also considers not to
overload the network by using the congestion control mechanism. This means
that irrespective of the route length, some flows in the network might have
high sending rates if the relay nodes are not congested and some flows might
have low sending rates if some relay nodes are congested.
On the other hand, JAM allows long range communications even for a
high number of attackers as long as redundant routes exist. This is because
detecting attackers would increase the chance to establish new routes free
of malicious nodes and would decrease the chance to establish routes of the
same length. For instance, when 40% of the nodes are attackers and 10
CHPs per seconds are used, the average number of hops is above 2.3, while
in AODV it is about 2.1 which is very close to the minimum (shortest route
consists of two hops). This means, that long range communication is still
alive even after severe attacks.
8.5.4.5 System Goodput
It can be observed in Figure 8.13 that there is no firm dependency of total
system goodput on the number of JF nodes in the network. This is because
the total system goodput depends on the topology and node movement. If an
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Figure 8.13: Impact of JAM on system goodput
intercepted victim flow contends or interferes with other flows, more capacity
can be allocated to those flows which increases their goodput. This is seen in
the figure when up to 30% of the nodes are attackers. Otherwise, the total
system goodput would decrease when 40% of the nodes are malicious.
The JAM model successfully keeps the changes in the system goodput
small compared to the changes in AODV. This indicates that the level of
contention or interference does not change remarkably. For instance, when
10 CHPs per second are used, the system goodput stays stable irrespective of
the number of attackers in the network. The changes in the system goodput
are still very small relative to the changes in AODV. When 30% of nodes
are attackers, the system goodput in AODV jumps from approximately 14.5
Mbytes to approximately 19 Mbytes which is a 31% increase. It only jumps
from approximately 12 Mbytes to approximately 12.7 Mbytes which is only a
5% increase when 10 CHPs per second are used. In other words, the networks
stay more stable when the JAM approach is applied and when the redundant
routes exist between source and destination nodes.
8.5.5 Overhead of the Proposed Model
Figure 8.14: Overhead of the JAM scheme
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The overhead of sending CHPs in JAM in terms of the average number
of CHPs per second per flow is shown in Figure 8.14. The results show
that when 5 CHPs per second are used, the overhead is between 1.5 and 2.2
CHP/(sec · flow) and is almost doubled when the number of used CHPs
per second is doubled. This is a small overhead compared to the number
of packets sent in TCP. For instance, when the goodput of a flow is 10
Kbytes/sec, the number of packets sent per second is 100 (payload size of
100 byte). When 10 CHPs per second are used, the overhead is about 4%.
In Figure 8.15, the overhead of sending CHPs are compared to different
values of T 1h and GPTlow. The threshold values GPTlow, T
1
h , and T
2
h control
the overhead of sending CHPs. CHPs are sent as long as the RTO value
is between the threshold values T 1h and T
2
h or the average goodput over
the last Tgt seconds is below GPTlow. When the RTO value is higher than
T 2h , TCP would stop sending CHPs and would initiate a route discovery
procedure in order to establish a route with the destination. When a new
route is established, the TCP agent waits for Twchp seconds before resuming
the procedure of sending CHPs. For higher values of T 1h , it is more likely
that only the value of GPTlow controls the sending of CHPs as the current
goodput is inversely proportional to the value of RTO. This explains the
monotonic behavior of the overhead in Figure 8.15 with respect to GPTlow
for high values of T 1h , i.e. when T
1
h = 7sec.
Figure 8.15: Overhead of the JAM scheme
For lower values of T 1h , the decision of sending CHPs depends on both
parameters. Therefore, no monotonic behavior is observed. A good combin-
ation of the pair (T 1h , GPTlow) would decrease the overhead on one hand,
and may increase the system fairness on the other hand. For instance, the
choice (7sec, 1Kbps) incurs a very low overhead while keeping a high system
fairness when 30% of the nodes are malicious.
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8.5.6 Mobility and the Proposed Model
We consider a scenario in which 50 nodes move randomly (random waypoint
model) in a 700 x 700 m topology, at a maximum velocity of 20 m/s, pausing
for 100 secs on average. The metrics that are of great interest in case of
mobility are the system fairness and the average number of hops. The other
parameter such as ratio of compromised routes is of no interest here as the
routes dynamically change with the high mobility of nodes. We compare the
effect of mobility of AODV under attack with and without our implemented
scheme. Mobility increases the number of route breaks which in turn increases
the probability of including attackers in new routes. Moreover, the set of
attackers’ neighbors changes with time. This results in the detection of an
increased number of attackers by a higher number of observing nodes as
compared to static scenarios.
The system fairness of our mobile topology is shown in Figure 8.16. It is
clear from the figure that as the number of attackers increase, the system
fairness in the case of AODV decreases. In case of 10% attacker nodes, it is
0.85 while in case of 50% attackers it falls to 0.75. This is due to the decrease
in the number of multi-hop routes as the number of attackers are increased.
Figure 8.16: Impact of JAM on system fairness (mobile topology)
The average number of hops for received (acknowledged) packets is shown
in Figure 8.17. In case of AODV, the average number of hops decrease as the
percentage of attackers increase. When 10% of the nodes in the network are
attackers, the average number of hops is 1.15 which decreases to 1.1 in case of
50% attackers. This shows that most of the flows consist of only source and
destination nodes without having any relay nodes. On the other hand, when
our proposed mechanism is used and 5 CHPs per second are sent, the average
fluctuates in between 1.6 to 1.8. This shows that attackers are circumvented
and attack-free routes are established. Similarly, when 10 CHPs per second
are sent, the average increases from 1.17 to 1.19. These values also depict an
interesting fact. When the percentage of attackers is less, sending 5 CHPs
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per second have better results while for higher percentage of attackers, 10
CHPs per second excels the other in performance.
Figure 8.17: Impact of JAM on average number of hops (mobile topology)
As evident from Figure 8.17, the high number of attackers has successfully
prevented long range communications. This can be seen by the decreasing
average number of hops in case of AODV. The single-hop flows do not
counter an attack due to the absence of relay nodes. Due to severe attack
on multi-hop flows, most of the network capacity is given to one-hop flows
which monopolize the network for themselves.
The JAM scheme has successfully protected against JF attacks and
has increased the system fairness remarkably. Moreover, JAM allows the
existence of routes which are longer than the routes in the attacked AODV.
However, it may slightly decrease the system goodput due to the contention
and interference among nodes.
JAM can also achieve better results than AODV even when no attack
exists. This is due to the CHP mechanism of JAM that saves unnecessary
long waiting times after a temporal congestion.In general, the improvement
of JAM depends on the topology, node movement, and attackers placement.
Moreover, collision occurrence may also affect the results as it can prevent
nodes from receiving RREQ and RREP packets which might cause longer
routes to be established.
Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
“I am turned into a sort of
machine for observing facts and
grinding out conclusions.”
- Charles Darwin (1809-1882)
This chapter summarizes the results that we have achieved from the
work presented in this dissertation and propose new research questions and
dimensions.
9.1 Conclusive Summary
This thesis work proposes solutions for the issue of security vulnerabilities
in wireless mesh networks in three dimensions. Firstly, two lightweight
authentication and protection mechanisms NETCLAW and MALMA are
proposed. NETCLAW is a protected neighborhood-based trust mechanism
using hash chains in clustered wireless mesh networks. It is secure and identi-
fication privacy friendly and does not require a trusted authority. Moreover,
it provides hop-by-hop authentication with adequate privacy of nodes and
is computationally efficient. Although, this mechanism is specifically de-
signed for WMNs, it can be used for other wireless networks. MALMA is
another lightweight, mobility- and anonymity- friendly model for securing
wireless ad hoc and mesh networks. This model provides a communication
between source and destination nodes by establishing a secure connection
with low overhead and computational delay. The intermediate nodes (for
this connection) do not require encryption or decryption of data but only the
hashed connection element which makes the solution extremely lightweight.
Additionally, it also provides secure and seamless mobility of nodes without
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requiring re-authentication and new connection establishment. Secondly, we
presented a novel approach called ASSA to provide fast authentication and
tunable security using service level association. Our solution allows nodes
and users in wireless mesh networks with varying security requirements and
available resources to adjust the security service level according to their
abilities and needs. Finally, we proposed two mechanism called PiCAT
and JAM to mitigate DoS attacks such as channel assignment attacks and
jellyfish attacks in wireless mesh networks. PiCAT is a secure dynamic
channel assignment architecture for mesh networks. The proposed solution
is lightweight and mitigates the various channel assignment attacks in these
networks such as false assignment, link disconnectivity, and misinformation
of channels. JAM is a detection and mitigation scheme for jellyfish attacks in
mobile ad hoc and mesh networks which increases the system’s performance
remarkably while incurring a low overhead. These attacks are a set of pro-
tocol compliant attacks which target closed-loop flows such as TCP. These
attacks include jellyfish periodic dropping and jellyfish reorder attacks which
are extenuated by nodes observing the data exchange in promiscuous mode
and using catalyst-helper packets called CHPs in our proposed approach.
9.2 Future Directions
It is very obvious that only a single thesis work is not enough for handling all
the security issues and vulnerabilities relevant to WMNs. Various research
aspects can still be explored that are not covered in our thesis work. This area
is relatively new and requires massive amount of further research. We mention
here, some of the ideas that can be considered as future work. NETCLAW
requires further analysis in terms of delay and efficiency to step-up its
performance. As a succeeding work, focusing on the seamless authentication
of mobile nodes in MALMA that belong to different domains or networks is
an important aspect. Moreover in ASSA and PiCAT, we require to analyze
the performance of our proposed frameworks by implementing them on test-
beds and enhance them for mobile ad hoc networks. Futuristic study of JAM
includes the development of a secure scheme to detect and isolate colluding
nodes, to enable source nodes to detect jellyfish nodes, and to exclude
malicious nodes from being part of new routes. The new fields that have
been added to each IP packet and to each link layer acknowledgment allow
the detection of other attacks such as black hole attacks. Moreover, JAM
can be integrated into trust-based-systems [20, 110, 39, 150, 149, 67, 135] to
get mutual benefits.
Chapter 10

List of Abbreviations and
Acronyms
ACK Acknowledgment
AODV Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector
AP Access Point
ASSA Adaptive Security Service-level Association
BRCST Broadcast Message
BSTACK Bootstrap Acknowledgment
BSTREP Bootstrap Reply Message
BSTREQ Bootstrap Request Message
CA Channel Assignment
CBK Cluster-head Broadcast Key Message
CBR Constant Bit Rate
CCA Cluster Channel Assignment
CH Cluster Head
CHP Catalyst Helper Packet
CM Clustering Message
CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DoS Denial of Service
DS Digital Signature
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DSR Dynamic State Routing
DTA Distributed and Dynamic Trusted Authority
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
GW Gateway
ICK Inter Cluster-head Key
ISA Identity-based Security Architecture
JAM JellyFish Attack Mitigator
JF JellyFish
LAN Local Area Network
LK Link Key
MAC Medium Access Control
MALMA Mobility, Anonymity and Lightweight Security in Mesh and
Ad hoc Networks
MAN Metropolitan Area Network
MANET Mobile Ad hoc Networks
MR-MC WMN Multi-radio and Multi-channel Wireless Mesh Networks
NETCLAW NEighborhood Trust in CLustered Wireless Mesh Networks
NIC Network Interface Card
NT Neighborhood Trust Messages
NTM Neighborhood Trust Mechanism
PiCAT Palliating Channel Assignment Attacks
PK Public Key
PKG Private Key Generator
PW Password
REALISM Rendering Anonymity and Lightweight Security with Mobil-
ity in Wireless Ad hoc and Mesh Networks
RREQ/RREP Route Request / Route Reply
SAODV Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol
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TA Trusted Authority
TFRC TCP Friendly Rate Control
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
WLAN Wireless Local Area Networks
WMAN Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks
WMN Wireless Mesh Networks
WSN Wireless Sensor Networks
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